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1Abstract
Switching costs and network e￿ects bind customers to vendors if prod-
ucts are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices.
Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable
or unpredictable) changes in e￿ciency, and gives vendors lucrative ex post
market power|over the same buyer in the case of switching costs (or brand
loyalty), or over others with network e￿ects.
Firms compete ex ante for this ex post power, using penetration pric-
ing, introductory o￿ers, and price wars. Such \competition for the market"
or \life-cycle competition" can adequately replace ordinary compatible com-
petition, and can even be ￿ercer than compatible competition by weaken-
ing di￿erentiation. More often, however, incompatible competition not only
involves direct e￿ciency losses but also softens competition and magni￿es
incumbency advantages. With network e￿ects, established ￿rms have little
incentive to o￿er better deals when buyers’ and complementors’ expectations
hinge on non-e￿ciency factors (especially history such as past market shares),
and although competition between incompatible networks is initially unsta-
ble and sensitive to competitive o￿ers and random events, it later \tips"
to monopoly, after which entry is hard, often even too hard given incom-
patibility. And while switching costs can encourage small-scale entry, they
discourage sellers from raiding one another’s existing customers, and so also
discourage more aggressive entry.
Because of these competitive e￿ects, even ine￿cient incompatible com-
petition is often more pro￿table than compatible competition, especially for
dominant ￿rms with installed-base or expectational advantages. Thus ￿rms
probably seek incompatibility too often. We therefore favor thoughtfully
pro-compatibility public policy.
c ￿ Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer
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The economics of switching costs and network e￿ects have received a great
deal of popular, as well as professional, attention in the last two decades.
They are central to the \new economy" information technology industries.
But these new topics are closely linked to traditional concepts of contract
incompleteness, complementarity, and economies of scale and scope.
Both switching costs and proprietary network e￿ects arise when con-
sumers value forms of compatibility that require otherwise separate purchases
to be made from the same ￿rm. Switching costs arise if a consumer wants a
group, or especially a series, of his own purchases to be compatible with one
another: this creates economies of scope among his purchases from a single
￿rm. Network e￿ects arise when a user wants compatibility with other users
so that he can interact or trade with them, or use the same complements;
this creates economies of scope between di￿erent users’ purchases.
These economies of scope make a buyer’s best action depend on other,
complementary transactions. When those transactions are in the future,
or made simultaneously by others, his expectations about them are crucial.
When they are in the past, they are history that matters to him. History
also matters to a ￿rm because established market share is a valuable asset:
in the case of switching costs, it represents a stock of individually locked-in
buyers, while in the case of network e￿ects an installed base directly lets
the ￿rm o￿er more network bene￿ts and may also boost expectations about
future sales.
Vying for valuable share, ￿rms may compete hard for early adoptions,
notably with penetration pricing but perhaps also in less e￿cient ways. Early
sales induce lucrative follow-on sales, which we often call locked-in, although
lock-in is seldom absolute. Both switching costs and proprietary network
e￿ects thus shift the locus of competition from smaller to larger units of sales,
as economies of scope, tying, and bundling do.
When switching costs are high, buyers and sellers actually trade streams
of products or services, but their contracts often cover only the present.
Similarly, network e￿ects push large groups of users toward doing the same
thing as one another, but contracts usually cover only a bilateral transaction
between a seller and one user. If users choose sequentially, early choices
constrain later buyers and create \collective switching costs"; if users choose
simultaneously, they face a coordination problem. Clever contracts can solve
these problems, but ordinary contracts generally do not.
Because ￿rms compete to capture buyers, those problems are more subtle
than the mere fact that buyers are locked in ex post. For example, in the
simplest switching-cost models, initial sales contracts do not specify future
prices, yet competition for the stream of purchases is e￿cient. Similarly, in
some simple network models, users e￿ciently coordinate and network e￿ects
cause no trouble. As such models illustrate, conventional competition \in the
market" can be replaced by well-functioning competition \for the market"|
6for a buyer’s lifecycle requirements in the case of switching costs, or for the
business of many buyers when there are network e￿ects. Early adoptions
are often pivotal and competition focuses on them; later, locked-in buyers
pay more and create ex post rents; but ex ante competition passes those
rents through to the pivotal buyers. This can be e￿cient, though it raises
distributional issues unless (as in simple switching cost markets) locked-in
buyers were themselves previously pivotal.
But these simplest models are misleading: things do not usually work so
well. Despite ex ante competition for the market, incompatibilities often
reduce e￿ciency and harm consumers in a number of ways:
Direct costs are incurred if consumers actually switch or actually adopt
incompatible products.1 Consumers may avoid those costs by not switch-
ing, or by buying from the same ￿rm, but that ties together transactions and
thus often obstructs e￿cient buyer-seller matching. Variety may be more
sustainable if niche products don’t force users to sacri￿ce network e￿ects
or incur switching costs by being incompatible with mainstream products.
Entrants lack installed bases and consumers’ expectations may naturally fo-
cus on established ￿rms, so entry with network e￿ects, and large-scale entry
with switching costs, are hard. These entry hurdles may be broadly e￿-
cient given incompatibility, but they nevertheless represent a social cost of
incompatibility.
Ex ante competition often fails to compete away ex post rents: switching
costs typically raise oligopoly pro￿ts and proprietary network e￿ects often
do, especially if expectations fail to track relative surplus. And even when
ex ante competition dissipates ex post rents, it may do so in unproduc-
tive ways such as through socially ine￿cient marketing; at best it induces
\bargain-then-ripo￿" pricing (low to attract business, high to extract sur-
plus) that normally distorts buyers’ quantity choices, gives consumers wrong
signals about whether to switch, and (in the case of network e￿ects) provides
arti￿cial incentives to be or appear pivotal.
Thus while incompatibility does not necessarily damage competition, it
often does.
1.1 Switching Costs
A product has classic switching costs if a buyer will purchase it repeatedly
and will ￿nd it costly to switch from one seller to another. Switching costs
also arise if a buyer will purchase follow-on products such as service and
repair, and will ￿nd it costly to switch from the supplier of the original
product.
Large switching costs lock in a buyer once he makes an initial purchase,
so he is e￿ectively buying a series of goods, just as (more generally) with
strong enough relationship-speci￿c economies of scope, sellers compete on
1Firms may also dissipate resources creating and defending incompatibility.
7bundles of goods rather than single goods. Sometimes sellers o￿er complete
(\life-cycle") contracts that specify all prices. But often contracts do not
specify all the future prices, so that a long-term relationship is governed by
short-term contracts. This pattern creates ex post monopoly, for which ￿rms
compete ex ante.2
Some of the same issues arise if contracts are incomplete for other reasons.
For instance, shops often advertise some, but not all, of their prices: the
consumer learns others only once he is in the shop and will ￿nd it costly to
go elsewhere. Just as with dynamic switching costs, this tends to produce
ripo￿s on un-advertised (small print) prices and corresponding bargains on
advertised (loss leader) prices.
The same consumer-speci￿c economies of scope are present in \shopping-
cost" markets where consumers face costs of using di￿erent suppliers for
di￿erent goods in a single period and with all prices advertised, but neither
time nor commitment problems arise. Such shopping costs encourage ￿rms
to o￿er a full (perhaps too broad) product line { and so help explain multi-
product ￿rms { but can lead ￿rms to o￿er similar products to each other
so that there may be too little variety in the market as a whole. We argue
below that the shopping-cost framework is the best way to understand the
\mix and match" literature.
Switching costs shift competition away from what we normally think of
as the default (a single consumer’s needs in a single period) to something
broader|a single consumer’s needs over time. Even when that long-term
relationship is governed by short-term contracts, this shift need not cause
competitive problems: competing on ￿rst-period terms can be an adequate
proxy for competition with complete contracts. Likewise, the theory of bilat-
eral contracts with hold-up shows that when parties cannot readily contract
on future variables and there are switching costs, it can be e￿cient to accept
that hold-up will occur and to compensate the prospective victim up front.
But this only works if the parties can e￿ciently transfer rents across periods;
often, instead, \hold up" or \bargain-then-ripo￿" pricing distorts quantity
choices, incentives to switch suppliers, and entry incentives.
The bargain-then-ripo￿ structure is clearest when new and locked-in cus-
tomers are clearly distinguished and can be charged separate bargain and
ripo￿ prices respectively. This will be the case when prices are individually
negotiated (and existing customers are known); it will also be the case when
locked-in buyers buy separate \follow-on" products such as parts and service,
rather than repeatedly buying the same good.
If, however, each ￿rm has to set a single price to old (locked-in) and new
customers, then its trade with a locked-in customer a￿ects its trade with a
new customer and the problem is no longer bilateral. A form of bargain-then-
ripo￿ pricing sometimes survives, with ￿rms engaging in repeated \sales",
2Williamson (1985) stressed the \fundamental transformation, in which the initial win-
ner of a bidding competition thereafter enjoys an advantage over rival suppliers because
of its ownership of or control over transaction speci￿c assets."
8but prices will often instead be a compromise between high prices to exploit
locked-in buyers and lower prices to build a locked-in customer base
Whether with bargain-then-ripo￿ dynamics or with a single compromise
price, switching costs may either raise or lower average oligopoly prices. The
outcome depends heavily on how consumers form expectations about future
prices, but on balance switching costs seem more likely to increase prices.
Furthermore, switching costs can segment an otherwise undi￿erentiated mar-
ket as ￿rms focus on their established customers and do not compete aggres-
sively for their rivals’ buyers, letting oligopolists extract positive pro￿ts.
Switching costs also a￿ect entry conditions, in two opposing ways. They
hamper forms of entry that must persuade customers to pay those costs. So
in a classic switching-cost market they hamper large-scale entry that seeks
to attract existing customers (for instance to achieve minimum viable scale,
if the market is not growing quickly). Likewise, shopping costs make single-
product entry hard.
On the other hand, if incumbents must set a single price to old and new
buyers, a ￿rm with a larger customer base puts relatively more weight on
harvesting this base than on winning new customers. Thus switching costs
create a fat-cat e￿ect that actually encourages entry that focuses purely on
new customers, and makes competition stable: large shares tend to shrink
and small shares to grow. More generally, the tradeo￿ between harvesting
and investing depends on interest rates, the state of the business cycle, ex-
pectations about exchange-rates, etc, with implications for macroeconomics
and international trade.
1.2 Network E￿ects
A good exhibits direct network e￿ects if adoption by di￿erent users is com-
plementary, so that each user’s adoption payo￿, and his incentive to adopt,
increases as more others adopt. Thus users of a communications network or
speakers of a language gain directly when others adopt it, because they have
more opportunities for (bene￿cial) interactions with peers.
Indirect network e￿ects arise through improved opportunities to trade
with the other side of a market. Although buyers typically dislike being
joined by other buyers because it raises price given the number of sellers,
they also like it because it attracts more sellers. If thicker markets are more
e￿cient, then buyers’ indirect gain from the re-equilibrating entry by sellers
can outweigh the terms-of-trade loss for buyers, and vice versa; if so, there
is an indirect network e￿ect.
From a cooperative game theory perspective, network e￿ects are just
economies of scale: the per-buyer surplus available to a coalition of buyers
and a seller increases with the size of the coalition.3 But the contracting
3The analogy becomes weaker if network e￿ects are less anonymous. Likewise, switching
costs correspond to economies of scope on the production side in a single-consumer context,
but the analogy is imperfect with many consumers because individual customer-supplier
9and coordination issues seem much harder.
Unless adoption prices fully internalize the network e￿ect (which is dif-
￿cult), there is a positive externality from adoption, and a single network
product tends to be under-adopted at the margin. But when one network
competes with another, adopting one network means not adopting another;
this dilutes or overturns that externality.
More interestingly, network e￿ects create incentives to \herd" with others.
Self-ful￿lling expectations create multiple equilibria and cause chicken-and-
egg or critical-mass behavior with positive feedback or \tipping": a network
that looks like succeeding will as a result do so.
How adopters form expectations and coordinate their choices dramatically
a￿ects the performance of competition among networks. If adopters smoothly
coordinate on the best deal, vendors face strong pressure to o￿er such deals.
Indeed, competition may be unusually ￿erce because all-or-nothing compe-
tition neutralizes horizontal di￿erentiation | since adopters focus not on
matching a product to their own tastes but on joining the expected winner.
Smooth coordination is hard, especially when di￿erent adopters would
prefer di￿erent coordinated outcomes, as in the Battle of the Sexes, perhaps
because each has a history with a di￿erent network and faces individual
switching costs. However, some institutions can help. Consensus stan-
dard setting (informally or through standards organizations) can help avert
\splintering"; contingent contracts seem theoretically promising but little
used; and|most important|adoption is very often sequential. If one trusts
long chains of backward induction, fully sequential adoption eliminates the
starkest coordination traps, in which an alternative equilibrium would be
strictly better for all.
However, sequential adoption may not help overall e￿ciency in the Battle-
of-the-Sexes case. Sequential adoption translates multiple static (simultaneous-
adoption) equilibria into the adoption dynamics characteristic of network
markets: early instability and later lock-in. In particular, sequential adoption
implements tradeo￿s between early and late e￿ciencies that are not gener-
ally e￿cient. Because early adoptions a￿ect later ones, long-term behavior is
driven by early events, whether accidental or strategic. Thus early adopters’
preferences count for more than later adopters’: \excess early power."
These adoption dynamics are the essence of competition if each network is
competitively supplied, and the playing ￿eld for competition if each network
is proprietary to one \sponsor". Sponsors compete ex ante, in particular
with penetration pricing, and perhaps also using other tactics such as prean-
nouncements, to appeal to the pivotal early adopters, since the ex post lock-in
creates ex post dominance and pro￿ts. This competition for the market can
neutralize or overturn excess early power if sponsors’ anticipated later rela-
tive e￿ciency feeds through into their early willingness to set low penetration
prices. But where that feed-through is obstructed or asymmetric, networks
matches matter in switching-cost markets.
10that appeal to early pivotal customers thrive, while late developers have a
hard time. Much has been written on whether incompatible transitions are
even harder than they should be, given ex-post incompatibility, but whether
there is such \excess inertia" or its opposite, \excess momentum," long-term
choices still hinge mainly on early preferences and early information. In sec-
tion 3.2 below, we illustrate these themes in the famous case of the QWERTY
keyboard.
If such incompatible competition does not tip all the way to one network,
it sacri￿ces network bene￿ts and may segment the market; if it does tip, it
sacri￿ces matching of products to customers or to time periods and loses the
option value from the possibility that a currently inferior technology might
become superior. Moreover, if adopters don’t coordinate well, or coordinate
using cues|such as history|other than the surpluses ￿rms o￿er, the direct
loss in performance is exacerbated by vendors’ weaker incentive to o￿er good
deals. For example, if one ￿rm clearly has the ability to o￿er the highest
quality, so buyers know it could pro￿tably recapture the market even after
losing any one cohort’s business, they may quite rationally all buy from it
even if it never actually produces high quality or o￿ers a low price. Finally,
the excess power of early adopters biases outcomes towards networks that are
more e￿cient early on, when unsponsored networks compete; biases outcomes
in favor of sponsored over unsponsored alternatives; and often biases the
outcome even when both alternatives are sponsored.
If ￿rms choose to compete with compatible products, then consumers ob-
tain full network bene￿ts even when they don’t all buy from the same ￿rm.
This raises consumers’ willingness to pay, which can persuade ￿rms to make
their products compatible. But, as with switching costs, compatibility often
sharpens competition and neutralizes the competitive advantage of a large
installed base; furthermore, while switching costs tend to soften competition,
hindering attempts to lure customers from rivals (though they may facilitate
small-scale entry, they also encourage entry to stay small), proprietary net-
work e￿ects tend to make competition all-or-nothing, with risks of exclusion.
Thus large ￿rms and those who are good at steering adopters’ expectations
may prefer their products to be incompatible with rivals’. If others favor
compatibility, this can lead to complex maneuvering, but intellectual prop-
erty can help ￿rms insist on incompatibility.
1.3 Strategy and Policy
Switching costs and proprietary network e￿ects imply complementarities that
in turn make success selling in one period or to one customer an advantage
in another. This central fact has important implications for competitive
strategy and for public policy.
For a ￿rm, it makes market share a valuable asset, and encourages a
competitive focus on a￿ecting expectations and on signing up pivotal (no-
tably early) customers, which is re￿ected in strategies such as penetration
11pricing; competition is shifted from textbook competition in the market to
a form of Schumpeterian competition for the market in which ￿rms struggle
for dominance.
For a consumer, it may make early choices tantamount to long-term
commitments|necessitating great care and raising the value of accurate in-
formation at that stage; it may make those choices a coordination problem
with other adopters, or it may mean that there is no real choice because of
what others have done or are expected to do.
And for policy, these facts collectively have broad repercussions. Because
early choices are crucial, consumer protection (against deception, etc.) and
information can be key; because coordination is often important and di￿-
cult, institutions such as standards organizations matter. Finally, because
competition for the market di￿ers greatly from competition in the market,
competition policy gets involved in issues of compatibility, as well as in the
analysis of mergers, monopolization, intellectual property, and predation, all
of which behave di￿erently in the presence of switching costs and network
e￿ects.
2 Switching Costs and Competition
2.1 Introduction
A consumer faces a switching cost between sellers when an investment speci￿c
to his current seller must be duplicated for a new seller.4 That investment
might be in equipment, in setting up a relationship, in learning how to use
a product, or in buying a high-priced ￿rst unit that then allows one to buy
subsequent units more cheaply (when ￿rms’ prices are non-linear). Switching
costs may be psychological.5 Klemperer (1995) gives many examples of each
of these kinds of switching costs, and Section 2.2 discusses empirical evidence
for switching costs.
Switching costs may be learning costs, in which case a consumer who
switches from ￿rm A to ￿rm B has no switching cost of later buying from ei-
ther ￿rm. Alternatively, switching costs may be transactional, in which case
a consumer who switches from A to B would incur an additional switching
cost if he reswitched back to A (an example is the cost of returning rented
equipment and renting from a new supplier). Of course, many switching
costs have both learning and transactional aspects.
We will generally assume that switching costs are real social costs, but
there can also be contractual or pecuniary switching costs (that are not social
4There can also be switching costs among di￿erent products of a single ￿rm, as there
were among IBM computers until the internally compatible System/360 family. But we
(following the economics literature) focus on switching costs between ￿rms.
5Social psychologists have shown that consumers change their own preferences in favour
of products that they have previously chosen or been given, in order to reduce \cognitive
dissonance" (Brehm, 1956).
12costs). Examples include airlines’ \frequent-￿yer" programs, and \loyalty
contracts" that rebate a fraction of past payments to consumers who con-
tinue to patronise the ￿rm. These pecuniary switching costs are a form of
quantity discount or bundling. Lars Stole (forthcoming) discusses such price
discrimination strategies elsewhere in this Volume, so we will focus mainly
on \real" switching costs.6,7
We assume consumers have perfect information about the existence and
qualities of all ￿rms’ products, even before purchasing any. So \new" con-
sumers who have not yet developed an attachment to any particular prod-
uct are especially important in markets with switching costs. In contrast,
\search costs" directly a￿ect even consumers’ initial purchases. But search
costs and switching costs have much in common, and models of the e￿ects
of switching costs can also apply to search costs. For example, either kind of
friction makes a ￿rm’s market share important for its future pro￿tability (see
Section 2.6) and much empirical work does not distinguish between search
and switching costs.8 For a survey of search costs, see, for example, Stiglitz
(1989) in Volume 1 of this Series.
\Experience-good" markets in which each consumer needs to purchase a
product to determine its quality (see Nelson, 1970) and so prefers to repur-
chase a brand he tried and liked rather than try a new brand of unknown
quality, also have much in common with switching-cost markets. But with
experience goods, unlike with switching costs, complications can arise from
the possibility of prices signaling qualities, and from the existence of con-
6Typically, a consumer who has not previously bought from any ￿rm incurs a start-up
cost similar to (or greater than) the new investment (switching cost) that a brand switcher
must make. We will use the term \switching cost" to include these start-up costs. So
a consumer may have a \switching cost" of making a ￿rst purchase. In many models
consumers have high enough willingnesses to pay that this cost has little consequence
since it does not a￿ect consumers’ preferences between ￿rms.
7Sometimes costs of forming a new relationship fall upon the supplier, not (or as well
as) on the customer, and ￿rms’ costs of serving new customers have parallels to consumers’
switching costs (see Klemperer (1995)). Firms’ switching costs have been less studied,
but in some contexts, such as the simple model of the next subsection, the total prices
(including any switching costs) paid by consumers are una￿ected by whether ￿rms or
consumers actually pay the switching costs. Thus the equilibrium incidence need not
coincide with the apparent incidence of switching costs.
8For example, empirical ￿ndings about the credit card (Ausubel (1991) etc. { see
footnote 66) and telecommunications (see, e.g., Knittel (1997)) markets, and about the
e￿ects of ￿rms’ discount rates on prices (Froot and Klemperer (1989), Chevalier and
Sharfstein (1996), Fitoussi and Phelps (1988) etc.) could be the result of either switching
or search costs. On the other hand, Moshkin and Shachar (2000) develop a discrete-choice
empirical model to estimate how many consumers behave as if they have switching costs
and search costs respectively. Their test is based on the fact that whereas the switching
probability of a consumer facing search costs depends on the match between his tastes
and the attributes of the alternative he last chose, the switching probability of a consumer
facing switching costs depends on the match between his tastes and the attributes of all
available alternatives. Using panel data on television viewing choices, they suggest 72%
of viewers act as if they have switching costs between TV channels, while 28% act as if
they have search costs.
13sumers who disliked the product they last purchased.9,10
Switching costs not only apply to repeat-purchases of identical goods.
An important class of examples involves \follow on" goods, such as spare
parts and repair services, bought in \aftermarkets": buyers face additional
\switching" costs if the follow-on goods are not compatible with the original
purchase, as may be the case if they are not bought from the same ￿rm.11
Similar issues arise when retailers each advertise the prices of only some
of their products (often the \loss leaders"), but expect consumers who enter
their stores to buy other products also.12 See, for example, Lal and Matutes
(1994) and Lee and Png (2004). In these models, consumers decide whether
or not to buy the advertised goods before entering a store, that is, consumers
are making purchase decisions about the advertised goods and the unadver-
tised (\follow-on") products in di￿erent \periods".13
If all prices are advertised, consumers may incur switching costs, or \shop-
ping costs", at a single date by choosing to buy related products from multiple
suppliers rather than from a single supplier. In this case a static (single-
period) model is appropriate. (These \shopping costs" can be real social
costs or contractual costs created by quantity discounts and bundling.)
Either in a static context, or in a dynamic context when ￿rms can com-
mit to future prices and qualities, a market with switching costs is closely
analogous to a market with economies of scope in production; with switching
costs each individual consumer can be viewed as a market with economies
of scope between \purchases now" and \purchases later". Just as a market
with large production economies of scope is entirely captured by the ￿rm with
the lowest total costs in the simplest price-competition model, so in a simple
model with complete contracts each individual buyer’s lifetime requirements
in a market with large switching costs are ￿lled by the lowest-cost supplier
of those requirements. That is, ￿rms compete on \lifecycle" prices and the
market lifecycle price is determined by lifecycle costs, with any subdivision of
the lifecycle price being arbitrary and meaningless. In this case, the outcome
9Schmalensee (1982) and Villas Boas (2006) analyse models of experience goods that
show similarities to switching costs models. Hakanes and Peitz (2003) and Doganoglu
(2004) model experience goods when there are also learning or transactional switching
costs; Doganoglu shows that adding small switching costs to Villas Boas’ (2006) model
can sometimes reduce price levels.
10For related models in which consumers di￿er in their \quality" from ￿rms’ point of
view, and ￿rms are uncertain about consumers they have not supplied and can exploit
those they know to be of \high quality", see, for example, Nilssen (2000) and Cohen (2005)
on insurance markets and Sharpe (1990) and Zephirin (1994) on bank loan markets.
11Aftermarkets have been much studied since a US Supreme Court decision (ITS v.
Kodak) held that it was conceptually possible for ITS, an independent repair ￿rm, to prove
that Kodak had illegally monopolized the aftermarket for servicing Kodak photocopiers:
see e.g. Shapiro (1995), Shapiro and Teece (1994), MacKie-Mason and Metzler (1999),
and Borenstein, MacKie-Mason, and Netz (1995, 2000).
12If the unadvertised follow-on product is always purchased, it can be interpreted as the
\quality" of the advertised product { see Ellison (2005) and Vickers (2003).
13Gabaix and Laibson (2006) analyse this case when only some consumers are rational.
14is e￿cient and switching costs confer no market power on ￿rms.
However, most of the literature focuses on dynamic problems and em-
phasises the resulting commitment problems. The simple analogy in the
paragraph above|including the e￿ciency of the outcome|can survive even
if ￿rms cannot credibly commit to future prices or qualities. But even small
steps outside the simplest story suggest ways in which the analogy and the
e￿ciency break down (Section 2.3). The analogy is still weaker if ￿rms
cannot discriminate between di￿erent customers (Section 2.4), or consumers
use multiple suppliers (Section 2.5). After treating these cases (and having
discussed empirical evidence in Section 2.2), we analyze the \market share"
competition that switching costs generate (Section 2.6). All this discussion
takes both the switching costs and the number of ￿rms as exogenous, so we
then consider entry (Section 2.7) and endogenous switching costs (Section
2.8), before addressing implications for competition policy (Section 2.9).
2.2 Empirical Evidence
The empirical literature on switching costs is much smaller and more recent
than the theoretical literature.14,15 Some studies test speci￿c aspects of the
theory (see later sections), but only a few studies directly attempt to measure
switching costs.
Where micro data on individual consumers’ purchases are available, a
discrete choice approach can be used to explore the determinants of a con-
sumer’s probability of purchasing from a particular ￿rm. Greenstein (1993)
analyses federal procurement of commercial mainframe computer systems
during the 1970s, and ￿nds that an agency is likely to acquire a system
from an incumbent vendor, even when controlling for factors other than the
buyer’s purchase history that may have in￿uenced the vendor-buyer match;
he suggests switching costs were an important source of incumbent advan-
tage in this market.16 Shum (1999) analyzes panel data on breakfast cereal
purchases, and ￿nds that households switching brands incur average implicit
switching costs of $3.43|which exceeds every brand’s price! (However he
also ￿nds advertising can be e￿ective in attracting customers currently loyal
to rival brands).
Because switching costs are usually both consumer-speci￿c and not di-
rectly observable, and micro data on individual consumers’ purchase histories
are seldom available, less direct methods of assessing the level of switching
14Experimental studies are even fewer and more recent, but include Cason and Friedman
(2002), and Cason, Friedman, and Milam (2003). See footnote 36.
15The theoretical literature arguably began with Selten’s (1965) model of \demand
inertia" (which assumed a ￿rm’s current sales depended in part on history, even though
it did not explicitly model consumers’ behavior in the presence of switching costs), and
then took o￿ in the 1980s.
16Breuhan (1997) studies the switching costs associated with the Windows and DOS
operating systems for personal computers. See Chen and Hitt (2002) for a general survey
of the literature on switching costs in information technology.
15costs are often needed. Kim et al. (2003) estimate a ￿rst-order condition and
demand and supply equations in a Bertrand oligopoly to extract information
on the magnitude and signi￿cance of switching costs from highly aggregated
panel data which do not contain customer-speci￿c information. Their point
estimate of switching costs in the market for Norwegian bank loans is 4.12%
of the customer’s loan, which seems substantial in this market, and their
results also suggest that switching costs are even larger for smaller, retail
customers.17 Shy (2002) argues that data on prices and market shares reveal
that the cost of switching between banks varies from 0 to 11% of the average
balance in the Finnish market for bank accounts. He also uses similar kinds
of evidence to argue that switching costs in the Israeli cellular phone market
approximately equal the price of an average phone.
One defect of all these studies is that none of them models the dynamic
e￿ects of switching costs that (as we discuss below) are the main focus of
the theoretical literature; in e￿ect, these empirical studies assume consumers
myopically maximise current utility without considering the future e￿ects of
their choices.18
Other empirical studies, many of which we will discuss below in the con-
text of speci￿c theories, provide evidence for the importance of switching
costs for credit cards (Ausubel (1991), Calem and Mester (1995), Stango
(2002)); cigarettes (Elzinga and Mills (1998, 1999)); computer software (Larkin
(2004)); supermarkets (Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996)); air travel, and al-
liances of airlines in di￿erent frequent-￿yer programmes (Fernandes (2001),
Carlsson and L￿ ofgren (2004)); individual airlines for di￿erent ￿ight-segments
of a single trip (Carlton, Landes, and Posner (1980)); phone services (Knittel
(1997), Gruber and Verboven (2001), Viard (forthcoming)); television view-
ing choices (Moshkin and Shachar (2000)); online brokerage services (Chen
and Hitt (2002)); electricity suppliers (Waterson (2003)); bookstores (Lee
and Png (2004)); and automobile insurance (Schlesinger and von der Schu-
lenberg (1993), Israel (2005), Waterson (2003)).
There is also an extensive empirical marketing literature on brand loy-
alty (or \state dependence") which often re￿ects, or has equivalent e￿ects
to, switching costs. Seetharaman et al (1999) summarise this literature;
a widely cited paper is Guadagni and Little’s (1983) analysis of the co￿ee
market.19 Finally, Klemperer (1995) gives many other examples of markets
17Sharpe (1997) studies the bank retail deposit market and argues that the data support
the model of Klemperer (1987b). See also Waterson (2003).
18But Viard (forthcoming) studies the impact of number portability on prices in the
US market for toll-free numbers using a dynamic model in which consumers consider the
future e￿ects of their choices.
19Jacoby and Chestnut (1978) survey earlier attempts in the marketing literature to
measure brand loyalty. Theoretical marketing papers include Wernerfelt (1991) (see foot-
note 34), Villas Boas (2006) (see footnote 9), and Kim et al (2001) who study incentives to
o￿er reward programs that create pecuniary switching costs. Seetharaman and Che (forth-
coming) discusses adopting switching costs models to model \variety seeking" consumers
with negative switching costs.
16with switching costs, and U.K. O￿ce of Fair Trading (2003) presents useful
case studies.
2.3 Firms who Cannot Commit to Future Prices
2.3.1 Bargains Followed by Ripo￿s
The core model of the switching costs literature posits that ￿rms cannot
commit to future prices.
The simplest model has two periods and two symmetric ￿rms, with costs
ct in periods t = 1;2.20 A single consumer has a switching cost s and
reservation price rt > ct + s for one unit of the period￿t good, ￿rms set
prices, and there is no discounting. Then in period 2 the ￿rm that sold
in period 1 will exercise its ex post market power by pricing (just below)
c2 + s (the rival ￿rm will o￿er price c2 but make no sale). Foreseeing this,
￿rms are willing to price below cost in period 1 to acquire the customer
who will become a valuable follow-on purchaser in period 2; undi￿erentiated
competition to win the customer drives period-1 prices down to c1 ￿ s:
Note that in this simple model the consumer’s expectations do not matter.
Competition among non-myopic ￿rms makes buyer myopia irrelevant.21
Although ￿rst-period prices are below cost, there is nothing predatory
about them, and this pattern of low \introductory o￿ers", or \penetra-
tion pricing" (see section 2.6), followed by higher prices to exploit locked-
in customers is familiar in many markets. For example, banks o￿er gifts
to induce customers to open new accounts, and Klemperer (1995) gives
more examples.22 This \bargains-then-ripo￿s" pattern is a main theme
of many two-period models in the switching-costs literature, including Klem-
20c2 6= c1 is especially natural if the second-period good is spare parts/repair ser-
vices/consumables for a ￿rst-period capital good.
It makes no di￿erence if there are n > 2 ￿rms.
21Because ￿rms are symmetric and so charge the same price in period 2, the consumer
is indi￿erent in period 1. If ￿rms A, B had di￿erent costs cA2 and cB2 in period 2, then if
A made the period-1 sale, its period-2 price would be pA2 = cB2 + s (that is, constrained
by B), while if B made the period-2 sale, its period-2 price would be pB2 = cA2+s: In this
case, the prices that ￿rms charge in period 1 (and hence also ￿rms’ incentives to invest in
cost reduction, etc.) depend on whether the consumer has rational expectations about the
period-2 prices it will face or whether the consumer acts myopically. We discuss the role
of expectations in Section 2.4.5. Other simple models such as that in Klemperer (1995,
Section 3.2) sidestep the issue of consumers’ expectations by assuming period-2 prices are
constrained by consumers’ reservation price r2; hence independent of consumers’ period-1
choice. The distinction between these modelling approaches is crucial in some analyses
of network e￿ects (see Section 3.7.3).
It is important for the modelling that the customer buys from just one ￿rm in period
1. If a unit mass of consumers splits evenly betwen the ￿rms in period 1, there may be
no pure-strategy equilibrium in period 2. See footnote 31.
22Skott and Jepsen (2000) argue that a tough drug policy may encourage the aggressive
marketing of illegal drugs to new users, by increasing the costs of switching between
dealers.
17perer (1987a, b, 1995 [Sec 3.2]), Basu and Bell (1991), Padilla (1992), Basu
(1993), Ahtiala (1998), Lal and Matutes (1994), Pereira (2000), Gehrig and
Stenbacka (2002), Ellison (2005), and Lee and Png (2004). Of these models,
Klemperer (1995; Section 3.2) is particularly easy to work with and to extend
for other purposes.23
Although the switching cost strikingly a￿ects price in each period, it does
not a￿ect the life-cycle price c1 + c2 that the consumer pays in the simple
model of this subsection. As in the case of full commitment noted in section
2.1, we can here view the life-cycle (the bundle consisting of the period-1 good
and the period-2 good) as the real locus of competition, and competition in
that product has worked exactly as one would hope. In particular, the
absence of price commitment did not lead to any ine￿ciency in this very
simple model.
2.3.2 Ine￿ciency of the Price-Path
Although the outcome above is socially e￿cient, the inability to contract in
period 1 on period-2 prices in general leads to ine￿ciencies, even if ￿rms still
earn zero pro￿ts over the two periods. Even slight generalizations of the
simple model above show this.
In particular, if the consumer has downward-sloping demand in each pe-
riod and ￿rms are restricted to linear pricing (i.e. no two-part pricing), or
if ￿rms face downward-sloping demands because there are many heteroge-
neous consumers with di￿erent reservation prices among whom they cannot
distinguish, then there will be excessive sales in period 1 and too few sales
in period 2 (Klemperer (1987a)).24
Our simple model also assumed that ex-post pro￿ts can feed through
into better early deals for the consumers. In practice this may not be
possible. For example, setting very low introductory prices may attract
worthless customers who will not buy after the introductory period.25 If
for this or other reasons ￿rms dissipate their future pro￿ts in unproductive
activities (e.g., excessive advertising and marketing) rather than by o￿ering
￿rst-period customers truly better deals, or if, for example, risk-aversion and
liquidity concerns limit the extent to which ￿rms charge low introductory-
period prices to the consumers whom they will exploit later, then consumers
are made worse o￿ by switching costs, even if competition ensures that ￿rms
are no better o￿.
In our simple model ￿rms make zero pro￿ts with or without switching
23For example, the many-period extension of this model is Beggs and Klemperer (1992).
24Thus discussions of aftermarket power point out the possibility of sub-optimal trade-
o￿s between aftermarket maintenance services, self-supplied repair, and replacement of
machines. See Borenstein, MacKie-Mason, and Netz (2000), for instance.
25This is a particular problem if the introductory price would have to be negative to fully
dissipate the ex-post rents. There may also be limits on ￿rms’ ability to price discriminate
in favour of new customers without, for example, antagonizing their \regular" customers.
See Section 2.4 for the case in which price-discrimination is infeasible.
18costs. But switching costs and the higher ex-post prices and lower ex-ante
prices that they create can either raise or lower oligopolists’ pro￿ts. The
reason is that, in cutting its ￿rst-period price, each ￿rm sets its marginal
￿rst-period pro￿t sacri￿ce equal to its marginal second-period gain, so the
total ￿rst-period pro￿t given up can be greater or less than the total second-
period gain (see, especially, Klemperer (1987a,b)). However, the arguments
we will review in Section 2.4 (which also apply to two-period models) suggest
￿rms typically gain from switching costs.26
Finally note that while we (and the literature) primarily discuss ￿rms
exploiting locked-in consumers with high prices, consumers can equally be
exploited with low qualities. And if it is hard to contract on future qual-
ity, contracting on price does not easily resolve the ine￿ciencies discussed
above.27
2.4 Firms who Cannot Discriminate Between Cohorts
of Consumers
In our ￿rst bargains-then-ripo￿s model, we assumed that there was just one
customer. It is easy to see that the basic lessons extend to the case where
there are many customers but ￿rms can charge di￿erent prices to \old" and
\new" consumers, perhaps because \old" consumers are buying \follow on"
goods such as spare parts. But when old consumers buy the same good as
new consumers, it can be di￿cult for ￿rms to distinguish between them. We
now consider this case when a new generation of consumers arrives in the
market in each of many periods.
2.4.1 Free-Entry Model
Even if ￿rms cannot distinguish between cohorts of consumers, we may get
the same pricing pattern if ￿rms specialize su￿ciently. In particular, in
a simple model with free entry of identical ￿rms and constant returns to
scale, in each period some ￿rm(s) will specialise in selling to new consumers
while any ￿rm with any old locked-in customers will sell only to those old
customers.
If consumers have constant probability ￿ of surviving into each subse-
quent period, new-entrant ￿rms with constant marginal costs c and discount
factor ￿ o￿er price c ￿ ￿￿s and sell to any new consumers, while established
￿rms charge s more, i.e., charge c + (1 ￿ ￿￿)s in every period.28 That is,
26See, especially, Klemperer (1987b). Ellison (2005) argues that ￿rms gain from switch-
ing costs for a natural type of demand structure.
27Farrell and Shapiro (1989) show that price commitments may actually be worse than
pointless. See footnote 78.
28See Klemperer (1983). This assumes all consumers have reservation prices exceeding
c+(1￿￿￿)s for a single unit in each period, and that all consumers survive into the next
period with the same probability, ￿, so a consumer’s value is independent of his age. If
consumers live for exactly two periods the price paths in general depend on whether ￿rms
19established ￿rms charge the highest price such that no \old" consumers want
to switch, and new entrants’ expected discounted pro￿ts are zero. Thus the
price paths consumers face are exactly as if ￿rms could perfectly discriminate
between them. In either case one can think of every (new and old) consumer
as getting a \discount" of ￿￿s in each period re￿ecting the present value of
the extent to which he can be exploited in the future, given his option of
paying s to switch to an entrant; simultaneously, every \old" consumer is
indeed exploited by s in every period. The outcome is socially e￿cient.
2.4.2 Do Oligopolists Hold Simultaneous Sales?, or Staggered Sales?,
or No Sales?
Just as in the free-entry model, if there is a small number of ￿rms who face no
threat of entry and who cannot distinguish between cohorts of consumers,
it is possible that in every period one ￿rm might hold a \sale", setting a
low price to attract new consumers, while the other(s) set a higher price
to exploit their old consumers. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) explore such an
equilibrium in a model that has just one new and one old consumer in each
period. Since this assumption implies that in any period one ￿rm has no
customer base while the other already has half the market \locked-in", it
is not surprising that this model predicts asynchronous sales. However,
Padilla’s (1995) many-customer model yields somewhat similar results: ￿rms
mix across prices but a ￿rm with more locked-in customers has more incentive
to charge a high price to exploit them, and so sets high prices with greater
probabilities than its rival.29 These papers illustrate how switching costs
can segment an otherwise undi￿erentiated products market as ￿rms focus on
their established customers and do not compete aggressively for their rivals’
buyers, letting oligopolists extract positive pro￿ts.
More generally it is unclear whether oligopolists will hold sales simulta-
neously or will stagger them. On the one hand, it might make most sense
to forgo short run pro￿ts to go after new customers when your rivals are
not doing so. On the other hand, if switching costs are learning costs, then
staggered sales cause switching and create a pool of highly mobile consumers
who have no further switching costs, intensifying future competition (see Sec-
tion 2.5). Klemperer (1983, 1989) and the extension of the latter model in
Elzinga and Mills (1999) all have simultaneous sales.30,31
can directly distinguish between old and new consumers (as in the previous subsection)
or cannot do this (as in this section).
29Farrell and Shapiro assume ￿rms set price sequentially in each period, but Padilla
assumes ￿rms set prices simultaneously. See also Anderson, Kumar and Rajiv (2004).
30Elzinga and Mills’ model ￿ts with observed behaviour in the cigarette market. See
also Elzinga and Mills (1998).
31In a single-period model in which all consumers have the same switching cost, s, and
many customers are already attached to ￿rms before competition starts, the incentive to
either undercut a rival’s price by s or to overcut the rival’s price by just less than s generally
20Another possibility is that rather than holding occasional sales, each
oligopolist in every period sets a single intermediate price that trades o￿
its incentive to attract new consumers and its incentive to exploit its old
customers. In a steady state, each ￿rm’s price will be the same in every
period. Such an equilibrium could break down in several ways: if the ￿ow
of new consumers is too large, a ￿rm would deviate by cutting price signif-
icantly to specialise in new consumers. If some consumers’ switching costs
and reservation prices are too large, a ￿rm would deviate by raising price
signi￿cantly to exploit old customers while giving up on new ones. And if
￿rms’ products are undi￿erentiated except by switching costs, a ￿rm might
deviate to undercut the other slightly and win all the new consumers.32 But
when none of these breakdowns occurs, there may be a stationary \no-sales"
equilibrium: much of the literature examines such equilibria.33
Beggs and Klemperer (1992) explore a no-sales equilibrium in which in









where ci is i’s cost, ￿i
t￿1 is i’s previous-period market share (i.e., the fraction
of consumers i sold to in the previous period) and ￿, ￿, and ￿ are positive
constants. These constants depend on four parameters: the discount fac-
tor, the market growth rate, the rate at which individual consumers leave
the market, and the extent to which the ￿rms’ products are functionally
eliminates the possibility of pure-strategy equilibria if s is not too large: numerous papers
(Baye et al (1992), Padilla (1992), Deneckere et al (1992), Fisher and Wilson (1995),
Green and Scotchmer (1986), Rosenthal (1980), Shilony (1977), Varian (1980)), analyse
single-period models of switching costs (or models that can be interpreted in this way)
that yield mixed strategy equilibria, and Padilla (1995) ￿nds mixed-strategy equilibria in
a multi-period model. However, adding more real-world features to some of these models
yields either asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria or symmetric pure-strategy Bayesian-
Nash equilibria (if information is incomplete) rather than mixed-strategy equilibria.
Asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium can be interpreted as asynchronous sales. Like
Farrell and Shapiro (1988), Deneckere et al ￿nd that if ￿rms can choose when to set their
prices, the ￿rm with fewer locked-in customers sets price second and holds a \sale".
Symmetric Bayesian equilibria correspond to \tradeo￿ pricing" of the kind discussed in
the next paragraph of the text. Bulow and Klemperer (1998, Appendix B) give an example
of this by incorporating incomplete information about ￿rms’ costs into a one-period model
with switching costs that would otherwise yield mixed-strategy equilibria.
Gabrielson and Vagstad (2003, 2004) analyse when a pure-strategy equilibrium that
looks like monopoly pricing exists in a single-period duopoly with heterogeneous switching
costs.
32However, if consumers have rational expectations about future prices, a small price
cut may win only a fraction of new consumers: see section 2.4.5 below.
33Even if there are occasional \sales", ￿rms will balance exploiting the old with at-
tracting the new in \ordinary" periods, and this literature is relevant to these ordinary
periods.
In the case of monopoly, both stationary \no-sales" models (see Holmes, 1990) and
models in which periodic sales arise in equilibrium (see Gallini and Karp, 1989) can be
constructed.
21di￿erentiated; when ￿rms are symmetric, the steady-state equilibrium price
increases in the last of these four variables and decreases in the other three.34
2.4.3 Oligopoly Dynamics
We have seen that sometimes a lean and hungry ￿rm with few locked-in
customers holds a sale while its rivals with larger customer bases do not.
Similarly, in no-sale models in which all ￿rms sell to both old and new con-
sumers, a ￿rm with more old locked-in customers has a greater incentive
to exploit them, so will usually price higher and win fewer new unattached
consumers. In both cases, the result is stable industry dynamics as more
aggressive smaller ￿rms catch up with larger ones.
In the equilibrium of Beggs’ and Klemperer’s (1992) no-sale duopoly
model, described in (1) above, for example, ￿ > 0, so larger ￿rms charge
higher prices, yielding stable dynamics. Indeed, it can be shown that
￿i
t = ￿i + (￿)t(￿i
0 ￿ ￿i) in which ￿i is ￿rm i’s steady-state market share
and 0 < ￿ << 1
2; so the duopoly converges rapidly and monotonically back
to a stable steady state after any shock. Chen and Rosenthal (1996) likewise
demonstrate a tendency for market shares to return to a given value, while
in Taylor (2003) any initial asymmetries in market shares between otherwise
symmetric ￿rms may persist to some extent but are dampened over time.
However, the opposite is possible. If larger ￿rms have lower marginal
costs, and especially if economies of scale make it possible to drive smaller
￿rms completely out of the market, then a larger ￿rm may charge a lower
price than its smaller rivals. In this case, any small advantage one ￿rm
obtains can be magni￿ed and the positive-feedback dynamics can result in
complete dominance by that ￿rm. This is just as is typical with network
e￿ects (see Section 3.5.3)|indeed, switching costs create positive network
e￿ects in this case, because it is more attractive to buy from a ￿rm that
other consumers buy from (Beggs, 1989).
So switching-costs markets can \tip" like network-e￿ects markets. But
the simple models suggest a presumption that markets with switching costs
are stable, with larger ￿rms acting as less-aggressive \fat cats".35
2.4.4 The Level of Pro￿ts
A central question in policy and in the literature is whether switching costs
raise or lower oligopoly pro￿ts. The simple two-period model of Section
34Klemperer (1995) discusses this model further: variants are in Chow (1995), and To
(1995). Other important \no-sales" models are von Weizs￿ acker (1984) and Wernerfelt
(1991); Phelps and Winter’s (1970) and Sutton’s (1980) models of search costs, and Rad-
ner’s (2003) model of \viscous demand", are related.
35In the terminology introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). In the terminology
introduced by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985a,b), there is strategic comple-
mentarity between a ￿rm’s current price and its competitors’ future prices. See also
Farrell (1986a).
222.3.1 suggests they do neither, but many non-theorist commentators, notably
Porter (1980, 1985), believe switching costs raise pro￿ts.36 As we discuss
next, most models that are richer than the simple model tend to con￿rm the
popular idea that switching costs raise pro￿ts.
If duopolists who cannot discriminate between old and new buyers hold
asynchronous sales, they can earn positive pro￿ts in price competition even if
their products are undi￿erentiated except by switching costs. The switching
costs segment the market, and when one ￿rm (generally the ￿rm with the
larger customer base) charges a high price to exploit its locked-in customers,
the other ￿rm then has market power even over new consumers because
it can operate under the price umbrella of its fat-cat rival (see Farrell and
Shapiro (1988) and Padilla (1995)). So in these models, a duopolist earns
positive pro￿ts even in a period in which it starts with no locked-in customers.
(However, if there were two identical new ￿rms entering in every period, they
would not generally earn any pro￿ts.)
Furthermore, if switching costs are heterogenous, a similar e￿ect means
even duopolists who can (and do) discriminate between old and new cus-
tomers can earn positive pro￿ts in price competition with products that are
undi￿erentiated except by switching costs|see our discussion of Chen (1997)
and Taylor (2003) in Section 2.5.1, below.
In addition, the symmetric stationary price of a \no-sales" equilibrium of
the kind described in Section 2.4.3 is also usually higher than if there were
no switching costs. There are two reasons:
First, the \fat cat" e￿ect applies here too, though in the indirect way
discussed in Section 2.4.3; ￿rms price less aggressively because they recognise
that if they win fewer customers today, their rivals will be bigger and (in
simple models with switching costs) less aggressive tomorrow.
Second, when consumers face switching costs, they care about expected
future prices as well as current prices. Depending on how expectations of
future prices react to current prices, this may make new customers (not yet
locked into any ￿rm), react either more or less elastically to price di￿erences.
However, as we now discuss, the presumption is that it makes their response
less elastic than absent switching costs, thus raising ￿rms’ prices and pro￿ts.
2.4.5 The E￿ect of Consumers’ Expectations on Prices
How consumers’ expectations about future prices depend on current prices
critically a￿ects competition and the price level|just as in other parts of
the lock-in literature.37 Consumers’ expectations about their own future
36We know of no convincing empirical evidence, but Cason and Friedman (2002) provide
supportive laboratory evidence.
37Consumers’ expectations about how future prices depend on costs are, of course, also
important in determining whether ￿rms have the correct incentives to invest in future cost
reduction. This issue does not seem to have been directly addressed by the switching-costs
literature, but we discuss in Section 3.7 how a network-e￿ects model can be reinterpreted
to address it. See also footnote 21.
23tastes also matter in a market with real (functional) product di￿erentation;
we assume consumers expect some positive correlation between their current
and future tastes.
In a market without switching costs, a consumer compares di￿erences
between products’ prices with di￿erences between how well they match his
current tastes. But with switching costs, he recognises that whichever prod-
uct he buys today he will, very likely buy again tomorrow. So switching
costs make him more willing to change brands in response to a price cut if,
roughly speaking, he expects that price cut to be more permanent than his
tastes; they will lower his willingness to change in reponse to a price cut if
he expects the price cut to be less permanent than his tastes.
(i) Consumers who Assume any Price Cut below their Expected Price will be
Maintained in the Future
If consumers expect a ￿rm that cuts price today to maintain that price
cut forever then, relative to the case of no switching costs, they are more
in￿uenced by such a price cut than by their current (impermanent) product
preferences.38 (In the limit with in￿nite switching costs, a consumer’s prod-
uct choice is forever, so unless his preferences are also permanent, products
are in e￿ect less di￿erentiated.) So switching costs then lower equilibrium
prices; see von Weizs￿ acker’s (1984) model in which each ￿rm chooses a single
once-and-for-all price (and quality) to which it is (by assumption) committed
forever, but in which consumers are uncertain about their future tastes.39
We will see below (see Section 3.7) that a similar e￿ect arises when there
are strong proprietary network e￿ects and di￿erentiated products. Then,
consumers’ desire to be compatible with others overwhelms their di￿erences
in tastes and drives ￿rms whose networks are incompatible towards undi￿er-
entiated Bertrand competition. Here, with switching costs, each consumer’s
desire to be compatible with his future self (who in expectation has tastes
closer to the average) likewise reduces e￿ective di￿erentiation and drives the
￿rms towards undi￿erentiated Bertrand competition.
(ii) Consumers whose Expectations about Future Prices are
Una￿ected by Current Prices
If consumers expect that a ￿rm that unexpectedly cuts price this period
38A related model with these expectations is Borenstein, Mackie-Mason and Netz (2000).
In their model, consumers buy a di￿erentiated durable good (\equipment") from one of
two ￿rms and must then buy an aftermarket product (\service") in the next period from
the same ￿rm. High service prices generate pro￿ts from locked-in customers, but deter
new customers from buying equipment because they expect high service prices in the
following period. So the stationary equilibrium service price lies between marginal cost
and the monopoly price, even if ￿rms’ products are undi￿erentiated except by switching
costs.
39The e￿ect we discussed in the previous subsection, 2.4.4|that ￿rms moderate price
competition in order to fatten and so soften their opponents|is also eliminated by von
Weizs￿ acker’s commitment assumption.
24will return to setting the expected price next period, then price changes are
less permanent than, and so in￿uence consumers less than, taste di￿erences.
So switching costs raise price levels. Each consumer is making a product
choice that his future selves must live with, and his future selves’ prefer-
ences (while possibly di￿erent from his own) are likely to be closer to his
currently-preferred product than to other products. Consumers are there-
fore less attracted by a current price cut than absent switching costs.
(iii) Consumers with Rational Expectations
If consumers have fully rational expectations they will recognise that a
lower price today generally presages a higher price tomorrow. As we dis-
cussed above, a ￿rm that wins more new consumers today will be a \fatter
cat" with relatively greater incentive to price high tomorrow; and we ex-
pect that this will typically be the main e￿ect, although other e￿ects are
possible.40 So consumers with rational expectations will be even less sensi-
tive than in (ii) to price cutting, and switching costs thus raise prices.41
In summary, while there is no unambiguous conclusion, under either
economists’ standard rational-expectations assumption ((iii)), or a more my-
opic assumption ((ii)), switching costs raise prices overall. Only if consumers
believe unanticipated price changes are more permanent than their product
preferences do switching costs lower prices. For these reasons, Beggs and
Klemperer (1992) argue that switching costs tend to raise prices when new
and old customers are charged a common price. There is therefore also a
more general presumption that switching costs usually raise oligopolists’ to-
tal pro￿ts.
40See e.g., Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Klemperer (1987a,b,c), Padilla (1992, 1995).
As discussed above, the fat cat e￿ect can be reversed if e.g. economics of scale or network
e￿ects are strong enough. (Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2004) show how appending
network bene￿ts to Klemperer’s (1987b) model lowers prices.) Another caveat is that
with incomplete information about ￿rms’ costs a lower price might signal lower costs, so
consumers might rationally expect a lower price today to presage a lower price tomorrow.
But if there is incomplete information about costs, ￿rms might price high in order to signal
high costs and thus soften future competition. (A search-costs model that is suggestive
about how ￿rm-speci￿c cost shocks might a￿ect pricing in a switching-costs model is
Fishman and Rob (1995).) Furthermore, if ￿rms di￿er in the extent that they can or
wish to exploit locked-in customers, consumers will expect that a lower price today means
a higher price tomorrow, which will also be a force for higher prices.
41Holmes (1990) analyses price-setting by a monopolist facing overlapping generations
of consumers who must sink set-up costs before using the monopolist’s good. He ￿nds
that if consumers have rational expectations, then prices are higher than those that would
prevail if the ￿rm could commit to future prices. The reason is similar: rational consumers
are insensitive to price cuts because they understand that a low price today will encourage
other consumers to sink more costs which in turn results in higher future prices.
252.4.6 Collusive Behavior
Like most of the literature, the discussion above assumes noncooperative
behavior by ￿rms, without strategic threats of punishment if others compete
too hard.42
One should also ask whether switching costs hinder or facilitate collusion,
in which high prices are supported by ￿rms punishing any other ￿rm thought
to have deviated. While many people’s intuition is that switching costs
support collusion, this remains unclear as a theoretical matter:
Switching costs make deviating from a collusive agreement less pro￿table
in the short run, because it is harder to quickly \steal" another ￿rm’s cus-
tomers. But, for the same reason, switching costs make it more costly to
punish a deviating ￿rm. So it is not obvious whether collusion is easier or
harder on balance, and in Padilla’s (1995) model, which incorporates both
these e￿ects, switching costs actually make collusion more di￿cult.
Switching costs may also make it easier for ￿rms to monitor collusion,
because the large price changes necessary to win away a rival’s locked-in cus-
tomers may be easy to observe. And switching costs may additionally facili-
tate tacit collusion by providing \focal points" for market division, breaking
a market into well-de￿ned submarkets of customers who have bought from
di￿erent ￿rms. However, while these arguments are discussed in Stigler
(1964) and Klemperer (1987a), they have not yet been well explored in the
literature, and do not seem easy to formalise satisfactorily. Furthermore,
if collusion is only easier after most customers are already locked-in, this is
likely to induce ￿ercer competition prior to lock-in, as in the simple bargain-
then-ripo￿ model.
2.5 Consumers Who Use Multiple Suppliers
In the models above, as in most leading models of switching costs, switching
costs a￿ect prices but there is no switching in equilibrium. In reality a con-
sumer may actually switch, and use di￿erent suppliers in di￿erent periods,
either because ￿rms’ products are di￿erentiated and his tastes change, or
because ￿rms’ relative prices to him change over time, as they will, in par-
ticular, when each ￿rm charges new customers less than existing customers.
Furthermore, although we assumed above that each consumer buys one
unit from one ￿rm in each period, a consumer who values variety may buy
multiple products even in a single period. Consumers may therefore use
multiple suppliers in a period or, as we will discuss, each ￿rm may produce
a range of products.
42For example, Beggs and Klemperer assume each ￿rm’s price depends only on its
current market share and not otherwise on history, and rule out the kind of strategies
described by, for example, Abreu (1988) or Green and Porter (1984) that support collusive
outcomes in contexts without switching costs.
262.5.1 Paying Consumers to Switch
Most of the switching costs literature assumes a ￿rm o￿ers the same price
to all consumers in any given period. However, as the bargains-then-rip-o￿s
theme stresses, ￿rms would often like to price discriminate between their
old locked-in customers, unattached (new) customers, and customers locked-
in to a rival. And ￿rms often do pay consumers to switch to them from
rivals. For example, long-distance phone carriers make one-time payments
to customers switching from a rival; credit card issuers o￿er lower interest
rates for balance transfers from another provider; and economics departments
pay higher salaries to faculty members moving from other departments. How
does the possibility of such discrimination a￿ect pricing?
Chen (1997) analyses a two-period, two-￿rm, model in which each ￿rm
can charge one price to its old customers and another to other consumers
in the same period. In e￿ect, second-priced consumers are in two separate
markets according to which ￿rm they bought from in the ￿rst period. Each
of these \markets" is like the second period of our core (Section 2.3.1) two-
period model. In that model all consumers had the same switching costs,
s, so the period-2 incumbent charged a price just low enough to forestall
actual switching.43 But in Chen’s model, old consumers have heterogenous
switching costs (and ￿rms cannot discriminate between them, perhaps be-
cause they cannot observe individual consumers’ switching costs), so ￿rms
charge higher prices than their rivals to their old consumers but consumers
with low switching costs switch ￿rms.
In Chen’s model both ￿rms’ second-period pro￿ts and their total dis-
counted pro￿ts are lower than if they could not discriminate between old
and new customers. However, consumers might also be worse o￿ overall,
because of the costs of actually switching.
Firms’ total discounted pro￿ts are nevertheless higher than absent switch-
ing costs because (as in Section 2.4.4) the switching costs segment the market,
so ￿rms have some market power even over customers who are new to them
43Likewise, the simple model of section 2.4.1 shows that if ￿rms can price discriminate,
the price will be c+(1￿￿￿)s to all old consumers, and will be s lower to new consumers,
but no consumers will ever actually switch. Similarly, Nilssen (1992) observes that if
each ￿rm can charge a di￿erent price to each consumer, there will be no actual switching.
Nilssen showed that transactional switching costs give consumers less incentives to switch
than do learning switching costs. Thus transactional costs lead to lower prices for new
consumers, higher prices for loyal consumers, and so also a bigger within-period quantity
distortion if there is downward-sloping demand in each period. (Gabrielsen and Vagstad
(2002) note that two-part tari￿s can in theory avoid this distortion.)
27in the second period.44,45
In Chen’s two-￿rm model, consumers who leave their current supplier
have only one ￿rm to switch to, so this other ￿rm can make positive pro￿ts
even on new customers, and the duopolists earn positive pro￿ts in equilib-
rium. But with three or more ￿rms, there are always at least two ￿rms
vying for any consumer willing to leave his current supplier and, if products
are undi￿erentiated, these ￿rms will bid away their expected lifetime pro￿ts
from serving those consumers in their competition to attract them. So, as
Taylor (2003) shows, with three or more ￿rms, ￿rms earn positive rents only
on their current customers, and these rents are competed away ex ante, as
in our core model.
These models of \paying customers to switch" suggest repeat buyers pay
higher rather than lower prices. While this is often observed, we also often
observe the opposite pattern in which customers are rewarded for loyalty.
Taylor’s model provides one possible explanation. He shows that if switching
costs are transactional, consumers may move between suppliers to signal
that they have low switching costs and so improve their terms of trade.
Because this switching is socially costly, equilibrium contracts may discourage
it through \loyal customer" pricing policies that give better terms to loyal
customers than to those who patronised other ￿rms in the past. But Taylor
nevertheless ￿nds that ￿rms charge the lowest prices to new customers.
Sha￿er and Zhang (2000) study a single-period model that is similar to
the second period of Chen’s model but in which the distributions of switching
costs from the two ￿rms are di￿erent. If ￿rm A’s customers have lower and
more uniform switching costs than ￿rm B’s, then A’s loyal-customer demand
is more elastic than its new-customer demand, so it may charge a lower
price to its loyal customers than to customers switching from B. But this
rationale is asymmetric, and this model never results in both ￿rms charging
lower prices to loyal customers than to switching customers.46
44Because in this model a ￿rm’s old and new customers are e￿ectively in unconnected
markets, both of the ￿rm’s prices are independent of its previous-period market share,
by contrast with the no-price-discrimination models discussed above. This feature allows
Taylor (2003) to extend Chen’s model to many periods and many ￿rms, but Arbatskaya
(2000) shows that the \independence" result does not persist if there is functional product
di￿erentiation as well as switching costs.
45Gehrig and Stenbacka (2004a) develop a model in which the last two periods are
similar to Chen’s model, and in which pro￿ts are increasing in the size of switching costs;
in Gehrig and Stenbacka’s three-period model ￿rms therefore (non-cooperatively) make
product choices that maximize the switching costs between them. See also Gehrig and
Stenbacka (2004b). In another related model, Gehrig and Stenbacka (2005) ￿nd that
when goods are vertically di￿erentiated and consumers have switching costs, two ￿rms
choose to produce the highest quality, by contrast with most models of vertical product
di￿erentiation in which just one ￿rm produces the top quality.
46Lee (1997) also studies a one-period switching-cost model similar to the second period
of Chen’s model. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) explore a two-period model with some
similar features to Chen’s, in which ￿rms price discriminate between consumers based
on their past demands, but with real functional product di￿erentiation between ￿rms and
28There are also models of contractual switching costs that result in lower
e￿ective prices to repeat customers than to new customers, and contracts
that favour repeat customers arise endogeously in some of these models (see
Section 2.8.3). But the literature has found it hard to explain how real
switching costs might generate discrimination in favor of old customers.
2.5.2 Is There Too Much Switching?
Consumers decide whether or when to switch, and pay the switching costs.
So there will generally be the wrong amount of switching if (i) ￿rms’ rel-
ative prices to a consumer fail to re￿ect their relative marginal costs47, or
(ii) consumers switch (or not) in order to a￿ect ￿rms’ future prices, or (iii)
consumers’ switching costs are not real social costs. Most simple models
recognize no e￿ciency role for switching, so any switching in such models is
ine￿cient.
(i) price di￿erences don’t re￿ect cost di￿erences
The bargains-then-ripo￿s theme predicts that, when they can do so, ￿rms
charge lower prices to their new consumers. As a result, a given consumer will
face di￿erent prices from di￿erent ￿rms that do not re￿ect any cost di￿erences
between ￿rms. This is true even when all ￿rms symmetrically charge high
prices to old customers and lower prices to new customers. Although some
simple models such as our core (Section 2.3.1) model predict no switching,
in general ine￿cient switching results.48
When ￿rms do not price discriminate between new and old consumers,
the same result applies for a slightly di￿erent reason. As we saw in section
2.4, a ￿rm with a larger customer base will then charge a larger markup
over its marginal cost. So if consumers have di￿ering switching costs, such
a ￿rm’s price exploits its old high switching-cost customers and induces its
low switching-cost consumers to switch to a smaller ￿rm or entrant. Thus
Gabszewicz, Pepall and Thisse (1992), Farrell and Shapiro (1988), and Wang
without real (socially costly) switching costs; they too ￿nd that loyal customers are charged
higher prices than switchers. However, they also show that ￿rms may wish to o￿er long-
term contracts that o￿er consumers a high period-one price in return for a guaranteed low
period-two price (see Section 2.8.3). (Villas-Boas (1999) analyses a many-period model
similar to Fudenberg and Tirole’s but does not consider long-term contracts.) Acquisti
and Varian (2005) present a related two-period monopoly model which can be interpreted
as being of consumers with switching costs.
47Consumers must also have rational expectations about future price di￿erences, etc.
48Even if all consumers have the same switching cost, if an entrant’s production cost
plus that switching cost exceeds the incumbent’s production cost, then in a quantity-
competition model the entrant will sell to some of them, thus inducing ine￿cient switching
(Klemperer (1988)). This result is just the standard oligopoly result that a higher-cost
￿rm wins a socially excessive market share (though at a smaller markup).
A caveat is that these excessive-switching results take the number of ￿rms as given. If
the switching costs mean there is too little entry from the social viewpoint (see Section
2.7.2) then there may for this reason be too little switching.
29and Wen (1998) also predict excessive switching to smaller ￿rms and entrants.
(ii) consumers switch in order to a￿ect prices
If a consumer is a large fraction of the market, or if ￿rms can discriminate
between consumers (so each consumer is, in e￿ect, a separate market), a
consumer may switch to a￿ect future prices.
If switching costs are learning costs, switching strengthens a consumer’s
outside option, so he may switch in order to strengthen his bargaining position|
by switching he e￿ectively creates a second source of supply and thereby
increases the competition to supply him in the future (Lewis and Yildirim,
forthcoming). And even if switching costs are transactional (and ￿rms are
imperfectly informed about their magnitude), we saw in section 2.5.1 that
consumers may switch to signal that their switching costs are low and so
improve their terms of trade.
Strategic consumers may also commit to ignore switching costs (or acting
as if their switching costs were lower than they truly are) in their future
purchase decisions, in order to force the incumbent supplier to price more
competitively (Cabral and Greenstein (1990));49 this strategy will generally
increase the amount of switching.
In all these cases, socially costly switching in order to a￿ect prices is in-
e￿cient to the extent that it merely shifts rents from ￿rms to the customer
who switches. On the other hand, if ￿rms cannot discriminate between con-
sumers, such switching usually lowers prices and so improves the e￿ciency
of other consumers’ trades with sellers, so there may then be less switching
than is socially desirable.
(iii) switching costs are not real social costs
If switching costs are contractual, and not social costs, consumers will
ceteris paribus switch less than is e￿cient. But if real (social) switching
costs exist, then contractual switching costs may prevent socially ine￿cient
switches of the types discussed above.50
2.5.3 Multiproduct Firms
A consumer who buys several products in a single period may incur additional
\shopping costs" for each additional supplier used. These shopping costs
may be the same as the switching costs incurred by consumers who change
suppliers between periods. However, the dynamic and commitment issues
that switching-cost models usually emphasise no longer arise. In particular,
￿rms and consumers can contract on all prices, so the analogy with economies
49The literature has largely assumed that consumers have no commitment power (see
Section 2.8 for exceptions).
50In Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) ￿rms endogenously o￿er long term contracts that cre-
ate contractual switching costs that reduce ine￿cient switching to less preferred products
and increase social welfare, conditional on ￿rms being permitted to price discriminate
between old and new customers.
30of scope in production is particularly strong.51 Thus shopping costs provide
an e￿ciency reason for multiproduct ￿rms just as economies of scope in
production do.52
The analogy is not perfect, because switching costs and shopping costs
are based on speci￿c consumer-￿rm matches, whereas the production-side
economies of scope emphasised by Panzar and Willig (1981) and others de-
pend only on a ￿rm’s total sales of each product and not on whether the same
consumers buy the ￿rm’s di￿erent products or whether some consumers use
multiple suppliers.53
However, the analogy is particularly good if ￿rms’ product lines are suf-
￿ciently broad that most consumers use just one supplier. For example,
Klemperer and Padilla (1997) demonstrate that selling an additional prod-
uct can provide strategic bene￿ts for a ￿rm in the markets for its current
products if consumers have shopping costs of using additional suppliers (be-
cause selling an extra variety can attract demand away from rival suppli-
ers for this ￿rm’s existing varieties). This parallels Bulow et al (1985)’s
demonstration of the same result if consumers’ shopping costs are replaced
by production-side economies of scope (because selling an additional vari-
ety lowers the ￿rm’s marginal costs of its existing products). In both cases
each ￿rm, and therefore the market, may therefore provide too many di￿er-
ent products. More obviously, mergers can be explained either by consumer
switching costs (Klemperer and Padilla (1997)) or by production economies
of scope.
Some results about single-product competition over many periods with
switching costs carry over to multi-product competition in a single period
with shopping costs. For example, we suggested in Section 2.4.2 that when
switching costs are learning costs, oligopolists might bene￿t by synchroniz-
ing their sales to minimize switching and so reduce the pool of highly price-
sensitive (no-switching cost) customers. Likewise multiproduct ￿rms com-
peting in a single period may have a joint incentive to minimize the number
of consumers who buy from more than one ￿rm. Indeed Klemperer (1992,
1995 ex.4) shows that ￿rms may ine￿ciently o￿er similar products to each
other, or similar product lines to each other, for this reason. Taken together
with the previous paragraph’s result, this suggests that each ￿rm may pro-
51But some super￿cially single-period contexts are better understood as dynamic. For
instance, supermarkets advertise just a few \loss leaders"; unadvertised prices are chosen
to be attractive once the consumer is in the shop (\locked in") but might not have drawn
him in. (See Section 2.1.)
52Examples include supermarkets, shopping malls, hospitals and airlines: Dranove and
White (1996) models hospitals as multi-product providers with switching costs between
providers. Several studies document that travelers stongly prefer to use a single airline for
a multi-segment trip, and the importance of these demand-side complementarities in air
travel (e.g. Carlton, Landes, and Posner (1980)).
53As we noted in Section 2.1, if ￿rms can discriminate between consumers, then each
consumer becomes an independent market which, in the presence of switching costs, is
closely analogous to a market with production economies of scope.
31duce too many products, but that there may nevertheless be too little variety
produced by the industry as a whole.
An important set of shopping-cost models are the \mix-and-match" mod-
els pioneered by Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides (1989) and Ein-
horn (1992). Most of this literature takes each ￿rm’s product-line as given,
and asks whether ￿rms prefer to be compatible (no shopping costs) or in-
compatible (e￿ectively in￿nite shopping costs); see Sections 2.7.3 and 2.8.
Similarly, when ￿rms \bundle" products (see, e.g., Whinston (1990),
Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Nalebu￿ (2000, forthcoming)) they are creat-
ing contractual shopping costs between their products; we discuss bundling
brie￿y in Sections 2.7.3 and 2.8.54
\Shopping costs" models are distinguished from other \switching costs"
models in that consumers can observe and contract on all prices at the same
time in the \shopping costs" models. We will henceforth use the term switch-
ing costs to cover all these costs, but continue to focus mainly on dynamic
switching costs.
2.6 Battles for Market Share
2.6.1 The Value of Market Share
We have seen that with switching costs (or indeed proprietary network e￿ects|
see Section 3.7), a ￿rm’s current customer base is an important determinant
of its future pro￿ts.
We can therefore write a ￿rm’s current-period value function, (i.e., total
discounted future pro￿ts), Vt, as the sum of its current pro￿ts, ￿t, and its
discounted next-period value function ￿Vt+1(￿t); in which ￿ is the discount
factor and the next-period value function, Vt+1(￿); is a function of the size of
its current-period customer base, ￿t.
Vt = ￿t + ￿Vt+1(￿t) (2)
For example, in our core model with free entry, Vt+1 = s￿t, and Biglaiser,
Cr￿ emer and Dobos (2003) have explored various cases in which this simple
formula holds. More generally, however, (2) is a simpli￿cation. In general,
the ￿rm’s future pro￿ts depend on its customers’ types and their full histo-
ries, how market share is distributed among competing ￿rms, how many con-
sumers in the market make no purchase, etc. However, Vt+1 depends only on
current-period market share in models such as Klemperer (1987b, 1995), Far-
rell and Shapiro (1988), Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Padilla (1992, 1995),
and Chen and Rosenthal (1996), which all model just two ￿rms and a ￿xed
set of consumers whose reservation prices are high enough that they always
purchase. (For example, equation (1) shows for Beggs and Klemperer’s
model how prices, and therefore also quantities, and hence value functions,
54Varian’s (1989) and Stole’s (forthcoming) surveys describe models of quantity dis-
counts and bundling in Volume 1 and the current volume of this Series, respectively.
32in a period depend on the ￿rm’s previous-period market share.) So ￿t is
often interpreted as \market share", and this explains ￿rms’ very strong con-
cern with market shares in markets with switching costs and/or (we shall see)
network e￿ects.55
2.6.2 Penetration Pricing














Provided that the ￿rm’s value function is increasing in its market share,56
therefore, the ￿rm charges a lower price or sets a higher quantity57 than would
maximize short-run pro￿ts, in order to raise its customer base and hence its
future pro￿ts. That is, @￿t=@pt > 0 (since we assume @￿t=@pt < 0).
In the early stages of a market, therefore, when few consumers are locked
in, so even short-run pro￿t-maximising prices are not high relative to costs,
equation (3) implies low penetration pricing, just as in the core two-period
model.58 59 Equation (3) also suggests that the larger the value of the future
market, Vt+1; the deeper the penetration pricing will be. For example, a more
rapidly growing market will have lower prices.60
55Because switching costs make current market share such an important determinant
of a manufacturer’s future pro￿ts, Valletti (2000) suggests they may provide a motive
for vertical integration with retailers to ensure su￿cient investment in a base of repeat
subscribers.
56This case, @Vt+1=@￿t > 0, seems the usual one, although in principle, stealing cus-
tomers from rival(s) may make the rival(s) so much more aggressive that the ￿rm is worse
o￿. See Banerjee and Summers (1987), Klemperer (1987c).
In Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Vt+1 is quadratic in ￿t: (The fact that the sum of the
duopolists’ value functions is therefore maximised at the boundaries is consistent with
stable dynamics because lowering current price is less costly in current pro￿ts for the ￿rm
with the smaller market share. See Budd et al (1993).)
57We can perform a similar analysis with similar results for a quantity-setting ￿rm. The
analysis is also una￿ected by whether each ￿rm sets a single price to all consumers or
whether, as in section 2.5, each ￿rm sets di￿erent prices to di￿erent groups of consumers
in any period.
58It is unclear whether we should expect \penetration pricing" patterns from a monopo-
list, since @Vt+1=@￿t may be smaller in monopoly|where consumers have nowhere else to
go|than in oligopoly, and (if goods are durable) durable-goods e￿ects imply falling prices
in monopoly absent switching-cost e￿ects (equation (3) only implies that early period
prices are lower than in the absence of switching-costs, not that prices necessarily rise).
Cabral et al (1999) show it is hard to obtain penetration pricing in a network-e￿ects
monopoly model (see Section 3.6).
59Of course, as noted in Section 2.3.2, in a more general model the \penetration" might
be through advertising or other marketing activities rather than just low prices.
60Strictly, (3) tells us prices are lower if @Vt+1=@￿t is larger, but this is often true for a
more rapidly growing market. See, for example, Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Borenstein,
Mackie-Mason and Netz (2000) and also Holmes’ (1990) steady-state model of a monopolist
332.6.3 Harvesting vs Investing: Macroeconomic and International
Trade Applications
As equations (2) and (3) illustrate, the ￿rm must balance the incentive to
charge high prices to \harvest" greater current pro￿ts ((3) showed ￿t is in-
creasing in pt) against the incentive for low prices that \invest" in market
share and hence increase future pro￿ts (Vt+1 is increasing in ￿t; which is
decreasing in pt):
Anything that increases the marginal value of market share will make the
￿rm lower price further to invest more in market share. Thus, for example,
a lower ￿, that is, a higher real interest rate, reduces the present value of
future market share (see (2)) so leads to higher current prices (see (3): lower
￿ implies lower @￿t=@pt implies higher pt
61).
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) develop this logic in a switching-cost
model based on Klemperer (1995). They argue that liquidity-constrained
￿rms perceive very high real interest rates and therefore set high prices,
sacri￿cing future pro￿ts in order to raise cash in the short term. They
provide evidence that during recessions (when ￿nancial constraints are most
likely to matter) the most ￿nancially-constrained supermarket chains indeed
raise their prices relative to other chains, and Campello and Fluck (2004)’s
subsequent empirical work shows that these e￿ects are larger in industries
where consumers face higher switching costs.62
Fitoussi and Phelps (1988) use a similar logic (emphasising search costs
rather than switching costs) to argue that high interest rates contributed to
the high rates of in￿ation in Europe in the early 1980s.
Froot and Klemperer (1989) also apply the same logic to international
trade in a model of competition for market share motivated by switching costs
and network e￿ects. A current appreciation of the domestic currency lowers
a foreign ￿rm’s costs (expressed in domestic currency) and so tends to lower
prices. However, if the appreciation is expected to be only temporary then
the fact that the domestic currency will be worth less tomorrow is equivalent
to an increase in the real interest rates which raises prices. So exchange-rate
changes that are expected to be temporary may have very little impact on
import prices. But if the currency is anticipated to appreciate in the future,
both the \cost e￿ect" and \interest-rate e￿ect" are in the same direction|
market share tomorrow is probably worth more if future costs are lower, and
tomorrow’s pro￿ts are worth more than today’s pro￿ts, so for both reasons
today is a good time to invest in market share rather than harvest current
pro￿ts. So import prices may be very sensitive to anticipated exchange-rate
selling a single product to overlapping generations of consumers who incur set-up costs
before buying the product.
61See Klemperer (1995). We assume stable, symmetric, oligopoly and that the dominant
e￿ect of lowering ￿ is the direct e￿ect.
62See also Campello (2003). Beggs and Klemperer (1989, Section 5.3) and Klemperer
(1995) provide further discussion of how \booms" and \busts" a￿ect the trade-o￿s em-
bodied in equation (3) and hence a￿ect price-cost margins.
34changes. Froot and Klemperer (1989) and Sapir and Sekkat (1995) provide
empirical support for these theories.63
2.7 Entry
Switching costs may have important e￿ects on entry: with real, exogenous
switching costs, small-scale entry to win new, unattached, consumers is often
easy and indeed often too easy, but attracting even some of the old \locked-
in" customers may not just be hard, but also be too hard from the social
standpoint.
Furthermore, ￿rms may also create unnecessary switching costs in order
to discourage entry.
2.7.1 Small-Scale Entry is (Too) Easy
We saw in Section 2.4 that if ￿rms cannot discriminate between old and new
consumers, then the \fat cat" e￿ect may make small scale entry very easy:
incumbent ￿rms’ desire to extract pro￿ts from their old customers creates
a price umbrella under which entrants can pro￿tably win new unattached
(or low switching cost) customers. And even after entry has occurred, the
erstwhile incumbent(s) will continue to charge higher prices than the entrant,
and lose market share to the entrant, so long as they remain \fatter" ￿rms
with more old consumers to exploit.
So if there are no economies of scale, even an entrant that is somewhat
less e￿cient than the incumbent(s) can enter successfully at a small scale
that attracts only unattached buyers.64 (See Klemperer (1987c), Farrell
and Shapiro (1988), Gabszewicz, Pepall and Thisse (1992), Wang and Wen
(1998), etc.)
Of course, the ￿ip-side of this is that the same switching costs that en-
courage new entry also encourage the new entrants to remain at a relatively
small scale unless there are many unattached buyers.65
63For other applications of switching-costs theory to international trade, see Tivig (1996)
who develops \J-curves" (since sales quantities respond only slowly to price changes if there
are switching costs), Gottfries (2002), To (1994), and Hartigan (1995).
64This result depends on there being (su￿cient) new customers in each period (which is
a natural assumption). For an analogous result that entry was easy into just one product in
a shopping-cost market, there would have to be su￿cient buyers without shopping costs,
or who wished to purchase just that product (this may be a less natural assumption).
Failing that, \small scale" entry in a shopping cost market is not easy.
Our assumption of no discrimination between old and new consumers means the easy-
entry result also does not apply to aftermarkets. Entry may be hard in this case if
￿rst-period prices cannot fall too low, and the incumbent has a reputational or similar
advantage. For example, the UK O￿ce of Fair Trading found in 2001 that new entry
was very hard into the hospital segment of the market served by NAPP Pharmaceutical
Holdings Ltd where prices were less than one-tenth of those in the \follow-on" community
market.
65Good (2006) shows that, for this reason, switching costs may lead an incumbent ￿rm
352.7.2 Large Scale Entry is (Too) Hard
While the fat-cat e￿ect gives new entrants an advantage in competing for new
customers, it is very hard for them to compete for customers who are already
attached to an incumbent. There is also adverse selection: consumers who
switch are likely to be less loyal, hence less valuable, ones.66 So entry may
be hard if small-scale entry is impractical, due perhaps to economies of scale,
or to network e￿ects. Furthermore, even new consumers may be wary of
buying from a new supplier if they know that it can only survive at a large
scale, since with switching costs consumers care about the future prospects
of the ￿rms they deal with.
Of course, this does not imply that there is too little large-scale entry. If
switching costs are social costs, then large-scale entry may not be e￿cient
even if the entrant’s production costs are modestly lower than an incum-
bent’s. That is, to some extent these obstacles to pro￿table large-scale
entry re￿ect social costs of such entry.
However, this re￿ection is imperfect. If the entrant cannot discriminate
between consumers, then large-scale entry requires charging all consumers a
price equal to the incumbent’s price less the marginal old buyer’s switching
cost. But socially the switching cost applies only to the old switching buyers,
not to the new consumers, and only applies to switching buyers at the average
level of their switching cost, not at the marginal switching cost. So e￿cient
large-scale entry may be blocked.
Furthermore, entry can sometimes be strategically blockaded. In par-
ticular, an incumbent may \limit price", that is, cut price to lock in more
customers and make entry unpro￿table at the necessary scale, when entry
at the same scale would have been pro￿table, and perhaps e￿cient, if the
additional customers had not been \locked-up" prior to entry (see Klemperer
(1987c)).67
Of course, entry can be too easy or too hard for more standard reasons.
Entry can be too hard if it expands market output, and consumers rather
to prefer to delay innovation and instead rely on new entrants to introduce new products
which the incumbent can then imitate.
66Some work on the credit card market emphasises this adverse-selection problem: cred-
itworthy borrowers may have been granted high credit limits by their current card issuers
so have higher switching costs. Furthermore, low-default risk customers may be less
willing to switch (or even search) because they do not intend to borrow|but they often
do borrow nevertheless (Ausubel, 1991). Calem and Mester (1995) provide empirical
evidence that this adverse selection is important, Ausubel provides evidence that the US
bank credit card issuing market earns positive economic pro￿t and attributes this, at least
in part, to switching costs or search costs, and Stango (2002) also argues that switching
costs are an important in￿uence on pricing.
67The incumbent’s advantage is reduced if it does not know the entrant’s costs, or
quality, or even the probability or timing of entry, in advance of the entry. Gerlach (2004)
explores the entrant’s choice between pre-announcing its product (so that more consumers
wait to buy its product) and maintaining secrecy so that the incumbent cannot limit price
in response to the information.
36than the entrant capture the surplus generated. And entry is too easy if
its main e￿ect is to shift pro￿ts from the incumbent to the entrant.68 But
these caveats apply whether or not there are switching costs; the arguments
speci￿c to switching costs suggest that entry that depends for its success on
consumers switching is not just hard, but too hard.
2.7.3 Single-Product Entry May Be (Too) Hard
If switching costs (or shopping costs) \tie" sales together so consumers prefer
not to patronise more than one ￿rm, and consumers wish to buy several prod-
ucts (see Section 2.5.3), then an entrant may be forced to o￿er a full range of
products to attract new customers (let alone any old consumers). If o￿ering
a full range is impractical, entry can e￿ectively be foreclosed. Thus in Whin-
ston (1990), Nalebu￿ (forthcoming), and Klemperer and Padilla (1997), tying
can foreclose ￿rms that can only sell single products. In Whinston and Nale-
bu￿ the \switching costs" are contractual, while in Klemperer and Padilla
the products are \tied" by real shopping costs.69 If the switching/shopping
costs are real, entry need not be too hard given the switching costs, but the
arguments of the previous subsection suggest it often may be.
2.7.4 Arti￿cial Switching Costs Make Entry (Too) Hard
The previous discussion addressed whether entry is too easy or too hard,
taking the switching costs as given: we observed that switching costs make
certain kinds of entry hard, but that this is at least in part because they also
make entry socially costly, so entry may not be very much too hard given the
switching costs. A larger issue is whether the switching costs are inevitable
real social costs. They may instead be contractual,70 or may be real but
caused by an unnecessary technological choice that an entrant cannot copy.
In these cases, it is the incumbent’s ability to choose incompatibility that is
the crucial entry barrier.
68Klemperer (1988) illustrates the latter case, showing that new entry into a mature
market with switching costs can sometimes be socially undesirable. The point is that just
as entry of a ￿rm whose costs exceed the incumbent’s is often ine￿cient in a standard
Cournot model without switching costs (Bulow et al, 1985, section VI E, Mankiw and
Whinston, 1986) so entry of a ￿rm whose production cost plus consumers’ switching cost
exceeds the incumbent’s production cost is often ine￿cient in a quantity-setting model
with switching costs (see footnote 48).
69Choi (1996a) shows that tying in markets where R&D is critical can allow a ￿rm with
an R&D lead in just one market to pre-empt both. The welfare e￿ects are ambiguous.
70This includes those created by \loyalty contracts", \exclusive contracts" and
\bundling" or \tying" etc.
372.8 Endogenous Switching Costs: Choosing How to
Compete
Market participants may seek to either raise or to lower switching costs in
order to reduce ine￿ciencies (including the switching cost itself), to enhance
market power, to deter new entry, or to extract returns from a new entrant:
2.8.1 Reducing Switching Costs to Enhance E￿ciency
As we have seen, a ￿rm that cannot commit not to exploit its ex-post
monopoly power must charge a lower introductory price. If the price-path (or
quality-path) is very ine￿cient for the ￿rm and consumers jointly, the ￿rm’s
surplus as well as joint surplus may be increased by nullifying the switching
costs. Thus, for example, a company may license a second source to create
a future competitor to which consumers can costlessly switch (Farrell and
Gallini (1988)).71
Likewise, ￿rms producing di￿erentiated products (or product lines) may
deliberately make them compatible (i.e., choose zero switching costs). This
increases the variety of options available to consumers who can then \mix-
and-match" products from more than one ￿rm without paying a switching
cost. So eliminating switching costs can raise all ￿rms’ demands, and hence
all ￿rms’ pro￿ts.72
Where suppliers are unwilling to reduce switching costs (see below), third
parties may supply converters,73 or regulators may intervene.
We have also already noted that customers may incur the switching (or
start-up) cost of using more than one supplier, or may pre-commit to ignoring
the switching costs in deciding whether to switch,74 in order to force suppliers
to behave more competitively.75
Finally, ￿rms may be able to mitigate the ine￿ciencies of distorted prices
and/or qualities by developing reputations for behaving as if there were no
switching costs.76
71In Gilbert and Klemperer (2000) a ￿rm commits to low prices that will result in
rationing but will not fully exploit the consumers ex-post, to induce them to pay the
start-up costs of switching to the ￿rm.
72See Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides (1989), Garcia Mari~ noso (2001), Stahl
(1982), etc. But the mix-and-match models reveal other e￿ects too; see Section 2.8.4.
Note that many models ignore the demand-reducing e￿ect of switching costs by considering
a ￿xed number of consumers all of whom have reservation prices that are su￿ciently high
that total demand is ￿xed.
73See Section 3.8.3 for more on converters.
74See Cabral and Greenstein (1990).
75Greenstein (1993) discusses the procurement strategies used by U.S. federal agencies in
the late 1970s to force suppliers of mainframe computers to make their systems compatible
with those of their rivals.
76See Eber (1999). Perhaps more plausibly ￿rms may develop reputations for, or
otherwise commit to, treating old and new customers alike (since this behaviour is easy for
consumers to understand and monitor); this behavior may also mitigate the ine￿ciencies
due to the distorted prices (though see footnote 78) { it is most likely to be pro￿table if
382.8.2 Increasing Switching Costs to Enhance E￿ciency
Firms may also mitigate the ine￿ciencies of distorted prices and qualities
by contracting, or even vertically integrating, with their customers.77 78
Likewise Taylor (2003) ￿nds ￿rms might set lower prices to loyal consumers
to reduce ine￿cient switching. Of course, a downside of these strategies
of increasing switching costs is that they also limit the variety available to
consumers unless they pay the switching costs.
2.8.3 Increasing Switching Costs to Enhance Oligopoly Power
Although switching costs typically reduce social surplus, we saw in Sections
2.3-2.5 that they nevertheless often increase ￿rms’ pro￿ts. If so, ￿rms jointly
prefer to commit (before they compete) to real social switching costs than to
no switching costs. Thus, ￿rms may arti￿cially create or increase switching
costs.
Of course, a ￿rm may prefer switching costs from but not to its product if
it can achieve this, especially where the switching costs are real social costs.
Adams (1978) describes how Gillette and its rivals tried to make their razor
blades (the pro￿table follow-on product) ￿t one another’s razors but their
razors accept only their own blades. However, Koh (1993) analyses a model
in which each duopolist chooses a real social cost of switching to it, and shows
the possibility that each chooses a positive switching cost in order to relax
competition.79
In Banerjee and Summers (1987) and Caminal and Matutes (1990) ￿rms
have the option to generate contractual switching costs by committing in pe-
riod zero to o￿ering repeat-purchase coupons in a two-period duopoly, and
both ￿rms (independently) take this option.80 Similarly Fudenberg and Ti-
role (2000) explore a two-period model in which ￿rms can price discriminate
between consumers based on their past demands; if ￿rms can also o￿er long
term contracts|that is, generate contractual switching costs|then ￿rms do
o￿er such contracts in equilibrium, in addition to spot contracts.81
bargain-then-ripo￿ pricing is particularly ine￿cient.
77See Williamson (1975) and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978).
78However incomplete contracts to protect against suppliers’ opportunism may be less
desirable than none at all. Farrell and Shapiro (1989) call this the Principle of Negative
Protection. The point is that it is better (ex ante) for customers to be exploited e￿ciently
than ine￿ciently ex-post. So if contracts cannot set all future variables (e.g. can set prices
but not qualities), so customers anyway expect to be exploited ex-post, it may be better
that there are no contracts.
79Similarly Bouckaert and Degryse (2004) show in a two-period credit market model
that each bank may reduce switching costs from itself, in order to relax competition.
80However, Kim and Koh (2002) ￿nd that a ￿rm with a small market share may reduce
contractual switching costs by choosing to honour repeat-purchase coupons that its rivals
have o￿ered to their old customers.
81These papers are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this Volume, in Stole
(forthcoming).
392.8.4 Reducing Switching Costs to Enhance Oligopoly Power
An important class of models which suggests that ￿rms may often be bi-
ased towards too much compatibility from the social viewpoint is the \mix-
and-match" models (see Section 2.5) in which di￿erent ￿rms have di￿erent
abilities in producing the di￿erent components of a \system". Consumers’
ability to mix-and-match the best product(s) o￿ered by each ￿rm is an e￿-
ciency gain from compatibility (that is, from zero rather than in￿nite shop-
ping costs), but ￿rms’ private gains from compatibility may be even greater
because|perhaps surprisingly|compatibility can increase prices.
In the simplest such model, Einhorn (1992) assumed that a single con-
sumer wants one each of a list of components produced by ￿rms A, B, with
production costs ai and bi respectively for component i. In compatible com-
petition the price for each component is maxfai;big, so the consumer pays a
total price
P
i maxfai;big for the system. But if the ￿rms are incompatible,




i big which is lower unless the
same ￿rm is best at everything: if di￿erent ￿rms are best at providing di￿er-
ent components, then the winning seller on each component appropriates its
full e￿ciency margin in compatible competition, but in incompatible compe-
tition the winner’s margin is its e￿ciency advantage where it is best, minus
its rival’s advantage where its rival is best. Firms thus (jointly) more than
appropriate the e￿ciency gain from compatibility, and consumers actually
prefer incompatibility.
This result depends on (among other assumptions) duopoly at each level.
If more than two ￿rms produce each component, the sum of the second-lowest
cost of each component (which the consumer pays under compatibility) may
easily be lower than the second-lowest system cost when ￿rms are incompat-
ible, so consumers often prefer compatibility and ￿rms’ incentives may be
biased either way (see Farrell, Monroe and Saloner (1998)).82
The \order-statistic" e￿ect emphasised in these models is not the only
force, however. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) stressed that under compat-
ibility a price cut by one ￿rm in one component increases demand for the
other ￿rms’ complements, whereas under incompatibility all of this boost in
complementary demand accrues to the ￿rm, so compatibility reduces incen-
tives to cut prices.83 Economides (1989) argued that, unlike the Einhorn
82Einhorn’s results, but not those of Farrell, Monroe and Saloner, are qualitatively
una￿ected by whether or not ￿rms know their own e￿ciencies in each component. The
analysis of these two papers is related to Palfrey (1983).
83Matutes and Regibeau (1992) allowed ￿rms to set separate prices for bundles (not
necessarily the sum of the component prices) and found that the force toward compat-
ibility weakens. Furthermore, compatibility also changes the structure of demand, so
even Matutes and Regibeau (1988) found that ￿rms are sometimes biased towards incom-
patibility. And Klemperer (1992) also shows that ￿rms may prefer incompatibility to
compatibility when the latter is socially preferred, and that the ￿rms may even distort
their product choices to sustain incompatibility. Garcia Mari~ noso (2001) examines a mix-
and-match model in which purchase takes place over two periods, and ￿nds that ￿rms are
biased towards compatibility because it reduces the intensity of competition in the ￿rst
40result, this logic does not depend on duopoly, so provides a clear argument
why ￿rms may try too hard to reduce switching costs and shopping costs.84
2.8.5 Increasing Switching Costs to Prevent or Exploit Entry
The mix-and-match literature of the previous subsection ignores the fact that
entry provides a much greater discipline on prices when compatability means
a new ￿rm can enter o￿ering just one component of a system than when any
entrant needs to o￿er a whole system.
More generally, we have seen (Section 2.7) that an incumbent ￿rm may
protect a monopoly position against entry by writing exclusionary contracts,
or by arti￿cially creating real switching costs through technological incom-
patibility with potential entrants.85 Imposing contractual switching costs
(but not real social switching costs) can also enable an incumbent to extract
rents from an entrant without preventing its entry|the entrant is forced to
pay a fee (the \liquidated damages") to break the contracts.86
2.9 Switching Costs and Policy
As we have seen, with (large) switching costs ￿rms compete over streams
of goods and services rather than over single transactions. So one must
not jump from the fact that buyers become locked in to the conclusion that
there is an overall competitive problem. Nor should one draw naive inferences
from individual transaction prices, as if each transaction were the locus of
ordinary competition. Some individual transactions may be priced well above
cost even when no ￿rm has (ex-ante) market power; others may be priced
below cost without being in the least predatory.87 88 Thus switching-cost
period { see also Haucap (2003) and Garcia Mari~ noso (2003). (All these models, unlike
Einhorn and Farrell, Monroe, and Saloner, assume some product di￿erentiation between
￿rms’ components even under compatibility). See also Anderson and Leruth (1993).
84Most of the \mix-and-match" literature assumes that each ￿rm o￿ers a full line of
products, but DeNicolo (2000) analyzes competition with one full-line and a pair of spe-
cialist ￿rms. In our terminology, there are then no additional shopping costs of buying
from an additional specialist ￿rm after having bought from one of the specialist ￿rms, but
the specialist ￿rms do not internalize the complementarities between them.
85Imposing switching costs would not be worthwhile for the incumbent if they reduced
consumers’ willingnesses to pay by more than the gains from excluding entry. In models
such as Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1989), and Segal and Whinston (2000), it is
unpro￿table to enter and serve only one customer, so no customer loses by signing an
exclusive contract if other customers have already done so; in equilibrium this can mean
that no customer needs to be compensated for signing an exclusive contract.
Deterring entry is also pro￿table if it can transfer rents from an entrant to the incumbent.
86See Aghion and Bolton (1987) and Diamond and Maskin (1979).
87For instance, in an aftermarket context such as the Kodak case, the fact that repair
services are priced well above cost does not by itself prove that there is a serious competitive
problem.
88Another na￿ ￿ve argument is that if one observes little or no switching, then ￿rms do
not constrain one another’s prices: ￿rms that compete on a life-cycle basis (rather than
41markets can be more competitive than they look, and switching costs need
not generate supernormal pro￿ts, even in a closed oligopoly. These points
emerge clearly from the core two-period model with which we began.
But, as our further discussion shows, while switching costs need not cause
competitive problems, they probably do make competition more fragile, es-
pecially when they coexist with ordinary scale economies (or, as we will see in
section 3, with network e￿ects). Because large-scale entry into switching-cost
markets is hard (whether or not ine￿ciently so), there may be much more
incentive for monopolizing strategies such as predation or merger than there
is in markets in which easy entry limits any market power. Thus switching
costs, in combination with other factors, could justify heightened antitrust
scrutiny.89
Furthermore, while sometimes (as in our core model) ￿rms must give all
their ex post rents to consumers in ex ante competition, that is not always
true. The ex post rents may be less than fully competed away, as in most of
the oligopoly models we discussed. Or, if the ex post rents are dissipated
in unproductive activities such as excessive marketing or advertising, then
consumers are harmed by switching costs even if ￿rms are no better o￿. So
switching costs often do raise average prices. Moreover, as in our core model,
switching costs often cause a bargain-then-ripo￿ pattern of prices, and (going
beyond the core model) this can be ine￿cient even when the average level of
prices remains competitive; they make matching less e￿cient by discouraging
re-matching or the use of multiple suppliers; and, of course, they result in
direct costs when consumers do switch.
For these reasons, despite the warnings in the ￿rst paragraph of this sub-
section, markets may indeed perform less well with switching costs than with-
out, so policy intervention to reduce switching costs may be appropriate.90
on an individual transaction basis) constrain one another’s life-cycle prices and, of course,
￿rms may be constrained even ex post by the threat of customer switching even when that
threat is not carried out in equilibrium.
89For example, the UK Competition Commission in July 2001 blocked the proposed
merger of two banks, Lloyds TSB and Abbey National, even though Abbey National
accounted for only 5 per cent of the market for personal banking. An important part of
the Commission’s reasoning was that consumer switching costs, combined with some scale
economies, make new entry very hard, and that existing ￿rms with low market shares tend
to compete more aggressively than larger ￿rms in markets with switching costs, so smaller
￿rms are particularly valuable competitors to retain. (Klemperer is a UK Competition
Commissioner, but was not involved in this decision.) See also Lofaro and Ridyard (2003).
Footnote 64 gives another example where policy makers were concerned that entry was
very hard in a market with switching costs. In this case the UK regulator (the Director of
the O￿ce of Fair Trading) limited NAPP’s aftermarket price to no more than ￿ve times
the foremarket price in order to ameliorate the bargains-then-ripo￿s price pattern. (He
also limited the absolute level of the aftermarket price.)
90Gans and King (2001) examine the regulatory trade-o￿s in intervening to reduce
switching costs and show that who is required to bear the costs of ameliorating switching
costs can importantly a￿ect the e￿ciency of the outcome. See also Galbi (2001).
Viard (forthcoming) found that the introduction of number portability for U.S. toll-
free telephone services substantially reduced switching costs and led to the largest ￿rm
42For example, policy might cautiously override intellectual property rights,
especially of copyright-like intellectual property that may have little inher-
ent novelty, if those rights are used only as a tool to enforce incompatibility
and so create private rewards that bear no relationship to the innovation’s
incremental value.91
In general ￿rms may be biased either towards or against compatibility
relative to the social standpoint. But switching costs seem more likely to
lower than to raise e￿ciency, so when ￿rms favor switching costs the reason
is often because they enhance monopoly or oligopoly power by directly raising
prices or by inhibiting new entry.92 This suggests that policy-makers should
take a close look when ￿rms with market power choose to have switching
costs (through contract form or product design) when choosing compatibility
would be no more costly.93 94
3 Network E￿ects and Competition
3.1 Introduction
It can pay to coordinate and follow the crowd. For instance, it is useful to
speak English because many others do. A telephone or a fax machine or an
substantially reducing prices; the U.S. wireless industry strongly resisted the introduction
of number portability in the wireless market. Aoki and Small (2000) and Gans, King,
and Woodbridge (2001) also analyse number portability in the telecoms market.
The UK government is currently considering recommendations to reduce switching costs
in the mortgage market, see Miles (2004).
91Thus, for example, the European Commission in 2004 ruled that Microsoft had abused
its market power by, inter alia, refusing to supply interface infrastructure to competitors,
thus making entry hard by products that could form part of a \mix-and-match" system
with Microsoft’s dominant Windows PC operating system. Microsoft was ordered to
provide this information even if it was protected by intellectual property.
92A caveat is that ￿rms often do not make a coordinated joint choice of whether to
compete with switching costs or without, and di￿erent ￿rms may be able to control the
costs of di￿erent switches. See Section 2.8.
93For example, the Swedish competition authority argued that Scandinavian Airlines’
\frequent-￿yer" program blocked new entry on just one or a few routes in the Swedish
domestic air-travel market in which entry on the whole range of routes was impractical
(see Section 2.7.3), and the airline was ordered to alter the program from October 2001.
A similar decision was made by the Norwegian competition authority with e￿ect from
April 2002. Fernandes (2001) provides some support for these decisions by studying
alliances formed by U.S. airlines, and showing that \frequent-￿yer" programs that cover
more routes are more attractive to consumers and confer greater market power on the
airlines operating the programs. See also Klemperer and Png (1986).
94A caveat is that the policy debate is often held ex-post of some lock-in. At this
point incumbents’ preference to maintain high switching costs is unsurprising and does
not prove that switching costs raise prices overall (nor do the switching costs necessarily
cause ine￿ciencies). Reducing switching costs ex-post also expropriates the incumbents’
ex-ante investments, which may be thought objectionable, though the fear of expropriation
of this kind of ex-ante investment seems unlikely to harm dynamic e￿ciency (and may in
fact improve e￿ciency).
43email account is more valuable if many others have them. Driving is easier
if everyone keeps right | or if everyone keeps left. While following the
crowd may involve a variety of choices, we follow the literature in using the
metaphor of \adoption of a good," construed broadly. We say that there are
network e￿ects if one agent’s adoption of a good (a) bene￿ts other adopters
of the good (a \total e￿ect") and (b) increases others’ incentives to adopt it
(a \marginal e￿ect").
Classic (or peer-to-peer) network e￿ects arise when every adoption
thus complements every other, although the e￿ects may be \localized:" for
instance, an instant-messaging user gains more when her friends adopt than
when strangers do. Indeed, adoption by spammers or telemarketers harms
other adopters and makes them less keen to adopt, yet a few such nuisance
adopters will not overturn the overall network e￿ect: \generally" increased
adoption makes the good more appealing.
An important kind of network e￿ect arises when following the crowd
enhances opportunities to trade. If thicker markets work better, then all
traders want to join (adopt) a big market, and gain when the market grows.
This ￿ts the de￿nition if each trader expects both to buy and to sell; but
when traders can be divided into buyers and sellers, it is not true that each
trader’s arrival makes all others better o￿ or encourages them to adopt.
Each buyer gains when more sellers join, but typically loses when more other
buyers join: he doesn’t want to trade with them and may su￿er an adverse
terms-of-trade e￿ect. Thus the e￿ect of a buyer’s adoption on sellers ￿ts
the de￿nition above, as does the e￿ect of a seller’s adoption on buyers, but
the buyer-buyer spillovers and the seller-seller spillovers often go the other
way. Indirect network e￿ects describe market-thickness e￿ects from one
side of the market, typically buyers, as the other side re-equilibrates. That
is, when an additional buyer arrives, the \marginal e￿ect" on sellers attracts
additional sellers, and the total and marginal e￿ects of additional sellers on
buyers can then be attributed (indirectly, hence the name) to the additional
buyer. If those e￿ects outweigh any adverse terms-of-trade e￿ect of the new
buyer on other buyers, they induce network e￿ects among buyers, treating
sellers not as adopters subject to the de￿nition but as a mere background
mechanism.
This can all take place in terms of just one good. For instance, a ￿rm’s
price policies create a network e￿ect among buyers if price falls when de-
mand rises. This can re￿ect production-side economies of scale if those are
passed through to consumers. For example, if public transport is always
priced at average cost, it gets cheaper the more it is used. Similarly, Bag-
well and Ramey (1994) and Bagwell’s chapter in this Handbook show how
economies of scale in retailing can encourage consumers to coordinate (per-
haps by responding to advertising) on large retailers. With or without scale
economies, a ￿rm’s price policy can create an arti￿cial network e￿ect among
buyers, as when a mobile-phone provider o￿ers subscribers free calls to other
subscribers. If a product will be abandoned without su￿cient demand, one
44can view that as a price increase; thus buyers who will face switching costs
want to buy a product that enough others will buy (Beggs 1989). At the in-
dustry rather than ￿rm level, there may be price-mediated network e￿ects in
decreasing-cost competitive industries; or a larger market may support more
sellers and thus be more competitive (Ramseyer, Rasmusen and Wiley 1991;
Segal and Whinston 2000) or more productively e￿cient (Stigler 1951).
But, usually, the concept gets an additional layer: the background mech-
anism is re-equilibration of sellers of varied complements to a \platform" that
buyers adopt. For instance, when more buyers adopt a computer hardware
platform, more vendors supply software that will run on it, making the com-
puter (with the option to buy software for it) more valuable to users: the
hardware-software paradigm.95 Similarly, buyers may want to buy a pop-
ular car because a wider (geographic and other) variety of mechanics will
be trained to repair it, or may hesitate to buy one that uses a less widely
available fuel. We give more examples in 3.2 and discuss indirect network
e￿ects further in 3.3.2.96
While such indirect network e￿ects are common|indeed, Rochet and
Tirole (2003) argue that network e￿ects predominantly arise in this way|it
is worth warning against a tempting short-cut in the logic. Even in classic
competitive markets, \sellers like there to be more buyers, and buyers like
there to be more sellers," and this does not imply network e￿ects if these
e￿ects are pecuniary and cancel one another. Indirect network e￿ects driven
by smooth free entry of sellers in response to additional buyers can only work
when larger markets are more e￿cient, as we discuss further in 3.3.5
Section 3.2 describes some case studies and empirical work. Section 3.3,
like the early literature, explores whether network e￿ects are externalities
and cause network goods to be under-adopted at the margin, a question that
draws primarily on the total e￿ect. But the modern literature focuses on how
the marginal e￿ect can create multiple equilibria among adopters, making co-
ordination challenging and giving expectations a key role in competition and
e￿ciency. As a result, network markets often display unstable dynamics such
as critical mass, tipping, and path dependence, including collective switching
costs. Section 3.4 argues that coordination is central and can be hard even
despite helpful institutions. Section 3.5 discusses how adoption in network
95Somewhat confusingly, a leading example puts Microsoft’s Windows in the role of
\hardware" and applications software in the role of \software."
96For theories of indirect network e￿ects through improved supply in a complement see
Katz and Shapiro (1985), Church and Gandal (1992, 1993), Chou and Shy (1990), and
Economides and Salop (1992); Gandal (1995) and Katz and Shapiro (1994) review this
literature. Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) argue that indirect network e￿ects lack the
welfare properties of direct e￿ects; see also Clements (2004); but Church, Gandal and
Krause (2003) argue otherwise.
Presumably we could have network e￿ects with several classes of adopter, each class
bene￿ting only from adoption by one other class, but in practice models tend to assume
either classic (single-class) or indirect (two-class) cases, although multi-component systems
are sometimes studied.
45markets favors the status quo; such \inertia" has important implications for
competition. Sections 3.3 to 3.5 thus study adopters’ collective behavior,
given their payo￿ functions including prices. Those sections thus describe
adoption dynamics when each network good is unsponsored (competitively
supplied), and also describe the demand side generally, including when each
network good is strategically supplied by a single residual claimant or spon-
sor.
Turning to the supply side of network-e￿ect markets, section 3.6 dis-
cusses how a sponsor might address coordination and externality problems;
section 3.7 considers competition between sponsors of incompatible network
products. In light of this analysis of incompatible competition, section 3.8
asks whether ￿rms will choose to compete with compatible or incompatible
products, and section 3.9 discusses public policy.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
3.2.1 Case Studies
Telecommunications Much early literature on network e￿ects was in-
spired by telecommunications. Since telecommunications at the time was
treated as a natural monopoly, the focus was mainly on how second-best
pricing might take account of network e￿ects/externalities, and on how to
organize \universal service" cross-subsidies to marginal (or favored) users.97
Modern telecommunications policy stresses facilitating e￿cient competi-
tion. Compatibility in the form of interconnection, so that a call originated
on one network can be completed on another, is fundamental to this.98 Un-
like many compatibility decisions elsewhere, it is often paid for, and is widely
regulated. Brock (1981) and Gabel (1991) describe how, in early unregu-
lated US telephone networks, the dominant Bell system refused to intercon-
nect with nascent independent local phone companies. Some users then
subscribed to both carriers, somewhat blunting the network e￿ects, as do
similar \multi-homing" practices such as merchants accepting several kinds
of payment cards.
Standards issues also arise in mobile telephony, although users on incom-
patible standards can call one another. Most countries standardized ￿rst-
and second-generation air interfaces, predominantly on GSM, but the US did
not set a compulsory standard for the second-generation air interface.
Radio and Television Besen and Johnson (1986) discuss standards ob-
stacles to the adoption of AM stereo in the US after the government declined
97See for instance (in chronological order) Squire (1973), Rohlfs (1974), Kahn and Shew
(1987), Einhorn (1993), Barnett and Kaserman (1998), Cremer (2000), Yannelis (2001),
and Mason and Valletti (2001).
98Besen and Saloner (1989, 1994) studied standards and network e￿ects in telecommuni-
cations; the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has an entire \standardization
sector."
46to mandate a standard; they argue that the competing standards were similar
enough, and demand limited enough, for such a leadership vacuum to stall
the technology. Greenstein and Rysman (2004) give a similar interpretation
of the early history of 56k modem standards.
In television, governments have imposed standards, but they di￿er among
countries; Crane (1979) interprets this as protectionist trade policy. Besen
and Johnson describe how the US initially adopted a color TV standard that
was not backward compatible with its black-and-white standard, so that
color broadcasts could not be viewed at all on the installed base of sets;
after brief experience with this, the FCC adopted a di￿erent standard that
was backward-compatible. Farrell and Shapiro (1992) discuss domestic and
international processes of picking high-de￿nition television standards.
Microsoft Powerful network e￿ects arise in computer platforms including
operating systems, and Bresnahan (2001) argues that internal strategy docu-
ments con￿rm that Microsoft understands this very well. Because they have
many users, Microsoft’s operating system platforms attract a lot of applica-
tions programming. An indirect network e￿ect arises because application
software writers make it their ￿rst priority to work well with the dominant
platform, although many applications are \ported" (a form of multi-homing),
softening this e￿ect. As we explore below, incompatible competition (and
entry in particular) may well be weak unless applications programmers, con-
sumers, and equipment manufacturers would rapidly coordinate and switch
to any slightly better or cheaper operating system.99
The US antitrust case against Microsoft relied on this network e￿ect or
\applications barrier to entry", but did not claim that Windows is \the
wrong" platform. Rather, Microsoft was convicted of illegal acts meant
to preserve the network barrier against potential weakening through the
Netscape browser and independent \middleware" such as Java.100
Others complain that Microsoft vertically \leverages" control from the
operating system to other areas, such as applications and servers. The Eu-
ropean Commission’s 2004 order against Microsoft addressed both leverage
into media viewers and interface standards between PCs and servers.
In software more generally, Shurmer (1993) uses survey data and ￿nds
network e￿ects in word processing and spreadsheet software; Liebowitz and
Margolis (2001) however argue that product quality largely explains success.
99A barrier to incompatible entry matters most if there is also a barrier (here, intellectual
property and secrecy) to compatible entry.
100Both the Department of Justice and Microsoft have made many documents available
on their web sites, www.usdoj.gov/atr/ and www.microsoft.com/ respectively. A good
introduction to the case is the 2001 decision of the DC Court of Appeals. A discussion
by economists involved in the case is Evans et al. (2000); Fisher (2000) and Schmalensee
(2000) give briefer discussions; see also the Journal of Economic Perspectives symposium
(2001). See also Evans and Schmalensee (2001), and Rubinfeld (2003). Werden (2001)
discusses the applications barrier to entry. Lemley and McGowan (1998b) discuss Java.
(Farrell worked on this case for the Justice Department.)
47Gawer and Henderson (2005) discuss Intel’s response to opportunities for
leverage.
Computers Gabel (1991) contrasts case studies of standards in personal
computers and in larger systems. In personal computers, initial fragmenta-
tion was followed by the rise of the IBM/Windows/Intel (or \Wintel") model,
whose control passed from IBM to Intel and Microsoft. The standard, which
lets many ￿rms complement the microprocessor and operating system (and
to a lesser extent lets others, such as AMD and Linux, compete with those),
has thrived, in part due to the attraction of scale for applications software
vendors and others, and relatedly due to the scope for specialization: see
Gates, Myrhvold and Rinearson (1996), Grove (1999), and Langlois (e.g.
1990). Outside this standard only Apple has thrived.
Credit Cards From the cardholder side, a credit card system has indirect
network e￿ects if cardholders like having more merchants accept the card
and don’t mind having more other cardholders. The question is more subtle
on the merchant side since (given the number of cardholders) each merchant
loses when more other merchants accept a card. Since this negative \total
e￿ect" applies whether or not this merchant accepts the card, Katz (2001)
and Rochet and Tirole (2002) show that the \marginal e￿ect" (adoption
encourages others to adopt) may apply but the total e￿ect may fail even
taking into account re-equilibration on the customer side, if card penetration
is already high and total spending does not rise much with cardholding.
Network e￿ects color inter-system competition, and dominant systems
could remain dominant partly through self-ful￿lling expectations, although
both merchants and cardholders often \multi-home," accepting or carrying
multiple cards, which weakens network e￿ects (Rochet and Tirole 2003). The
biggest card payment systems, Visa and Mastercard, have in the past been
largely non-pro￿t at the system level and feature intra-system competition:
multiple banks \issue" cards to customers and \acquire" merchants to ac-
cept the cards. The systems’ rules a￿ect the balance between inter- and
intra-system competition. Ramsey-style pricing to cardholders and mer-
chants may require \interchange fees," typically paid by merchants’ banks
to cardholders’ banks: see e.g. Katz (2001), Schmalensee (2002) and Rochet
and Tirole (2002). But such fees (especially together with rules against sur-
charges on card purchases) may raise prices to non-card customers (Schwartz
and Vincent 2006, Farrell 2006).
The QWERTY Keyboard David (1985) argued that the QWERTY
typewriter keyboard became dominant through \historical small events."
He suggested that QWERTY remains dominant despite being inferior (at
least on a clean-slate basis) to other keyboard designs, notably the \Dvorak
Simpli￿ed Keyboard" (DSK). Switching costs arise because it is costly to
48re-learn how to type. Network e￿ects may arise \directly" because typists
like to be able to type on others’ keyboards, and \indirectly" for various
reasons, e.g. because typing schools tend to teach the dominant design.
Liebowitz and Margolis (1990, 2001) deny that QWERTY has been shown
to be substantially inferior, claiming that the technical evidence is mixed,
weak, or suggests a relatively small inferiority|perhaps a few percent. If
the penalty is small, switching (retraining) could be privately ine￿cient for
already-trained QWERTY typists even without network e￿ects. And evi-
dently few users ￿nd it worth switching given all the considerations including
any network e￿ects.
But new users (who would not have to re-train from QWERTY) would
￿nd it worth adopting DSK or another alternative, if network e￿ects did
not outweigh their clean-slate stand-alone advantages. Combined with the
technical evidence, this gives a lower bound on the strength of these network
e￿ects. If most typists type for a ￿fth of their working time and QWERTY
has a stand-alone disadvantage of 5 percent, for instance, revealed preference
of new QWERTY students suggests that the network e￿ect is worth at least
one percent of earnings.101 Yet many would doubt that network e￿ects are
terribly strong in keyboard design: most typists work mostly on their own
keyboards or their employer’s, and DSK training and keyboards are available
(PC keyboards can be reprogrammed). We infer that even easily disparaged
network e￿ects can be powerful.102
But the e￿ciency of typing is mostly a parable; the deeper question is
whether the market test is reliable. That question splits into two:
(a) Ex ante: did QWERTY pass a good market test when the
market tipped to it? Can we infer that it was best when adopted,
whether or not it remains ex post e￿cient now? A short-run form of this
question is whether contemporary users liked QWERTY best among key-
boards on o￿er; a long-run version is whether the market outcome appropri-
ately took into account that not all keyboards had been tried and that taste
and technology could (and later did) change.
On the short-run question, David suggests that \small" accidents of his-
tory had disproportionate e￿ects; a prominent typing contest was won by an
101Since widespread dissemination of the PC, many typists type less than this; but for
most of the keyboard’s history, most typing probably was done by typists or secretaries
who probably typed more than this.
102If one were very sure that network e￿ects are weak, one might instead infer that
the clean-slate stand-alone penalty of QWERTY must be small indeed, even negative.
Even aside from the ergonomic evidence, however, that view is hard to sustain. For
instance, the keyboard design problem di￿ers among languages and has changed over
time, yet QWERTY and minor variations thereof have been persistently pervasive. Thus if
network e￿ects were unimportant, the evidence from new typists’ choices would imply that
QWERTY was remarkably optimal in a wide range of contexts. And even if QWERTY is
actually the best of all designs, the many people who believe otherwise would adopt DSK
if they did not perceive network e￿ects to be bigger.
49especially good typist who happened to use QWERTY. He suggests that the
outcome was somewhat random and thus may well have failed even the short-
run test. Liebowitz and Margolis argue that because both typing-contest
and market competition among keyboards was vigorous, one can presume
that the outcome served short-run contemporary tastes.
A fortiori, David presumably doubts that the market’s one-time choice
of QWERTY properly took long-run factors into account. Liebowitz and
Margolis do not directly address the long-run question, but suggest that it
shouldn’t be viewed as a market failure if QWERTY won because technically
superior alternatives weren’t yet on the market.103 In sections 3.5{3.7 below
we discuss market forces toward contemporaneous e￿ciency.
(b) Ex post: As of now, would a switch be socially e￿cient?
Many students of keyboard design believe DSK is better on a clean-slate
basis. But the slate is not clean: there is a huge installed base of equipment
and training. As things stand, no switch is taking place; should one? This
question in turn can take two di￿erent forms.
In a gradual switch, new users would adopt DSK while trained QWERTY
typists remained with QWERTY. This would sacri￿ce network bene￿ts but
not incur individual switching costs; it would presumably happen without
intervention if switching costs were large but network e￿ects were weak com-
pared to DSK’s stand-alone advantage. Private incentives for a gradual
switch can be too weak (\excess inertia") because early switchers bear the
brunt of the lost network bene￿ts (see 3.5 below). But equally the private
incentives can be too strong, because those who switch ignore lost network
bene￿ts to those who are stranded.
In a coordinated switch, everyone would adopt DSK at once (already-
trained QWERTY typists would retrain). Thus society would incur switch-
ing costs but preserve full network e￿ects. Because new users would un-
ambiguously gain, already-trained QWERTY typists will be too reluctant to
participate. Even if they were willing, coordination (to preserve full network
bene￿ts) could be a challenge; if they were opposed, compulsion or smooth
side payments could be required for an e￿cient coordinated switch; of course,
compulsion can easily lead to ine￿cient outcomes, and side payments seem
unlikely to be smooth here.
Video Recordings: Betamax versus VHS; DVD and DIVX Gabel
(1991) and Rohlfs (2001) argue that the VCR product overcame the chicken-
and-egg problem by o￿ering substantial stand-alone value to consumers (for
\time-shifting" or recording programs o￿ the air) even with no pre-recorded
programming for rent. By contrast, RCA and CBS introduced products to
play pre-recorded programming (into which they were vertically integrated),
103Below, we discuss what institutions might have supported a long-run market test.
50but those failed partly because they did not o￿er time-shifting; laser disks
su￿ered the same fate.
Later, the VCR market tipped, generally to VHS and away from Betamax|
though Gabel reports that (as of 1991) Betamax had won in Mexico. The
video rental market created network e￿ects (users value variety and con-
venience of programming availability, rental outlets o￿er more variety in a
popular format, and studios are most apt to release videos in such a format).
The rise of these network e￿ects hurt Sony, whose Betamax standard was
more expensive (VHS was more widely licensed) and, according to some, su-
perior at equal network size, although Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) argue
not. Gabel (1991) suggests that the strength of network e￿ects may have
surprised Sony.
Cusumano, Mylonadis and Rosenbloom (1992) describe the VHS-Betamax
battle. Park, S. (2004) and Ohashi (2003) develop dynamic model of con-
sumer choice and producer pricing for the VCR market and assess the extent
to which network e￿ects contributed to the tipping.
In the next generation of video, Dranove and Gandal (2003) and Karaca-
Mandic (2003) found substantial indirect network e￿ects in DVD adoption.
Dranove and Gandal found that a preannouncement of a competing format,
DIVX, delayed DVD adoption. Both papers ￿nd cross-e￿ects such that the
content sector as a whole could pro￿tably have subsidized hardware sales,
which could motivate vertical integration.
DVD players (until recently) did not record, like the laser disk product,
but many households are willing to own both a VCR and a DVD player,
allowing DVD’s other quality advantages to drive success in a way that the
laser disk could not. Again, such multi-homing blunts the network e￿ects
and can help with the chicken-and-egg problem.
Sound Recordings and Compact Disks Farrell and Shapiro (1992) ar-
gued that although prices of CDs and players fell during the period of rapid
adoption, it would be hard to explain the adoption path without network
e￿ects; on the other hand, since CD players could be connected to existing
ampli￿ers and loudspeakers, multi-homing was easy.
Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000) estimated a simultaneous-equations model
of adoption in terms of price and software availability, stressing the cross-
e￿ects that would lead to indirect network e￿ects.
Languages Human languages display classic network e￿ects. Changes
in patterns of who talks with whom presumably explain the evolution of
language, both convergent (dialects merging into larger languages) and di-
vergent (development of dialects). English is dominant, but there have been
previous bandwagons such as French in diplomacy, or Latin as lingua franca.
Some Americans argue for \English only" laws based on a network exter-
nality; across the border, Canadians intervene to discourage de facto stan-
dardization on English (Church and King 1993). As we discuss in 3.3.5
51below, the net externality involved in choosing between two network goods
(such as languages) is ambiguous. Of course, many people learn more than
one language, but native English speakers are less apt to do so. Shy (1996)
stresses that who learns a second language can be indeterminate and/or
ine￿cient, as Farrell and Saloner (1992) noted for converters or adapters
generally.
Law Klausner (1995) and Kahan and Klausner (1996, 1997) argue that
contracts and corporate form are subject to network e￿ects (especially under
common law), as it is valuable to use legal forms that have already been clar-
i￿ed through litigation by others, although Ribstein and Kobayashi (2000)
question this empirically. Radin (2002) discusses standardization versus
customization in the law generally.
Securities Markets and Exchanges Securities markets and exchanges
bene￿t from liquidity or thickness: see Economides and Siow (1988), Do-
mowitz and Steil (1999), Andieh (2003). When there is more trade in a
particular security its price is less volatile and more informative, and in-
vestors can buy and sell promptly without moving the market. This helps
explain why only a few of the imaginable ￿nancial securities are traded, and
why each tends to be traded on one exchange unless institutions allow smooth
cross-exchange trading.
Not only do buyers wish for more sellers and vice versa, but this positive
cross-e￿ect outweighs the negative own-e￿ect (sellers wish there were fewer
other sellers); the di￿erence is the value of liquidity, an e￿ciency gain from
a large (thick) market. This fuels a network e￿ect.
If products are di￿erentiated, a larger network o￿ers more e￿cient matches.
This is the network e￿ect behind eBay, and could be important in compe-
tition among B2B (business-to-business) exchanges (FTC 2000; Bonaccorsi
and Rossi 2002). This also captures part of the value of liquidity, in that a
larger market is more likely to have \coincidence of wants."
3.2.2 Econometric Approaches
Quantitative work on network e￿ects has focused on two questions. First, it
aims to estimate and quantify network e￿ects. Second, some less formal work
aims to test implications of the theory, notably the possibility of persistent
ine￿cient outcomes.
The theory of network e￿ects claims that widespread adoption causes
high value. How can one test this? Clearly one cannot simply include
demand for a good as an econometric predictor of demand for that good.
At the level of individual adoptions, it may be hard to disentangle network
e￿ects from correlations in unobserved taste or quality variables (Manski
1993). Moreover, dynamic implications of network e￿ects may be hard to
distinguish econometrically from learning or herding.
52Meanwhile, the theory predicts path dependence, which implies both large
\errors" and a small number of observations (a network industry may display
a lot of autocorrelation). Likewise it predicts that modest variations in
parameters will have unpredictable e￿ects, and focuses largely on claims
about e￿ciency, all of which makes testing a challenge. Nevertheless, some
work aims to quantify these e￿ects.
A popular hedonic approach compares demand for two products that
di￿er in the network e￿ects expected; the approach aims to isolate this e￿ect
from that of other quality variables. A natural proxy for expected network
e￿ects is previous sales: lagged sales or the installed base, relying on some
inertia in network size. Thus Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) estimated
that the value of an installed base of spreadsheet users represented up to
30% of the price of the market leader in the late 1980s; similarly Gandal
(1994, 1995) found a premium for Lotus-compatibility in PC spreadsheets.
Hartman and Teece (1990) ￿nd network e￿ects in minicomputers. This
approach risks misinterpreting unobserved quality as network e￿ects; but
Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) ￿nd evidence of strictly local network e￿ects
in the adoption of PCs, using geographic variation to control for unobserved
quality.
Another econometric approach rests on the fact that large adopters may
better internalize network e￿ects, and may care less than smaller adopters
about compatibility with others. Saloner and Shepard (1995) found that
banks with more branches tended to install cash machines (ATMs) sooner.
Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) also use geographic variation to estimate
network e￿ects for automated transactions by banks. Gowrisankaran and
Ackerberg (forthcoming) aim to separate consumer-level from bank-level net-
work e￿ects.104
It is easier to identify cross-e￿ects between complementary groups, esti-
mating how more adoption by one a￿ects demand by the other (but recall
that complementarities need not imply network e￿ects). Rosse (1967) docu-
mented that newspaper advertisers pay more to advertise in papers with more
readers, although news readers may not value having more advertisements;
by contrast, readers do value having more advertisements in the Yellow Pages
(Rysman 2004). Dranove and Gandal (2003) and Karaca (2003) also focus
on the cross-e￿ects.
Testing the central e￿ciency implications of the theory is hard, because
(a) it is hard (and not standard economic methodology) to directly assess
the e￿ciency of outcomes, and (b) the theory’s prediction that outcomes
depend sensitively on early events and are insensitive to later events, costs
and tastes, is also hard to test. Liebowitz and Margolis (2001) argue that
software products succeed when measured quality is higher, and that prices
do not systematically rise after the market tips; they infer that network e￿ects
seem unimportant.105 Bresnahan (2004) argues that e￿ective competition
104See also Guiborg (2001) and Kau￿man and Wang (1999).
105Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) suggest that network e￿ects may be essentially ex-
53for the market occurs only at rather rare \epochs" or windows of opportunity,
so that high quality may be necessary but is not su￿cient for success.
Fascinating though they are, these case studies and empirics do not sat-
isfyingly resolve the theoretical questions raised below, which concern the
e￿ciency of equilibria.
3.3 Under-Adoption and Network Externalities
In this sub-section we follow the early literature on network e￿ects in focus-
ing on the single-network case and on the total e￿ect or (often) adoption
externality.
3.3.1 Formalities
Each of K players, or adopters, chooses an action: to adopt a product or
not, or to adopt one product (network) or another. We often interpret these
players not as individuals but as \groups" of adopters, where group i is of
size ni and
X
ni = N: Often (but see 3.3.2), we treat each group as making
an all-or-nothing choice, to adopt or not, or to adopt one product or its rival.
Player i has payo￿ ui
a(x) from action a if a total of x adopters choose
action a; for simplicity, assume there is only one alternative, a0.106 Recalling
our de￿nition in 3.1, we say that there are network e￿ects in a if, for each
i, both the payo￿ ui
a(x) and the adoption incentive ui
a(x)￿ui
a0(N ￿x)
are increasing in x.107 At this point we are considering adoption incentives,
so these payo￿s include prices.
For simplicity, the literature often takes K = 2, though the problems
might not be very interesting with literally only two adopters. Consider two
groups choosing whether or not to adopt a single product. If a non-adopter’s
payo￿ is una￿ected by how many others adopt, then we can normalize it as
zero, and (dropping the subscript) write ui(x) for i’s payo￿ from adoption,
as in Figure 1:
Group 2 adopts Group 2 does not adopt
Group 1 adopts u1(N);u2(N) u1(n1);0
Group 1 does not adopt 0;u2(n2) 0;0
hausted at relevant scales, so that the u function ￿attens out, as Asvanund et al. (2003)
found in ￿le sharing. However, Shapiro (1999) argues that network e￿ects are less likely
than classic scale economies to be exhausted.
106It is not immediately clear how best to extend the de￿nition to more than two alter-
natives: for which alternative(s) a0 must the \adoption incentive" described in the text
increase with adoption of a, and which alternatives does that adoption displace? The
literature has not focused on these questions and we do not address them here.
107In reality network bene￿ts are not homogeneous (Beige 2001 discusses local network
e￿ects, or communities of interest). Also note that if ui
a(x) is linear in x and independent
of i, then the total value of the network is quadratic in x: \Metcalfe’s law." Swann (2002)
and Rohlfs (2001) argue that this is very special and even extreme.
54Network e￿ects arise for this single product if ui(N) > ui(ni) for i =
1;2;:::K;108 in 3.3.3, we show that this implies both parts of our de￿nition.
However, often the leading alternative to one network product is another, as
in Figure 2:
Group 2 adopts A Group 2 adopts B










Network e￿ects arise if ui
a(N) > ui
a(ni) for i = 1;2 and a = A;B; again, this
implies both parts of our de￿nition.
Network e￿ects are strong if they outweigh each adopter’s preferences for
A versus B, so that each prefers to do whatever others do. Then \all adopt
A" and \all adopt B" are both Nash equilibria of the simultaneous-move
noncooperative game whose payo￿ matrix is Figure 2. Strong network e￿ects
thus create multiple equilibria if adoption is simultaneous (not literally, but
in the game-theoretic sense that players cannot react to others’ actual choices
but must base their actions on expectations). For a single network product
(Figure 1), network e￿ects are strong if, for all i; ui(N) > 0 (each would adopt
if others do, or more precisely if he expects others to adopt) and ui(ni) < 0
(each will not if others do not). Thus \no adoption" can be an equilibrium
even for valuable network goods: the chicken-and-egg problem (Leibenstein
1950), especially in the \fragmented" case where groups are small in the
sense that each ui(ni) is small relative to ui(N).
3.3.2 What are the Groups?
Calling each kind of adopter a group, even though it does not act as a single
player, can help focus on the complementarity of adoption by di￿erent kinds
of adopter. For instance, in camera formats, we might make photographers
one group and ￿lm processors the other. Then each group’s bene￿t from
adoption increases when the other group adopts more strongly. Often this
reformulation greatly reduces the number of groups: here, from millions of
individuals to two groups.
This departs from our formal de￿nition in two ways. First, each group
does not coordinate internally and does not make an all-or-nothing adoption
choice; rather, some but not all members of each group adopt. Second, there
may be no intra-group network e￿ects; there may even be intra-group con-
gestion. Thus, given the number of photographers, a developer prefers fewer
other developers for competitive reasons, just as with merchants accepting
credit cards.
A di￿erent reformulation of the groups views only photographers as adopters,
and diagnoses an \indirect network e￿ect" among them, mediated through
the equilibrium response of ￿lm processors. Doing so returns us to the strict
108We often assume for clarity that u is strictly increasing when there are network e￿ects.
55framework above, but pushes the processors into the background.
Another way in which identifying groups is a non-trivial modeling choice
is that adoption choices often are made at several di￿erent vertical levels (see
3.8.3b). For instance, in the PC industry, memory technology is chosen by
memory manufacturers, by producers of complements such as chipsets, by
computer manufacturers (OEMs), and/or by end users or their employers.
Even in a simple model, \adopters" may be vendors, or may be end users
choosing between standards if vendors have chosen incompatible technologies.
3.3.3 Total and Marginal E￿ects
Our de￿nition of network e￿ects requires that (a) one agent’s adoption of a
good bene￿ts other adopters, and that (b) his adoption increases others’ in-
centive to adopt. We call these respectively the total e￿ect and the marginal
e￿ect. We noted above that the marginal e￿ect might apply to merchants’
decisions to accept credit cards even if the total e￿ect does not, if a mer-
chant’s adoption hurts his rivals who don’t adopt more than it hurts those
who do. On the other hand, the total e￿ect can apply where the marginal
e￿ect does not: if one ￿rm in a standard Cournot oligopoly chooses a lower
output, it bene￿ts other ￿rms who have chosen a low output, but those other
￿rms then typically have an incentive to increase their output.109
Although the two conditions are logically separate, de￿nitions in the liter-
ature often mention only the total e￿ect. The (seldom explicit) reason is that
if the total e￿ect holds for both alternatives A and B then the marginal e￿ect
follows. Group 2’s incentive to adopt A rather than B is u2
A(N) ￿ u2
B(n2)
if group 1 has adopted A; it is u2
A(n2) ￿ u2
B(N) if group 1 has adopted B.









B(n2); but this follows from adding the two
total-e￿ect conditions ui
y(N) > ui
y(ni) for i = 2 and y = A;B.
The early literature focused on a single network with a scale-independent
outside good. Thus (as in Figure 1) each group’s payo￿ from B is indepen-
dent of others’ choices, so there are network e￿ects in A if and only if the
total e￿ect holds for A. Accordingly, although the early literature generally
stressed the total e￿ect, the marginal e￿ect follows. By contrast, recent
work stresses competing networks, with much more stress on the marginal
e￿ect, which is essentially Segal’s (1999) \increasing externalities" or Topkis’
(1978, 1998) \supermodularity" (see also Milgrom and Roberts 1990).
3.3.4 Under-Adoption of a Single Network
Two forms of under-adoption threaten a network good. First, the marginal
e￿ect causes a chicken-and-egg coordination problem. Second, if the network
109Other ￿rms would have an incentive to reduce their outputs if ￿rms’ outputs are
\strategic complements" (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer 1985a,b), and the marginal
e￿ect then does apply.
56e￿ect is an externality (see below), there is too little incentive to adopt at the
margin, because the total e￿ect means that adoption bene￿ts other adopters.
We discuss this marginal externality here and the chicken-and-egg problem
in 3.4.2 below.
In Figure 1, if u1(N) > 0 > u2(N) then player 1 would like the \all adopt"
outcome but, even if he adopts, player 2 will not. If u1(n1) < 0 then the
unique equilibrium is no adoption; if instead u1(n1) > 0 then equilibrium is
adoption by group 1 alone. In either case, if u1(N)+u2(N) > max[u1(n1);0]
then adoption by all would increase total surplus. Since each player likes the
other to adopt, each one’s adoption incentive is too weak from the viewpoint
of adopters jointly.
The e￿cient outcome can still be an equilibrium if this bias is not too
strong, and this generic observation takes an interesting form here. Say that
preferences are similar if the players agree on the best outcome, so ui(N)
has the same sign for all i. Then the e￿cient outcome, which is either
\all adopt" or \no adoption," is an equilibrium of the simultaneous-adoption
game suggested by Figure 1, as Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) noted. More-
over, while this equilibrium need not be unique, it is each player’s best feasible
outcome, and many institutions (including side payments, sequential moves
and commitment, and communication) preserve and reinforce it.
But normally the bias will cause wrong choices. In a static framework, it
makes the network too small.110 If adoption is dynamic, for instance if costs
fall over time, the same logic makes adoption too slow.111 It is e￿cient
to subsidize a marginal adopter for whom the cost of service exceeds his
private willingness to pay, but exceeds it by less than the increase in other
adopters’ value. Such subsidies can be hard to target, as we discuss next,
but there is a deeper problem too, even with perfectly discriminatory prices.
With complete information and adopter-speci￿c pricing, Segal (1999) ￿nds
that without externalities on non-traders, e￿ciency results if the sponsor
simultaneously and publicly makes an o￿er to each adopter, but because there
are positive externalities on e￿cient traders, there is too little adoption when
o￿ers are \private," or essentially bilateral. E￿ciency requires multilateral
bargaining, in which trade between the sponsor and one trader depends on
trade with others.
110Beige (2001) shows that equilibrium locally maximizes a \harmony" function that
counts only half of the network e￿ects in the sum of payo￿s.
111Dynamic adoption paths with falling prices or other \drivers" of increasing adoption
have been studied by (e.g.) Rohlfs (1974), Farrell and Shapiro (1992, 1993), Economides
and Himmelberg (1995), Choi and Thum (1998), and Vettas (2000). Prices may fall over
time because of Coasian dynamics: see 3.6. Adoption paths can also be driven by the
strengthening of network e￿ects: human languages with more trade and travel; computer
programming languages with more modularity and re-use; VCRs with more movie rental.
573.3.5 Are Network e￿ects Externalities?
Network e￿ects often involve externalities, in the sense that prices don’t fully
incorporate the bene￿ts of one person’s adoption for others. Indeed, early
literature often simply called network e￿ects \network externalities." But
network e￿ects are not always externalities, as Liebowitz and Margolis (1994)
stressed.
Liebowitz and Margolis argue that many indirect network e￿ects are pe-
cuniary. If adoption by buyers just lowers price, it might be that Figure 1
describes payo￿s to buyers, but sellers bear an equal negative e￿ect. Then,
while buyers jointly could be made better o￿ by a well-targeted small subsidy
from inframarginal to marginal buyers, no such subsidy can make everyone
(sellers included) better o￿. However, the microfoundations of such pe-
cuniary network e￿ects seem unclear. Decreasing costs in a competitive
industry often re￿ect a real economy of scale (perhaps upstream), so there
is an e￿ciency (not just pecuniary) bene￿t of coordination. With no real
economy of agglomeration, it is unclear how a sheer price shift can both fa-
vor buyers and also induce additional entry by sellers, as we noted in 3.1.
Church, Gandal and Krause (2002) stress that there can be a real e￿ciency
gain when a larger \hardware" network attracts more varied \software," not
just lower prices.
More compellingly, any economic e￿ect is an externality only if not in-
ternalized. A network e￿ect might be internalized through side payments
among adopters, although this will be hard if there are many players or pri-
vate information. Alternatively (see 3.6-3.7) a seller who can capture the
bene￿ts of a larger network might internalize network e￿ects and voluntar-
ily subsidize marginal adopters, as in Segal’s (1999) model of public o￿ers.
But unless a seller can accurately target those adopters, subsidy is costly,
and while it may sometimes work well enough, it seems clear that it often
won’t. Indeed, ￿rst-best pricing would require the price to each adopter to
be equal to incremental cost less his external contribution to others, and
such pricing jeopardizes pro￿ts and budget balance. Suppose for instance
that a good will be supplied if and only if all K groups agree. For ￿rst-best
adoption incentives, the price facing group i should be equal to the cost C
of supplying the good to all, less the additional surplus accruing to groups




pi￿C = (N ￿1)[C￿
P
ui(N)], so costs are covered if and only if adoption
is ine￿cient! (First-best incentives require that each adopter be a residual
claimant, leaving the vendor a negative equity interest at the margin.) For
these reasons, adoption prices will often not fully internalize network e￿ects,
and a pro￿tably supplied single network good will be under-adopted.
Third, any externalities are smaller and ambiguous when networks com-
pete. To illustrate, suppose that K = 3, and that groups 1 and 2 have
adopted A and B respectively; now group 3 is choosing. A-adopters (group
1) gain if group 3 adopts A, but B-adopters gain if it adopts B. When each
58choice means rejecting the other, the net e￿ect on others is ambiguous.112
3.4 The Coordination Problem
When networks compete, we just noted that any conventional externality
becomes weaker and ambiguous. The same logic, however, strengthens
the marginal e￿ect|the fact that adoption encourages others to adopt the
same network. A user’s adoption of A instead of B not only directly makes
A more attractive to others but also makes the alternative, B, less so.113
For instance, part of the positive feedback in the adoption of CDs was the
declining availability of LP records as CDs became more popular.
Through the marginal e￿ect, strong network e￿ects create multiple adop-
tion equilibria and hence coordination problems. Optimal coordination is
hard, as everyday experience and laboratory experiments (Ochs 1995; Gneezy
and Rottenstreich 2004) con￿rm. Coordination problems include actual
breakdowns of coordination (3.4.1) and coordination on the wrong focal point
(3.4.2). Coordination is especially di￿cult|and the institutions to aid it
work less well|when (as in the Battle of the Sexes) the incentive for coor-
dination coexists with con￿ict over what to coordinate on.
3.4.1 Coordination Breakdowns: Mistakes, Splintering, and Wait-
and-See
Coordination \breaks down" when adopters choose incompatible options but
would all prefer to coordinate. This can happen in at least two ways, which
we call confusion and splintering. Economic theorists’ equilibrium perspec-
tive pushes them toward (probably over-) optimistic views on the risks of such
failures, but case studies and policy discussion often implicate coordination
failures.
112To quantify, treat K as large, and approximate the set of adopters with a continuum.
A small shift of dx users from a network of size xA to one of size xB has a net e￿ect on
other adopters of e = [xBu0
B(xB) ￿ xAu0
A(xA)]dx: this has ambiguous sign and is smaller
in magnitude than at least one of the xiu0
i(xi)dx.
The incentive to \splinter" from what most others are doing is too strong at the margin
(defection imposes a negative net externality, or conformity confers a positive externality)
if e < 0 whenever xB < xA. When the goods are homogeneous except for network
size, that condition is that xu0(x) is increasing: see Farrell and Saloner (1992). In the
convenient (if unrealistic) Metcalfe’s Law case u(n) = vn, there is thus too much incentive
to defect from a network to which most players will adhere. Then there is not just a
bene￿t but a positive externality from conformity.
113With a continuum of adopters, the gain in A’s relative attractiveness from a small
increase in its adoption at B’s expense is proportional not just to u0
A(xA), as it would be
if A were the only network good, but to u0
A(xA) + u0
B(xB). Note that this strengthening
of the marginal e￿ect depends on the total e￿ect in both A and B.
59Confusion Coordination can break down by mistake or confusion if adopters
do not know what others are doing.114 Common knowledge of plans averts
such confusion, and the simplest models assume it away by focusing on
pure-strategy equilibrium, in which by de￿nition players know one another’s
strategies and do not make mistakes.115 Other models use mixed-strategy
equilibrium,116 which may be too pessimistic about coordination: each player’s
attempt to coordinate with others is maximally di￿cult in mixed-strategy
equilibrium.117
Splintering Second, coordination can break down even in pure-strategy
equilibrium with strategic certainty. This happens if product di￿erentiation
discourages unilateral moves (e.g. to slightly larger networks) but is weak
enough that a coordinated move of everyone on networks B, C and D to
network A would bene￿t all.
When there are just two networks A and B splintering is impossible if
the users of each network can optimally coordinate as a group, but can arise
if, for example, a coordinated move of everyone on network B to network A
would bene￿t all of them, but the users of B cannot coordinate.
The incompatible outcome is thus (in game-theory language) an equilib-
rium but not coalition-proof: if multiple decision makers could coordinate a
move they would all do better. We call this splintering: a dysfunctional equi-
librium with multiple small and consequently unsuccessful networks instead
of one large and successful one. Common knowledge of plans does not avert
these problems; their solution requires a leadership-like ability to focus on
\let’s all do X instead."
Evidence that splintering is important includes the demand for consen-
sus compatibility standards, which provide just such leadership.118 Such
standards (see 3.4.3) go beyond mere communication of plans, since com-
mon knowledge need not cure the problem. For instance, following Thomp-
son (1954), Hemenway (1975) and Gabel (1991) argue that early twentieth-
century standardization of auto parts mainly reduced spurious variety. Even
before the standardization meetings any manufacturer could have chosen
to match another’s (non-proprietary, non-secret) speci￿cations; apparently
114In The Gift of the Magi, a famous short story by O. Henry, Jim sold his watch to buy
his wife Della a comb; Della sold her hair to buy Jim a watch-chain. Their plans were
secret because each was meant as a Christmas surprise for the other.
115Rationalizability, on the other hand, unhelpfully permits any outcome in a
simultaneous-adoption game with strong network e￿ects.
116See for instance Dixit and Shapiro (1986), Farrell (1987), Farrell and Saloner (1988),
Bolton and Farrell (1990), Crawford (1995).
117But mixed-strategy equilibrium can be defended as a shorthand for a symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with incomplete information.
118An optimistic view would be that consensus standards promptly solve the problem
wherever it arises, so splintering never persists. But ￿nding consensus standards seems
slow and painful, which casts doubt on such optimism. If the pain and slowness arises
from di￿culty in ￿nding Pareto-improving coordinated shifts, however, then the theory
sketched in the text is incomplete.
60such a unilateral move would not pay, but a coordinated voluntary move
did.119 But consensus standards generally are non-binding and do not in-
volve side payments, so they would not a￿ect a failure to standardize that
was a coalition-proof equilibrium re￿ection of (say) di￿erences in tastes.
There is little theoretical work on splintering, although Kretschmer (2004)
explores how it can retard innovation when there are multiple alternatives to
a single established standard.120 But it features prominently in case studies.
Postrel (1990) argued that quadraphonic sound in the 1970s failed because
competing ￿rms sponsored incompatible quad systems and because hard-
ware producers did not adequately manage complements (recorded music).
Rohlfs (2001) describes how competing incompatible fax systems (invented
in 1843) stalled for over a century until consensus standardization in the late
1970s.121 Augereau, Greenstein and Rysman (forthcoming) claim that the
adoption of 56K modem technology in aggregate was stalled by the coex-
istence of two equally good incompatible standards until the ITU issued a
third that became focal. Saloner (1990) discusses splintering among Unix
implementations (widely blamed for slow adoption of Unix until Linux be-
came relatively focal). Besen and Johnson (1986) argued that AM stereo
was adopted slowly because there were competing, broadly comparable, stan-
dards and no player could start a strong bandwagon: adopters (radio stations)
avoided explicit coordination because of antitrust fears, and the FCC did not
take a lead. Microsoft was accused of \polluting" or intentionally splintering
the Java standard when it perceived the latter as a threat to its own non-
Java standard. Rysman (2003) notes that competition in yellow pages may
involve splintering, thus reducing network bene￿ts (although he ￿nds that
this does not outweigh losses from monopoly). He does not assess whether
advertisers and users might instead all coordinate on the directory that o￿ers
them jointly the best deal|a sunnier non-splintering view of incompatible
competition that theory has tended to ￿nd focal.
Do similar splintering concerns arise with traditional economies of scale?
In terms of cooperative game theory (how much surplus is generated by
various groups of participants) network e￿ects and economies of scale are
isomorphic, so concerns about splintering parallel classic concerns about in-
e￿ciently small-scale production in monopolistic competition. Modern mod-
els of the latter, since Spence (1977) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), mostly
attribute splintering among monopolistically competitive ￿rms to horizontal
product di￿erentiation, and because variety is valuable, these models ￿nd
that although each ￿rm is too small to minimize average cost, it need not
be too small for overall e￿ciency. But the classical suspicion that equilib-
rium involves too much fragmentation re-surfaces in that a popular claimed
119The point is not that there are increasing returns in compatibility bene￿ts, but that
a critical mass may be necessary to overcome di￿erences in tastes, beliefs, etc.
120Goerke and Holler (1995) and Woeckener (1999) also stress ine￿ciencies of splintering.
121Economides and Himmelberg (1995) estimated a demand system for the adoption of
fax under a single standard.
61e￿ciency motive for horizontal mergers is achieving more e￿cient scale.122
Fear of Breakdowns Even mere fear of coordination breakdowns may
delay adoption as people wait to see what others will do.123 This can
ine￿ciently slow adoption through strategic uncertainty rather than because
of the externality from adoption.
3.4.2 Coordinating on the Wrong Equilibrium
Because coordination is hard, clumsy cues such as tradition and authority
are often used. Schelling (1960) suggested that two people wishing to meet
in New York might well go, by tradition, to Grand Central Station at noon.
Many species of animals meet at ￿xed times or places for mating. Human
meetings, and work hours, are often arranged in advance, and thus do not
respond sensitively to later-revealed information about what is convenient
for participants. The persistence of such clumsy solutions testi￿es to the
di￿culty of ￿exible optimal coordination. It would therefore be surprising
if multiple adopters of networks always coordinated on the choice that gives
them the most surplus.
Other parts of economics have studied the possibility of (perhaps persis-
tent) coordination on the wrong equilibrium. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) suggested that industrialization requires
a \Big Push" that coordinates many sectors of the economy and that may
not happen under laissez-faire. That is, industrialization is a \good" equi-
librium, but the economy may stay at the \bad" pre-industrial equilibrium
without major intervention. Modern economic geography sees patterns of
development as partly fortuitous (Saxenian 1994, Krugman 1991, Davis and
Weinstein 2002). Macroeconomists have studied how otherwise irrelevant
\sunspot" signals can guide economies to good or bad equilibria;124 game
theory has studied how cheap talk can do so.
Starting from a bad equilibrium, there would (by de￿nition) be joint
rewards for getting to a better equilibrium, but no rewards to individually
deviating. As Liebowitz and Margolis (1994, 1995) stressed, this can suggest
a role for an entrepreneur: in 3.6{3.8 below, we note some entrepreneurial
tactics.
i. Single Network With a single network (Figure 1), voluntary adop-
tion is weakly Pareto-improving, so an equilibrium with more adoption Pareto-
122For a skeptical view see Farrell and Shapiro (2001). A merger removes all competi-
tion between ￿rms, whereas a common standard replaces incompatible competition with
compatible competition; see 3.9.
123Kornish (forthcoming) describes a \decision-theoretic" model of adoption timing under
strategic uncertainty, but takes as given the behavior of all agents but one.
124See e.g. Cooper (1999), Cooper and John (1988), Cooper and Haltiwanger (1988),
Diamond (1982), and Bryant (1994).
62dominates one with less. Dybvig and Spatt (1983) show that there is a max-
imal equilibrium, in which all players who adopt in any equilibrium adopt.
This maximal equilibrium is Pareto preferred to all other equilibria, which
thus have too little adoption.125
As in any game with multiple equilibria, expectations are key. If players
expect others to adopt, they too will adopt. Shifting from a simultaneous-
move perspective to a more dynamic one (informally at this point), impli-
cations include positive feedback and critical mass: once enough adoption
happens or is con￿dently foreseen, further self-reinforcing adoption follows.
Similarly lack of adoption is self-reinforcing: a network product can enter
a \death spiral" (a dynamic form of the chicken-and-egg problem) if low
adoption persuades others not to adopt.126
While they both involve under-adoption, this chicken-and-egg problem is
quite di￿erent from the marginal externality in 3.3.4{5 above. The mar-
ginal problem arises only when preferences are not similar,127 could typically
be helped by small subsidies to marginal adopters, and cannot be solved by
voluntary joint action without side payments; whereas the chicken-and-egg
problem arises even with identical adopters, might be solvable by coordi-
nating better without side payments, and often cannot be helped by small
subsidies.
ii. Competing Networks Similar coordination problems can cause
the adoption of the wrong network good. In Figure 2, if players expect
others to adopt A, they will do so, but expectations in favor of B are equally
self-ful￿lling. And if expectations clash, so too will choices. What, then,
drives expectations? In general one must look to cues outside Figures 1 and
2, as we discuss in the rest of this sub-section.
Clumsy coordination can also blunt competitive pressures among net-
works, since business does not reliably go to the best o￿er, as we discuss in
3.7.
3.4.3 Cheap Talk and Consensus Standards
A natural response to a coordination problem is to talk. Credible talk can
make plans common knowledge and thus avert confusion-based coordination
failures, and may help adopters coordinate changes in plans and thus escape
splintered equilibria or coordination on the wrong focal point. In fact,
125This is characteristic of games with supermodularity (Topkis 1978, 1998 or Milgrom
and Roberts 1990) or \strategic complements" (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer
1985a,b).
126Schelling (1978) describes such dynamics in a wide range of applications. Of course, the
dynamics can also work in the other direction, with critical mass and take-o￿. Jeitschko
and Taylor (2001) study the stability of \faith-based coordination."
127This assumes, as does most of the literature, that each adopter’s choice is zero-one.
When each adopter makes a continuous quantity choice a marginal problem arises even if
preferences are identical.
63many voluntary \consensus standards" are reached through talk, sometimes
mediated through standards organizations; David and Shurmer (1996) report
that consensus standardization has grown dramatically.128 Large o￿cial
organizations often have formal procedures; smaller consortia may be more
￿exible.129 The economics literature on consensus standards is less developed
than that on de facto or bandwagon standards, perhaps because reaching
consensus seems political rather than a narrowly economic process.
Game theory ￿nds that cheap talk works less well the more con￿ict there
is. At the vendor level, con￿ict can arise because not everyone wants to
coordinate: see 3.8 below. Discussion of consensus standards has focused
more on con￿ict that arises if all players want to coordinate but disagree over
what to coordinate on, as in the Battle of the Sexes. For example, when
a promising new technology arrives, con￿ict is likely between the \installed
base" of those who are more locked in to an old technology and those who are
less so. Gabel (1991) argues that con￿ict is likely between those who are and
are not vertically integrated. Con￿ict may also arise because active partici-
pants in standards organizations tend to have vested interests (which indeed
may motivate them to bear the costs of participating).130 Vested interest
may be especially strong when potential standards incorporate intellectual
property.
As a result, attempts to coordinate through talk may induce bargaining
delays that dissipate much of the gains from coordination. The economics
literature stresses this observation, echoing concerns of many standards par-
ticipants. Economists have modeled the process as a war of attrition: partic-
ipants who favor standard A hope that those who favor B will give up rather
than delay further. Farrell and Saloner (1988) introduced such a model
with complete information and two participants, and compared \committee"
versus \bandwagon" standardization, and against a hybrid mechanism.131
128Some practitioners reserve the term \standard" for formal consensus coordination.
Standards organizations include the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and
a wide variety of national standards bodies such as ANSI in the US; ANSI is an umbrella
organization for specialized industry standards development. There are also many informal
standards fora.
129On the institutions, see e.g. Hemenway (1975), Kahin and Abbate (1995). On the
economics of consensus standards development see also Besen and Saloner (1988). Cargill
(1989) describes the standards process in information technology.
Weiss and Sirbu (1990) econometrically study technology choices in voluntary consensus
standards committees. Lehr (1995) describes consensus standardization in the internet;
see also Simcoe (2004).
130Weiss and Sirbu (1990); Farrell (1996).
131In a hybrid mechanism, compatibility may result either by consensus or by one propo-
nent driving a market bandwagon (but if both try simultaneously, the result is incompat-
ibility). Thus the consensus standards process competes directly against the bandwagon
process; Gabel (1991) stresses that network e￿ects can be realized through consensus,
bandwagons, or other means. Besen and Farrell (1991) note a di￿erent form of compe-
tition among processes: less-formal consensus processes may act faster than more formal
ones such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU); Lerner and Tirole (2004)
study forum-shopping equilibria in consensus standards.
64Farrell (1996) and David and Monroe (1994) observe that when there is pri-
vate information about the quality of proposed standards, the war of attrition
may select for good proposals, although at a high cost (Simcoe 2004 shows
how similar results can emerge from rational search by interested parties).
They then assess e￿ciency consequences of rules in the consensus standards
process. For instance, many standards organizations limit the exploitation
of intellectual property embodied in standards (Lemley 2002), and this may
reduce delays as well as limit patent-holders’ ex post market power. Sim-
coe (2004) analyzes data from the Internet Engineering Task Force and ￿nds
evidence that more vested interest (measured as more patents, or more com-
mercial participation) causes more delay. Another response is to seek rapid
consensus before vested interest ripens.
With two players (as in those models), either can ensure immediate con-
sensus by conceding. With more players, Bulow and Klemperer (1999) show
that delays can be very long if conceding brings no reward until others also
concede, as is the case if (as in many standards organizations) a standard
requires near-unanimous consensus.132
3.4.4 Coordination through Sequential Choice
Game theory claims that with full information and strong network e￿ects,
fully sequential adoption ensures coordination on a Pareto-undominated stan-
dard. The argument (Farrell and Saloner 1985) is fairly convincing with
two groups. For simplicity, consider the single-network case. Suppose that
ui(N) > 0 > ui(ni) for all i, so that adoption is an e￿cient equilibrium
and non-adoption is an ine￿cient equilibrium of the simultaneous-adoption
game. If group 1 ￿rst adopts, then group 2 will also adopt: knowing this,
group 1 can (and therefore will) get u1(N) by adopting. By moving ￿rst,
group 1 can start an irresistible bandwagon: it need not fear that adoption
will give it only u1(n1); thus only the e￿cient equilibrium is subgame-perfect
when adoption is sequential.
The argument extends in theory to any ￿nite number of players, and to
the choice between two (or more) networks.133 But it is much less compelling
with many players: it assumes that each adopter sees all previous choices
before making his own, and assumes strong common knowledge of preferences
and of rationality to forge a chain of backward induction with (on the order
of) K steps, an unreliable form of reasoning (empirically) when K is large.
Thus the theoretical result is surely too strong: the ￿rst player shouldn’t
count on it if u1(n) is very negative for small n; and if players won’t rely
on the result, it becomes false. But it does express one possible route out
132By contrast, they show that if a player can cease to bear delay costs by unilaterally
conceding (as in oligopolists competing to win a natural monopoly), a multi-player war
will quickly collapse to a two-player one. Political scientists analogously have Duverger’s
Law, a claim that most elections will have two serious candidates.
133Farrell and Saloner (1985) also show (with two groups) that cheap talk need not help
when information on preferences is incomplete; Lee (2003) extends this to K groups.
65of ine￿cient coordination traps: an in￿uential adopter could try to start a
bandwagon. In this respect in￿uence is related to size: when a big player
moves, it shifts others’ incentives by more than when a small player moves.
Indeed, it may even become a dominant strategy for others to follow, surely
a stronger bandwagon force than backward induction in the subgame among
the remaining players. Thus size confers leadership ability, and markets with
at least one highly concentrated layer are less apt (other things, notably
con￿ict, equal) to be caught in pure coordination traps. Illustrating this
idea, Holmes (1999) discusses the role of large players in the geographic shift
of the US textile industry; Bresnahan (2001) discusses AOL’s role (as a large
and potentially pivotal user) in the Netscape-Microsoft battle for browser
share.
This result is optimistic about the ability of adoption bandwagons to
avert Pareto-inferior outcomes. As we see next, however, bandwagons may
be less good at balancing early and late adopters’ preferences.
3.5 Inertia in Adoption
Individual switching costs can cause problems, as in section 2 above, but at
least each user makes his own choice. Network e￿ects, by binding together
di￿erent users’ choices, might generate a stronger and more worrying form of
inertia, locking society in to an ine￿cient product (or behavior) because it is
hard to coordinate a switch to something better but incompatible|especially
where network e￿ects coexist with individual switching costs. In a range
of cases, including QWERTY, English spelling, VHS, and many computer
software products, some suggest that a poor standard ine￿ciently persists
because network e￿ects create excessive inertia. Liebowitz and Margolis
(1990, 1995) are skeptical (notably in QWERTY) and argue (2001) that
success in computer software has followed trade reviewers’ assessments of
product quality; but Bresnahan (2003) argues that this has been true only
in wide-open periods and that high quality is necessary but not su￿cient for
success. It is hard to test ex post excess inertia in case studies by directly
assessing the e￿ciency of outcomes; we focus instead on the economic logic.
Here we ask how much inertia there is in adoption dynamics at given prices.
In 3.6{3.7, we ask how sponsors’ price and other strategies a￿ect it.
3.5.1 Ex Post Inertia
Inertia arises ex post if later adopters remain compatible with the installed
base even though an alternative would be better if network e￿ects were neu-
tralized. Just as contestability theory observes that economies of scale alone
do not create an advantage to incumbency, so too network e￿ects alone need
not generate inertia: in principle everyone could instantly shift to coordinate
on the better alternative. But there are usually some sunk costs or switching
costs; and if expectations centre on the status quo then inertia results even
66if there are no tangible intertemporal links.
Inertia surely is often substantial: Rohlfs (2001) argues from the history
of fax that a network product without stand-alone value must be \truly
wonderful and low-priced" to succeed; he and others attribute the VCR’s
success to its o￿ering stand-alone value; Shapiro and Varian (1998) quote
Intel CEO Andy Grove’s rule of thumb that an incompatible improvement
must be \ten times better."
Inertia can be e￿cient: incompatibility with the installed base is a real so-
cial cost if the status quo has network e￿ects. But inertia is ex post \excess" if
it would be more e￿cient for later adopters to switch, given earlier adopters’
choice. (As that phrasing suggests, we follow the literature in assuming here
that the installed base will not switch; if it would, then later adopters would
sacri￿ce no network bene￿ts and would collectively have excessive incentives
to switch.) For example, it would be ex post excess inertia if society should
switch to the DSK typewriter keyboard, counting the full social costs, but
network e￿ects and switching costs ine￿ciently prevent this. This requires
that pivotal movers ine￿ciently fail to move, because they expect others not
to move (the \horses" problem), or because they bear a larger share of the
costs than of the bene￿ts of moving (the \penguins" problem).134
In a simple two-group case where group 1 is committed and group 2 op-
timally coordinates internally, neither of these can happen, so inertia cannot
be ex post excessive. In Figure 2, suppose that group 1 has irreversibly
adopted (say) A. To be adopted by group 2, B must be substantially bet-
ter: u2
B(n2) > u2





That is, B’s quality or price advantage (assessed by group 2) must outweigh
the additional network bene￿t of compatibility with group 1 (assessed by
group 2 when it adopts A). Of course, there is inertia: if group 2 val-
ues compatibility with group 1, B will fail unless it is much better than





A(n1)]. Group 2 internalizes only part
of the social bene￿t of inter-group compatibility, and is thus too ready to
strand group 1. Far from excess inertia, this model displays ex post \excess
momentum."135
This result instructively contradicts the popular intuition that inertia is
obviously ex post excessive. But with more than two groups, ex post excess
134Farrell and Saloner (1987) analogize the ￿rst problem to horses tied to one another
who will not wander far or fast, because none can move independently and staying still is
more focal than moving in a particular direction at a particular speed. They analogize
the second problem to penguins, wishing to dive for ￿sh but concerned that the ￿rst one
in is most vulnerable to predators.
135Farrell and Saloner (1986b) phrased this result in terms of \unique equilibrium" be-
cause they did not assume that each group optimally coordinates. Ellison and Fudenberg
(2000) use essentially this model with optimal coordination to argue that there may be
excessive innovation. If early adopters (group 1 here) would switch ex post to retain
compatibility with group 2, group 2 is clearly again too willing to choose B. See also Shy
(1996) and Witt (1997).
67inertia may well occur, because optimal coordination among ex post adopters
may well fail due to coordination problems and/or free-riding. To see
this, return to the sequential adoption model of Farrell and Saloner (1985).
Adopters 1;2;:::;K arrive in sequence and, on arrival, irreversibly choose to
adopt A or B. Because of idiosyncratic preferences or relative technological
progress over time, adopters have di￿erent preferences between A and B.
There are network e￿ects: adopter i gets payo￿ ui
z(xz); where xz is the total
number of adopters on his network z = A;B.
Arthur (1989) simpli￿ed this framework by assuming that an adopter gets
network bene￿ts only from previous adoptions, not future ones; thus adopters
need not form expectations about the future. He showed that a technology
favored by enough early adopters can become permanently locked in. If the
relative network sizes ever become lopsided enough to outweigh the strongest
idiosyncratic preferences, all subsequent adopters follow suit, because none
wants to lead a new bandwagon, even if he knew that all future adopters
would join it. There is a free-rider problem in overcoming an installed-base
lead. Thus suppose that network e￿ects make x = 2 much more valuable
than x = 1, and that most adopters prefer B, but that by chance the ￿rst
adopter prefers, and adopts, A. Adopter 2, then, who prefers B, must
compare u2
B(1) against u2
A(2). He may adopt A only because x = 1 is so
undesirable, in which case he and all subsequent adopters would pick A; while
if he chose B, then other B-lovers would be happy choosing B thereafter.136
This is extreme, but getting a new network up to critical mass can generally
be costly for the pioneer, harmful to the installed base, but valuable to those
who arrive later.
Arthur’s assumption that adopters do not care about future adoptions
seems to ￿t learning-by-doing with spillovers rather than most network ef-
fects, but we can usefully re-formulate it. Adopters more generally get the
present value of a ￿ow of network bene￿ts, where the ￿ow is increasing in
adoptions to date. Then if adopter 2 adopts B and others follow, his sacri￿ce
of network bene￿ts is only temporary.
In this broader framework, Arthur’s model assumes that adopters are
in￿nitely impatient, thus both ignoring coordination problems and exagger-
ating the free-rider problem. On the other hand, Farrell and Saloner (1986a)
considered ex ante identical adopters with a ￿nite discount rate. Adopters
adopt immediately on arrival, and good B becomes available at date T.
Specializing their model in the opposite direction from Arthur’s, if identical
adopters are in￿nitely patient and can optimally coordinate from any point
on, the problem reduces to the two-group model outlined above in which ex
post excess inertia cannot arise.
But the coordination problem re-emerges as soon as we depart from
136This is similar to the \informational herding" literature: see e.g. Banerjee (1992),
Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), Bikchandani, Hirshleifer
and Welch (1992). Berndt, Pindyck and Azoulay (2003) argue that informational herding
creates network e￿ects in anti-ulcer drugs.
68Arthur’s in￿nite impatience. In particular, if previous history is the lead-
ing cue for coordination, then a patient small adopter 2 will compare u2
B(1)
against u2
A(K),137 so that an early lead would be even more powerful than
Arthur’s model suggests; it may be a self-ful￿lling prophecy that a minority
network will never grow. And if there are many contenders to displace the
incumbent, adopters might expect splintering among those who abandon the
incumbent (Kretschmer 2004). By the same logic, if everyone expects the
new network to take over then it often will do so even if it is ine￿cient.
With identical adopters, the inductive logic of Farrell and Saloner (1985)
suggests that the ￿rst adopter to arrive after T is pivotal. If he prefers that
everyone forever stick to A, he can adopt A and thus make the next adopter
feel all the more strongly the same way; similarly if he prefers that all from
now on adopt B.138 Because of the free-rider problem, the pivotal adopter
may have too little incentive to adopt the new network, B; on the other hand,
adopting B strands the installed base. As in 3.3.5 above, the net externality
can run in either direction, so ex post excess inertia and excess momentum
are both possible, even in unique equilibrium. If we eschew the long chain
of backward induction and instead assume that the date-T adopter expects
others’ future choices to be una￿ected by his own (he is small), then there are
typically multiple equilibria and expectations determine the outcome, which
can be biased in either direction. This would presumably also be the case if
nobody knows which adopter is pivotal.
Farrell and Saloner (1986a) and Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2006) describe
other models in which e￿cient coordination is hindered by delays before other
adopters can follow an early mover’s lead. Each is most easily described for
two adopters. In Farrell and Saloner, each adopter has only occasional
opportunities to adopt a new technology, so even if each adopts as soon as
possible, adopting ￿rst entails a temporary loss of network bene￿ts. If that
is painful enough, no adopter is willing to lead; the private cost may be either
greater or less than the social cost. In Ostrovsky and Schwarz, each adopter
chooses a \target" time to adopt, and if there were no noise, immediate
adoption by all would be a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. But when actual
adoption time is a￿ected by (continuous) noise, Pareto-dominance is not
enough. Each adopter i can contemplate slightly delaying its adoption, by dt.
If pi is the probability that it will be the ￿rst to adopt, slight delay is privately
desirable with probability pi and then yields a gain of [ui
A(2) ￿ ui
B(1)]dt; it
is privately undesirable with probability 1 ￿ pi and then yields a loss of
[ui
B(2) ￿ ui













B(1), it will prefer to delay slightly. Thus in
any equilibrium with adoption by all, pi ￿ ri for all i. But
P
pi = 1, so if
P
ri < 1 then there is no equilibrium with adoption, even if all would gain
137This makes what may seem an unduly pessimistic assumption about later adopters’
expectations if adopter 2 picks B. But that pessimistic assumption seems more natural if
we are instead discussing adopter 3 after two A-adoptions.
138Thus his preference is evaluated assuming that all subsequent adopters follow his lead.
69(ui
B(2) > ui
A(2) for all i) and there is only a little noise. However much each
player expects others (collectively) to delay, he wants to delay slightly more.
Entry Our discussion of inertia also informs us about competitive entry
of a product that is incompatible with an established network. Inertia
implies that even if an entrant o￿ers a better deal, network e￿ects aside, to
new adopters, they may (and perhaps should) stick to the installed base,
assuming that the base itself won’t move (perhaps because of individual
switching costs). Incompatible entry is di￿cult, and Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000) show that limit pricing can be powerful with network e￿ects.
If new adopters optimally coordinate, this inertia is presumably because,
for them, compatibility with the installed base outweighs the new prod-
uct’s advantages. As noted above, inertia can be ex post e￿cient given
incompatibility,139 although even ex post excess momentum (too-strong in-
centives for such entry) is possible. The point here is not whether incompat-
ible entry is too hard ex post, given incompatibility and the installed base,
but the fact that even e￿cient (indeed, even less-than-e￿cient) inertia can
confer ex post market power on the established network.
Some incompatible innovation/entry succeeds in overcoming inertia. Of
course, a product that is \ten times better" may simply outweigh inertia.
But inertia can be lowered in other ways, as Bresnahan’s (2003) discussion
of competitive transitions in the computer industry stresses.
First, compatibility with the installed base eliminates the coordination
and free-rider problems, and lowers individual switching costs; even partial
compatibility through converters (see 3.8) can help. Similarly, multi-homing
or double purchase (de Palma, Leruth and Regibeau 1999) mitigates pivotal
adopters’ losses of network bene￿ts if they switch; Shapiro (1999) thus ar-
gues that exclusive dealing140 by incumbents in network markets is especially
threatening. Complementors can also multi-home, as when applications soft-
ware providers \port" their programs from one operating system to another.
Rapid market growth makes the installed base less important relative
to new adopters, and can thus mitigate pivotal adopters’ transient losses
of network bene￿ts if they lead a switch (Farrell and Saloner 1986a); large
players may both su￿er less from such losses and be especially e￿ective leaders
of a bandwagon. When expectations otherwise focus on the incumbent,
mechanisms such as consensus standards to help adopters coordinate on the
best deal can also lower entry barriers. Finally, just as splintering among
139Moreover, we saw that ex post excess inertia, blocking ex post e￿cient incompatible
entry, is plausible when there are free-rider or coordination problems among adopters, and
perhaps especially if expectations track history; Krugman (1991b) discusses the relation-
ship between expectations and history. Since those problems may become more severe as
the installed base grows, incompatible entrants may face \narrow windows" of opportunity
(David, 1986).
140Broadly speaking this means agreements that make it hard for an entrant to thrive
with small scale or limited scope.
70innovators tends to preserve the status quo (Kretschmer 2004), disarray and
incompatibility in the installed base may open up opportunities for a \strong
leader" that can o￿er coordination as well as (or instead of) a better product.
As this last point suggests, successful static compatibility or standard-
ization might retard (incompatible) innovation. Although the logic requires
care|it is natural that the better the status quo, the less likely a good
system is to engage in costly change|this might be an argument (in the
spirit of maintaining biodiversity) against static standardization, as Cabral
and Kretschmer (forthcoming) explore. But while marketwide compatibility
may retard incompatible replacement of the compatible outcome, mix-and-
match compatibility encourages component innovation (Langlois 1990).
3.5.2 Early Power
When there will be inertia|even ex post e￿cient inertia|early movers’
choices determine later adoptions. Thus early movers might strategically
or inadvertently commit to a standard that is bad for later adopters but
won’t be abandoned. We say there is excess early power if early movers
adopt and are followed but this is ex ante ine￿cient: e￿ciency might de-
mand instead that they defer to later adopters’ preferences, or that they
wait. That is, early adopters have excess power if their preferences weigh
too heavily (relative to later adopters’) in the collective choice of what is
adopted.
Such an ex ante problem is sometimes called excess inertia, but we pre-
fer to distinguish it more sharply from the ex post problem discussed above.
They di￿er not only in timing, but in that ex post excess inertia concerns later
adopters’ choices, while ex ante excess early power concerns early adopters’
choices. Excess early power does not imply ex post excess inertia: for in-
stance, with two groups we saw that if group 2 optimally coordinates then
there cannot be ex post excess inertia, but if inter-group network e￿ects are
strong and group 1 optimally coordinates, it has all the power. But the two
concepts re￿ect the same force: the stronger ex post inertia will be, the more
power early adopters have.
Arthur’s model predicts excess early power; foresight complicates but
does not fundamentally change the picture. Moving ￿rst gives commitment:
early adopters are pivotal (early power), and the more they recognize that
later adoptions will have to follow, the less sensitive early adopters will be to
later preferences. Like inertia, early power can be e￿cient but can readily
go too far: with strong network e￿ects, long-run network technology choice
can be determined by ￿rst-mover advantage and by historical small events.141
With positive (not necessarily small) probability, almost all adopters choose
A but total surplus would have been greater had almost all chosen B.142
141Thus it can create a \butter￿y e￿ect:" a butter￿y ￿apping its wings might cause a
hurricane years later and thousands of miles away.
142In principle this might also arise if good A is worth more than B when each network is
71Lock-in could go the other way, in which case foresight weakens early
power: if group 2 ￿nds adopting B a dominant strategy, while group 1 wants
to adopt whatever it expects group 2 to adopt, then group 2 is pivotal.143
But that requires network e￿ects to be strong for group 1 but weak for group
2, so reverse lock-in seems likely to be rarer and weaker than forward lock-in.
Thus Farrell and Saloner (1985) found that, given preferences, each player is
better o￿ moving earlier: this \New Hampshire Theorem" says that earlier
adopters’ preferences get more weight than later adopters’ in the collective
outcome,144 which strongly suggests excess early power.145
In summary, early adopters have the strategic advantage: there is a rea-
sonable presumption of excess early power at the adopter level. As we see
in 3.7.2 below, however, this need not imply that early advantages confer
sustained success when sponsors of competing standards compete using pen-
etration pricing.
3.5.3 Positive Feedback and Tipping
We have seen how early choices are powerful, able either to help coordination
or to wield disproportionate in￿uence. Thus any early lead in adoptions
(whether strategic or accidental) will tend to expand rather than to dissipate.
Network markets are \tippy": early instability and later lock-in.
To explore this, consider a continuum of identical adopters who only
want to coordinate. There are three kinds of static pure-strategy Nash
equilibria: all adopt A, all adopt B, and many splintered equilibria in which
half adopt A and half adopt B (and all are indi￿erent). Now suppose market
shares are randomly perturbed, and at each instant some adopters can change
their move in response to current shares. Then as soon as the shares are
unequal, those who can choose will adopt the majority product; this makes
the half-and-half equilibrium unstable. The point carries over even with
some horizontal product di￿erentiation.146
Although sketchy, such dynamics suggest that re-equilibration by others
small but B is worth more than A when each network is large. As Liebowitz and Margolis
(1994) observe, there is no obvious reason to expect that.
143Holmes (1999) shows how adopters who care less than others about network e￿ects
(relative to their preferences between products, or in his case locations) can lead a tran-
sition. He uses this in explaining the migration of the US cotton textile industry. Large
groups that can successfully coordinate internally are thus prime candidates to be pivotal
movers and get the best deals. Bresnahan (2001) explored this in the context of AOL’s
adoption of Internet Explorer during the Netscape-Microsoft browser war.
144Holding an early primary, as New Hampshire does, gives a state more in￿uence when
bandwagon e￿ects are important in a national election.
145Excess late power (sometimes called ex ante excess momentum) is also possible, be-
cause the outcome depends only on ordinal preferences and not on their intensity.
146With a ￿nite number of adopters rather than a continuum, the same force prevents
equal shares being an equilibrium at all. See e.g. Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1994).
Echenique and Edlin (2004) show that strategic complementarities make mixed-strategy
equilibria unstable, unless adopters have perverse beliefs about how shares will evolve.
72(which is central to indirect network e￿ects) strengthens instability.
Arthur (1989, 1990) and Arthur and Lane (1993) similarly ￿nd that if
prices are ￿xed, and adoption decisions depend only on past adoptions (cur-
rent shares of installed base), then one product or technology will come to
dominate.147148
3.5.4 Option Value of Waiting
We have seen that early adoption can freeze a technology choice and fore-
close what would otherwise be later adopters’ preferred choices. Above,
we asked whether early adopters instead ought to defer to the known pref-
erences of later adopters. When those preferences (and/or later costs) are
not known early on, waiting can thus be e￿cient. Lock-in|even lock-in
to a choice that’s optimal given available information at the time|sacri￿ces
social option value.
Just as future preferences are often under-weighted by market forces,
option value will be. And institutions may be less apt to repair this: it is
probably easier to acquire residual rights in one potential network with a clear
future than to internalize the gains from waiting for something unpredictable.
Whether or not the Dvorak keyboard is better than QWERTY, there clearly
was a chance in 1888 that something better would later appear. How might
incentives at that date incorporate this option value|what would persuade
early generations of typists to wait, or to adopt diverse keyboards, if that
was socially desirable in the long run? In principle the option value might
be internalized by a century-long monopoly on typing so that the monopoly
could price the loss of option value into early adoptions, or by a futuristic
patent on a range of alternative keyboards so that Dr Dvorak’s grandparents
could subsidize waiting or diversity. Even if there had been many individual
long-lived patents on particular keyboards, their proprietors would have faced
a public-good problem in encouraging waiting. These institutions seem far
from reality. It might well not have been e￿cient for nineteenth-century
typists to wait, or to use keyboards they didn’t like, in order to preserve a
more realistic option for a di￿erent design in 1940. But it is hard to think
that the market gave a very good test of whether or not that would have
been desirable.
Sometimes option value could be preserved by making later products
compatible with early adoption. Section 3.8 below discusses incentives to do
this, but clearly early adopters, or a sponsor of a product that they favor, may
not want to ensure compatibility if they expect ex post inertia (excess or not)
under incompatibility, as they gain from excess early power. Indeed, Choi
147In these models, the probability of winning a consumer is a function of prices and
shares of installed base; this assumption is rationalized by horizontal di￿erentiation.
148In Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) and Ellison, Fudenberg and Mobius (2004), there may
be a plateau of non-tipped outcomes from which no player unilaterally wants to move, if
buyers dislike (slightly) outnumbering sellers more than they like being in a bigger market.
73(1994) and Choi and Thum (1998) con￿rm that pre-emption competition for
the New Hampshire ￿rst-mover advantage can make adoption ine￿ciently
fast when moving quickly can drive a bandwagon. Recall however that
adoption may be too slow because of the externality or because early adoption
risks coordination failure.
3.6 Sponsored Price and Strategy for a Single Network
Having discussed the demand side of network markets | adopters’ choices
given the o￿ers they face | we turn to the supply side. This section primarily
discusses a network monopoly, but most of the insights apply equally to a
￿rm trying to establish its standard against a rival standard, as section 3.7
further explores.
A sponsor seeking to establish its network has two generic strategies.
First, it may focus selling e￿ort on pivotal adopters, whose choices strongly
a￿ect others’. In particular, when a network involves di￿erent classes of
adopters (for instance a credit card network that must be adopted by con-
sumers and merchants) a sponsor can choose where to focus its marketing
or price-cutting; and when there are di￿erent adoption dates a sponsor can
choose (subject to commitment issues) when to do so. Second, a sponsor
might seek to visibly commit to ensuring widespread adoption, or otherwise
work on expectations.
3.6.1 Pricing to Di￿erent Groups: Penetration Pricing
First consider separate prices to two classes or groups of adopters with inter-
group network e￿ects.149 These groups might be peers at di￿erent dates
(early and late adopters), or two sides of a market. As Rochet and Tirole
(2002, 2004) and Armstrong (forthcoming) observe, such two-sided markets
include credit cards, brokers, auctions, matchmakers, conferences, journals,
computer platforms, and newspapers.
Suppose ￿rst that the sponsor simultaneously commits to both prices.
Increased sales to one group raise the other group’s demand: the inter-group
marginal network e￿ect. So in broadly Ramsey fashion the optimal price to
group 1 will be lower, the more strongly group 2’s demand responds to adop-
tion by group 1 and the more pro￿table (endogenously) are sales to group 2,
as well as the higher group 1’s own demand elasticity (as usual).150 Thus
a single seller’s optimal prices to the two groups may well be asymmetric;
indeed, one side often pays zero or below cost.151
149We consider only simple prices; Sundararajan (2003) discusses nonlinear pricing with
network e￿ects.
150As we noted in 3.3.2, there may be intra-group network e￿ects (or congestion e￿ects
if the groups are di￿erent sides of a market). These a￿ect the welfare economics, but for
pro￿t-maximizing pricing we can treat each group as a demand curve.
151See for instance Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), Schmalensee (2002), Rochet and
Tirole (2004). As we saw in 3.3.2 above, ￿rst-best prices would be below marginal cost
74At an abstract level this is simply pricing with complementarities, as in
Gillette’s early strategy of giving away razors and making money on blades
(Adams 1978); but here the complementarities are between di￿erent cus-
tomers’ adoption choices. If there is no single sponsor, implementing an
optimal markup structure may require payments between sectors such as the
credit card interchange fees discussed in 3.2; if that’s hard to do well, it can
encourage vertical integration.
With early and late groups the analysis is the same if the seller commits to
a price path. For Ramsey-style reasons, low-then-high penetration pricing is
privately (and can be socially) e￿cient in the usual case where early adopters
are pivotal.
Finally, with early and late groups but no commitment, low-high pricing
is even further encouraged. The seller will predictably set a second-period
price higher than would be optimal ex ante, since ex post it will not take into
account the e￿ect on ￿rst-period adoption. Thus ￿rst-period adopters will
expect a high future price, lowering ￿rst-period demand; and incompatible
competition among sponsors will lower ￿rst-period prices in anticipation of
the ex post rents. All these forces push towards bargain-then-ripo￿ pene-
tration pricing, the reverse of Coasean dynamics.152
That commitment problem puts a sponsored network at a disadvantage
against an open (competitively supplied) network product in the relatively
rare case of reverse lock-in where second-period adopters are pivotal. A
proprietary sponsor might then seek even costly forms of commitment such
as (delayed) free licensing of a technology (Farrell and Gallini 1988, Econo-
mides 1996b). But sellers of an open product cannot recoup investment in
below-cost early prices, so a sponsored product has an advantage when (as is
probably typical) overall adoption responds more sensitively to early prices
than to sophisticated predictions of later prices (Katz and Shapiro 1986a).
3.6.2 Single Monopoly Price
Above, we separated the two roles of p: each adopter viewed the price facing
him in the ordinary way, and based his relevant expectations on the price
facing the complementary group. With switching costs, the ex ante and ex
post prices are similarly separable when locked-in customers buy a distinct
for both groups. Ramsey pricing looks qualitatively similar to pro￿t-maximizing pricing
because the problems are closely related.
152Cabral, Salant, and Woroch (1999) study monopoly penetration pricing of durable
network goods when buyers have rational expectations. In certain classes of example,
they ￿nd that Coase-conjecture price dynamics tend to predominate over penetration
pricing: prices fall rather than rise over time, especially when there is complete informa-
tion. Bensaid and Lesne (1996) ￿nd however that strong network e￿ects remove the
time-consistency Coase problem and cause optimal prices to increase over time. See also
Mason (2000) and Choi (1994a). Radner and Sundararajan (2004) study a network mo-
nopolist’s dynamic pricing problem when adopters expect each period’s network size to be
equal to last period’s; they ￿nd extreme bargain-then-ripo￿ pricing (the monopolist prices
at zero until the network reaches its desired size).
75good such as service; otherwise they may have to be equal, as we discussed in
2.4. Similarly here prices to two sides of a market are presumably separable,
but with two groups of peer adopters they may not be. In that case it is
natural to suppress the two groups and simply study overall demand at the
given price.
The \ful￿lled-expectations demand curve" then matches each price p with
those penetration levels x such that, when adopters expect penetration x,
just x of them will adopt at price p: see e.g. Leibenstein (1950), Rohlfs
(1974), Katz and Shapiro (1985), Economides (1996a). Such a demand
curve is more elastic than each of the ￿xed-expectations curves of which it is
built (Leibenstein 1950). Gabel (1991) suggests that Sony, Betamax’s spon-
sor in VCRs, may have optimized against a less elastic (perhaps short-run)
perceived demand curve because it did not anticipate video-rental network
e￿ects. Monopoly deadweight loss may be more severe with network ef-
fects: monopoly not only deters marginal adoption, but also lowers surplus
of inframarginal adopters.153
Multiple equilibria in adoption at price p now show up as multiple in-
tersections of the demand curve with a horizontal line at p. To pin down
demand at p, one might rule out \unstable" equilibria (at which demand is
upward-sloping); but if there is an unstable equilibrium, there are at least
two stable equilibria. However one selects an adoption equilibrium for each
p, there may well be discontinuous changes in behavior as a parameter such
as cost varies continuously, as in catastrophe theory.154 Even if a network
product only gradually becomes cheaper or better over time, it may suddenly
acquire critical mass and take o￿.155
A strategic monopoly seller might persuade adopters to coordinate on the
largest equilibrium x given p. If so, we say that the seller can \a￿ect expec-
tations" and pick any (xe;p) such that xe is an adoption equilibrium at price
p. The next sub-section discusses some tactics for a￿ecting expectations in
this sense.
3.6.3 Commitment Strategies
Since demand depends on expectations, a network sponsor can gain from
commitment to size, to inspire con￿dence and optimism. Commitment can
153Farrell and Shapiro (1992) argue this in a linear example; but Lambertini and Orsini
(2001), stressing network quality, reach di￿erent conclusions. One problem is that it is not
clear what the demand curve \would be" without network e￿ects. Rysman (2004) shows
that, even if competition involves splintering, it is better than monopoly in his calibrated
model of the market for Yellow Pages.
154Indeed, if the rational-expectations demand curve has an upward-sloping portion,
there is typically no everywhere-continuous selection of adoption equilibrium, even if there
is everywhere a locally continuous selection.
155Rohlfs (2001), Farrell and Shapiro (1992), Economides and Himmelberg (1995),
and Gandal (2000) suggest examples of sudden success that might re￿ect such tipping.
Liebowitz and Margolis (2001) question that interpretation and argue that price and share
dynamics in computer software seem inconsistent with tipping.
76address both the marginal and multiple-equilibrium underadoption problems
identi￿ed in 3.3 above.
One commitment is simply selling products early on. Sellers boast about
(even exaggerate) sales. To be a useful commitment, sales must be visible
and irreversible, so this strategy makes most sense for durables. Network
e￿ects typically arise from use, not from mere possession, so dumping (e.g.,
free) units on the market may be discounted. The most e￿ective sales are
to in￿uential adopters whose adoption will boost others’ by the most.
A blunt early-sales strategy is of course penetration pricing, as discussed
above. As we will see in 3.7 below, competition can induce penetration
pricing as the form of competition for the market. When a monopoly engages
in penetration pricing, however, it would seem to be leaving money on the
table relative to convincing early buyers in some other fashion that the long-
run network size will be large. Thus we focus here on means to commit to
that.
To encourage early adoption, a seller would like to commit to selling
more later than it will then wish to sell, a point made by Katz and Shapiro
(1986a) and put in a broader framework by Segal (1999). This kind of
commitment strategy can operate even when there is a single equilibrium;
commitment shifts the equilibrium. We have already noted some tactics such
as second-sourcing that might help such a commitment. One might model
commitment in a reduced-form way through assumptions about a sponsor’s
strategic variable. Rather than just setting a price, a sponsor might seek to
commit to quantities sold or to the utility it will give each (type of) adopter.
Reputation and general market credibility can help communicate com-
mitment or boost expectations. Another commitment strategy is to open a
standard to guarantee competitive future behavior, increasing early adopters’
expectations of long-run network size. And integration with complementors
might visibly improve incentives for supply of complements, as well as facil-
itate Ramsey-style cross-pricing.
When there are multiple equilibria, some of the same commitment tac-
tics can help ensure a more favorable equilibrium. Rohlfs (2001) develops a
model of irreversible adoption by many small buyers that involves dynamics
at two levels. First, at any time buyers adopt if they want to do so given
prices and given the current installed base, but they lack foresight and the
adoption-equilibrium selection is thus pessimistic: there may be other equi-
libria with more adoption. In the second kind of dynamics, sponsors try
to push the market past critical mass and generate positive feedback. For
instance, a sponsor may dump enough units on the market to enter the basin
of attraction of a preferred equilibrium.
In addition to the use of equilibrium-path price discrimination (pene-
tration pricing), out-of-equilibrium (discriminatory) o￿ers can eliminate an
equilibrium that the seller dislikes, as we discuss next and as Segal and
Whinston (2000) explored in the context of exclusive dealing. As that case
illustrates, these equilibrium-selection tactics can work against buyers when
77networks compete, whereas in the case of a single network both seller and
buyers prefer an equilibrium with more adoption.156
3.6.4 Contingent Contracts
Commitment through contracts could in principle overcome the coordination
problem, as Dybvig and Spatt (1983) noted. Suppose a seller o￿ers buyers
a contract: \The price is p < u(N) if all other buyers also adopt (which
I expect); if not, the price is p0 < u(ni)." Each buyer should accept this
contract whatever he expects other buyers to do. Of course, p0 may have
to be (perhaps far) below cost, so the seller will make a loss if some buyers
reject the o￿er. But in principle success depends only on buyers’ individual
rationality, not on their coordinating.
Likewise, the theory suggests, a contingent contract can pro￿tably attract
buyers away from coordination on the wrong network if a better alternative
has a residual claimant (sponsor). Thus, suppose that buyers expect one
another to adopt A; and that uB(ni) ￿ cB < uA(N) ￿ pA < uB(N) ￿ cB.157
Seller B o￿ers the contract: \If x of you buy B, the price will be uB(x) ￿
uA(N) + pA ￿ k." For k > 0; it is a dominant strategy for each buyer
to accept, and the contract is pro￿table if all buyers do so and k is small
enough. Indeed, as we noted in the previous sub-section, such a contract
may ine￿ciently succeed: Segal (1999) and Jullien (2001) show that, because
adoption of B imposes a negative externality on those who continue to buy A,
there will be excessive adoption of B even if initial expectations favor A, when
B (but not A) can o￿er public ￿exible pricing under complete information.
But Park, I.-U. (2004) applies mechanism-design methods and ￿nds that such
contingent inducement schemes (and a range of other schemes) will induce
less than e￿cient adoption when the seller has incomplete information about
adopters’ tastes.
It is not surprising that some ￿exible contracting can in theory solve
coordination problems.158 At the level of cooperative game theory, network
e￿ects are like ordinary economies of scale: in each case a coalition consisting
of a seller and x buyers achieves more surplus per buyer as x increases.
Indeed, Sutton’s (1998, chapters 14.2 and 15.2) models of network e￿ects
and learning e￿ects are formally identical. Since simple contracts often
enable e￿cient competition with economies of scale (even dynamically if
contestability holds), some contracts would in principle do so with network
e￿ects.159
156The reason is that one player’s adoption of network A hurts|relative to the
alternative|those who adopt B; thus in Segal’s (1999) terms there is a negative externality
on non-traders, leading to con￿ict at equilibrium when o￿ers are public (full commitment
by the seller).
157Recall here that cA is the production cost of good A, etc.
158Thum (1994) also considers how contract form a￿ects e￿ciency.
159One could also reach the same optimistic view via the Coase Theorem.
78Contingent contracts might be di￿erently implemented depending on
whether adopters make a one-time purchase or continue to buy in order
to use the network. When adopters will continue to trade with the seller
over time, penetration pricing can become contingent pricing;160 one version
is usage-based pricing.161 With one-time purchases, a seller might either
charge low prices and later collect top-up fees if the network succeeds, or
charge prices consonant with a successful network, promising refunds if the
network falls short. Refund promises might not be believed, either because
a nascent B-supplier would lack funds for such a large, non-diversi￿able risk,
or because buyers would suspect ￿ne print in the contract.
Despite the advantages of contingent contracts, they do not seem the
norm in network markets.162 Very low, especially negative, prices may be
problematic, as we discussed in section 2, and the nuisance adopter issue is
arguably worse here because network bene￿ts normally hinge on use, not just
possession, of the good. Especially if A is well established, this can make
users’ opportunity costs of adopting B large and hard to observe. Thus
contingent contracts might work better against the single-network chicken-
and-egg problem than to help an entrant displace an established network
rival.
While cost-side economies of scale often do not raise the coordination
issues that we argue are central in network e￿ects, this is not a fact of tech-
nology and preferences: it hinges on the contracts used. Thus contract theory
should play more role in the study of network e￿ects than it has hitherto, and
in particular understanding the use, or lack of use, of contingent contracts
would be an important advance.
3.7 Sponsored Pricing of Competing Networks
In incompatible competition ￿rms vie to control expectations. Competi-
tion will focus on pivotal customers; these are often early adopters|as with
switching costs, where competition is largely for early purchases. Central
questions are whether more e￿cient ￿rms reliably win and whether pro￿ts
re￿ect only their e￿ciency advantage.
160Another view of penetration pricing with one-time purchases is that it is an attempt
at contingent pricing but sacri￿ces part of the surplus from early adopters: they \ought
to" see that the network will succeed and hence be willing to pay a lot, but they don’t.
161Oren and Smith (1981) and Rohlfs (2001). That is, if each adopter’s use of a telecom-
munications product, say, is proportional to the value he derives from it, then tra￿c-
sensitive pricing may solve the chicken-and-egg problem even at the cost of ine￿ciently
deterring usage given network size. See also Carter and Wright (1999).
162Arguably this suggests either that there is no problem to be solved, or that (as we
suspect) the contracts are problematic. See also Innes and Sexton (1994) and Haruvy
and Prasad (2001).
793.7.1 Competition with Cost/Quality Di￿erences
Consider incompatible competition with purely vertical di￿erentiation: either
a cost di￿erence or a quality di￿erence valued equally by all consumers. First
we treat e￿ciency advantages as ￿xed over time; in 3.7.2 we allow them
to vary. Expectations may respond in various ways to quality and price
di￿erences: for instance they may track surplus, track quality, track past
success, or stubbornly favor one ￿rm.163
We say expectations track surplus if each buyer expects all others to buy
the product that, network e￿ects held constant, o￿ers the most surplus. For
instance, suppose ￿rms set prices just once and then there is a sequence of
adoption choices by small cohorts. If adopters have similar preferences (agree
on which product o￿ers them more surplus if all adopt it), one might expect
adoption of that product.164 Price competition then works just as it would
if the products were compatible. The e￿cient product wins, and (with non-
drastic e￿ciency di￿erences) consumers get the same surplus as they would
if the second-best product were o￿ered at average cost and adopted by all.
Consumers capture the network e￿ect and any economies of scale. Quality
competition also is therefore just as under compatibility.165
But this changes dramatically if instead expectations track quality. Al-
though this is a static model, this assumption can be motivated because,
as Katz and Shapiro (1992) showed, this is the equilibrium if sponsors can
adjust prices in response to adoption dynamics: suppose for instance that A
has higher quality (or lower costs), and that this outweighs the network gain
from adoption by a single additional cohort. Then, A will not fail through a
bandwagon e￿ect that starts because a few buyers adopt B instead. Rather,
such a loss will lead A’s sponsor to cut its price to subsequent adopters: it can
pro￿tably do what it takes to win, even coming from a bit behind in installed
base.166 So each adopter will recognize that even if he and his cohort adopt
product B, product A will still win the rest of the market. Since no buyer
is pivotal, the price to any buyer (or cohort) should not a￿ect expectations.
So rational expectations will track quality|focus on the network with higher
quality (or lower costs)|and ignore any period’s prices.
In this case, if A has higher quality it wins current sales if:167 uA(N) ￿
pA ￿ uB(1)￿cB, or pA￿cA ￿ [uA(N)￿uB(N)]+[uB(N)￿uB(1)]￿[cA￿cB].
Its pro￿t is equal to its actual (cost and/or quality) advantage plus the
163These terms are from Farrell and Katz (1998).
164As we saw in 3.4.4, this is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. As we argued
there, this may not be conclusive; but it is one plausible expection.
165Baake and Boom (2001), and Bental and Spiegel (1995) discuss static competition
with network e￿ects and quality di￿erentiation when consumers’ willingness to pay for
quality varies.
166Therefore B will not attempt penetration pricing: there is no follow-on gain to winning
a cohort or two. See Fudenberg et al. (1983) on races without leapfrogging.
167We assume that each adopter is of size 1 and that a losing seller is willing to price
down to cost.
80network e￿ect. If A visibly could make consumers a signi￿cantly better o￿er
than can B, it need not actually match B’s o￿er! Consumers would get
more surplus if they all adopted the losing network B priced at cost.168
Of course, when such lucrative expectations track quality, ￿rms will com-
pete intensely on quality. Consumers gain from additional quality created
by the second highest-quality ￿rm.169 The network e￿ect accrues to the
winner, and/or is dissipated in quality competition, which can therefore be
socially excessive.
Worse, other factors might make consumers expect a product to win the
market even after (out of equilibrium) losing a round or two | making
expectations stubbornly unresponsive to price or performance. For instance,
this logic would focus expectations on a ￿rm that plainly could dramatically
improve its product if necessary|even if it never actually does so. Other
forces might include deep pockets, history or reputation, a convincing road-
map for future products, control of a key complement, control of formal
standards e￿orts, or marketing activity. As we saw, a seller thus favored
by expectations can extract pro￿ts commensurate with the network e￿ects,
and may thus pro￿tably control the market even with an inferior product or
o￿ering | provided, crucially, that its inferiority does not loosen its control
of expectations. Such dysfunctional patterns of expectations may be most
likely where adopters have dissimilar preferences, hindering attempts (e.g.
through talk) to coordinate better.
When expectations thus stubbornly favor one ￿rm, it has monopoly-like
incentives for quality improvement. Its rivals cannot gain from ordinary
innovation. But if B’s quality improves so much that each user will adopt
B no matter what he expects others to do, then adopters should now give
B the bene￿t of expectations. Thus A’s rivals have strong incentives for
dramatic innovation (Grove’s \ten times better").
Thus these models suggest that quality competition can produce stronger
incentives for innovation than monopoly (even ine￿ciently strong incentives),
while expectations-dominant ￿rms have incentives for incremental innovation
and other ￿rms have little incentive for other than breakthrough innovation.
If expectations track past market success, they reinforce installed base
in giving past winners an advantage in future competition. This increases
collective switching costs and accentuates the bargain-then-ripo￿ pattern of
dynamic competition.
168This is an instance of the principle that pivotal adopters get the surplus: when there
are no such buyers, ￿rms can keep the surplus. (Raskovich (2003) argues, on the other
hand, that pivotal buyers ￿nd themselves saddled with the responsibility of ensuring that a
good is actually provided.) In predatory pricing policy, Edlin (2002) discusses how a ￿rm’s
ability to make a better o￿er can forestall the need to do so (to consumers’ detriment).
169As always when competition gives no gross return to investment by a subsequent
\loser", there can be equilibria in which only one ￿rm invests. Thus details of the quality
competition game may be important.
813.7.2 Competition with Cost/Quality Di￿erences that Vary over
Time
Now suppose that competing networks’ e￿ciency advantages may shift over
time. We revisit the inertia questions of 3.5 but now when competing net-
works are strategically priced. In doing so we address the scope for competi-
tive entry (perhaps via penetration pricing) by a sponsored network product
that must come from behind in network size and hence (often) in static ef-
￿ciency, but that might become more e￿cient than an incumbent if widely
adopted.
As we saw in 3.5, if early e￿ciency advantages determine o￿ers to the
pivotal early adopters, then a technology with an early lead will beat a
technology that will (or may) be better later. This is the New Hampshire
Theorem: early power for any given prices. In particular, if each network
is competitively supplied, there is excess early power: a bias toward the one
that early adopters prefer.
Now suppose instead that network sponsors compete for early adopters
through penetration pricing. We describe how competitive penetration pric-
ing can yield e￿cient adoption choices in favorable circumstances. More
realistically, biases can arise in either direction, but we argue that excess
early power remains more likely than its opposite.
Suppose that A has costs at in period t, while B has costs bt, and that
network e￿ects are strong: second-period adopters would follow ￿rst-period
adopters if both products were priced at cost, and will pay r for a product
compatible with ￿rst-period adoption. Finally, suppose that if a ￿rm fails
to win ￿rst-period sales, it exits (it knows it will lose in the second period).
Then A would price as low as a1 ￿ (r ￿ a2) to win ￿rst-period sales, while
B would go down to b1 ￿ (r ￿ b2). Consequently, second-period e￿ciencies
feed through e￿ciently into ￿rst-period penetration pricing, and the ￿rm
that can more e￿ciently provide the good in both periods wins sales in
both periods, if each cohort optimally coordinates internally and ￿rst-period
buyers correctly foresee second-period behavior. In this model, collective
technology choice is e￿cient, and the pivotal (￿rst-period) adopters get the
bene￿t of competition.170
How robust is this optimistic result? Second-period e￿ciency can feed
through more strongly than is e￿cient into ￿rst-period penetration pricing.
In Katz and Shapiro (1986a), a ￿rst-period loser does not exit but continues
to constrain pricing. Thus the second-period prize for which A is willing
to price below its cost in the ￿rst period is b2 ￿ a2 + ￿, where ￿ represents
a network-size advantage;171 similarly B expects a second-period prize of
170Welfare may still be lower than under compatibility if di￿erent products would then
be adopted in di￿erent periods, although ￿rms have an incentive to achieve compatibility
in that case (Katz and Shapiro 1986b; see 3.8 below).
171Speci￿cally, ￿ is the di￿erence in value between a network of all consumers and one
consisting only of second-generation consumers. With strong network e￿ects, ￿ exceeds
second-period cost di￿erences.
82a2 ￿ b2 + ￿ for winning the ￿rst period. So ￿rm A wins ￿rst-period (and
hence all) sales if and only if a1 ￿[b2 ￿a2 +￿] ￿ b1 ￿[a2 ￿b2 +￿]. Second-
period e￿ciency is double-counted relative to ￿rst-period e￿ciency, leading
to excess late power172 despite the excess early power for any given prices:
strategic pricing here reverses the adoption-level bias.
Or feed-through can be weaker than is e￿cient. There is no feed-through
when both standards are unsponsored (￿rms cannot later capture gains from
establishing a product). Uncertainty and capital market imperfections can
weaken feed-through.173 Feed-through is also ine￿cient if ￿rst-period com-
petition is not entirely through better o￿ers but consists of rent-seeking
through unproductive marketing. Feed-through can work e￿ciently even
if consumers do not know why they are getting good ￿rst-period o￿ers, or do
not know the extent of gouging, provided the latter is symmetric. But, as
we saw in Section 2, bargain-then-ripo￿ competition can cause ine￿ciencies.
As Katz and Shapiro (1986a) also noted, when one product is sponsored
but its rival is not, feed-through is asymmetric, biasing the outcome toward
the sponsored product. And, as Farrell and Katz (2005) note, feed-through
is also asymmetric if A would stay in the market for the second period after
losing the ￿rst, but B would exit if it lost the ￿rst round.174
To summarize, at given prices, network e￿ects cause pivotal adopters’
preferences to be over-weighted; since early adopters are often pivotal, prod-
ucts that appeal to them fare better than products that appeal comparably
to later adopters. That is, there is typically excess early power for any given
prices. But relative e￿ciencies in serving non-pivotal adopters may feed
through into prices to pivotal adopters, and thus into the outcome. This
feed-through can be zero (as with unsponsored products), weak, correct (as
in the model above where ￿rst-round losers exit), or excessive (as in Katz
and Shapiro 1986a and Jullien 2001). Nevertheless, in general we think feed-
through seems likely to be too weak, even if buyers optimally coordinate: the
arguments for optimal or excessive feed-through put a lot of weight on ￿rms’
ability to predict future quasi-rents and incorporate them into today’s pric-
ing. Perhaps more importantly, however, feed-through can be asymmetric
for reasons unrelated to the qualities of the competing products, and the
172This is why Katz and Shapiro (1986a) ￿nd excess late power (or \new-￿rm bias") with
sponsored products when network e￿ects are strong. When network e￿ects are weaker,
they found a new-￿rm bias for a di￿erent reason. The (\new") ￿rm with the second-
period advantage certainly would win second-period sales if it won ￿rst-period sales; but
the other ￿rm with the second-period disadvantage might not. The \old" ￿rm would like
to commit to doing so, in order to o￿er ￿rst-period customers a full network, but cannot.
173Feed-through will be weakened (as in switching-cost markets) if ￿rms cannot lower
￿rst-period prices enough to pass through all prospective ex post pro￿ts to the pivotal
early adopters (e.g. because of borrowing constraints, or because negative prices attract
worthless demand).
174Then, A’s second-period prize for winning the ￿rst period is r ￿ a2, but B’s is only
min[r ￿ b2;a2 ￿ b2 + ￿]. Thus if r > a2 + ￿, feedthrough is asymmetric and A wins both
periods if and only if a1 ￿[r ￿a2] ￿ b1 ￿[a2 ￿b2 +￿], or a1 +a2 ￿ b1 +b2 +[r ￿a2 ￿￿].
The last term in brackets is a bias toward the ￿rm with a reputation for persistence.
83asymmetry probably tends to favor established or sponsored products over
nascent or unsponsored ones.
Thus entry by an incompatible product is often hard, and may well be
too hard even given the incumbent’s installed base and given incompatibility.
Switching costs and network e￿ects can work in tandem to discourage in-
compatible entry: switching costs discourage large-scale entry (which would
require the installed base to switch) while network e￿ects discourage gradual,
small-scale entry (o￿ering a small network at ￿rst).
A Switching-Cost Analogy The models above have close switching-cost
analogies, although the switching-cost literature has not stressed e￿ciency
di￿erences between ￿rms. With costs as described above and no network
e￿ects or quality di￿erences but a switching cost s, suppose ￿rst that each
buyer expects to face a second-period price p2 that is independent of which
seller he is locked into. Then of course he will buy the lower-priced product in
the ￿rst period. If he is correct about second-period pricing (for instance, if
his reservation price r is low enough that switching can never pay, so p2 = r),
then seller A is willing to price down to a1 ￿[p2 ￿a2] in the ￿rst period, and
similarly for B. Hence, the ￿rm with lower life-cycle costs makes the sale,
as e￿ciency requires. This is the switching-cost analogy to the model with
exit above.175
But if second-period prices are instead constrained by the buyer’s option
to switch, then A will price at b2 +s in the second period if it wins the ￿rst,
while B will price at a2 + s if it does. If myopic buyers do not foresee
this di￿erence then second-period costs are double-counted relative to ￿rst-
period costs: this is an asymmetric version of the model in 2.2.1 above, and is
the switching-cost analogy to Katz and Shapiro (1986a). Finally, if second-
period prices are constrained by the option to switch and buyers have rational
expectations and know ￿rms’ second-period costs, then the buyer chooses A
only if its ￿rst-period price is at least b2 ￿a2 lower than B’s, and again the
￿rm with lower lifecycle costs wins.
3.7.3 Static Competition when Consumers’ Preferences Di￿er
Without network e￿ects, or with compatibility, horizontal di￿erentiation has
several e￿ects. First, tipping is unlikely: a variety of products make sales.
Second, prices re￿ect each ￿rm’s marginal cost and its market power due to
the horizontal di￿erentiation (in a Hotelling model, for instance, the level of
transport costs). Third, if a seller modestly improves its product, it gets
modestly higher share and pro￿ts.
With strong network e￿ects and incompatibility, all these lessons change.
Buyers want to coordinate and all adopt a single network, though they dis-
agree on which one. If they will succeed in doing so, and if their collective
choice is responsive to changes in quality or price, then ￿rms are competing
175See also section 3.2 of Klemperer (1995).
84for the market, which blunts horizontal di￿erentiation. Thus, strong propri-
etary network e￿ects can sharpen price competition when expectations are
up for grabs and will track surplus;176 Donanoglu and Grzybowski (2004)
contrast this with competition-softening switching costs. Product improve-
ment by the leader does not change market shares; nor does marginal product
improvement by other ￿rms. If price re￿ects cost, it will re￿ect the loser’s
average cost, because the loser is willing to price down that far in competition
for the whole market.
When di￿erentiation is stronger, or network e￿ects weaker, niche minor-
ity products such as Apple can survive. Multiple products can also survive
if network e￿ects are primarily localized within subgroups of adopters, seg-
menting the market. But the strategy of selling only to closely-matching
buyers is less appealing than under compatibility (or than without network
e￿ects), and if network e￿ects strengthen or become less localized, or the
dominant network grows, niches may become unsustainable, as speakers of
\small" human languages are ￿nding and as Gabel (1987) argues was the
case for Betamax.
3.7.4 Dynamic Competition when Consumers’ Preferences Di￿er
Just as excess early power at ￿xed prices need not imply excess early power
when ￿rms compete in penetration pricing, tipping at given prices might not
imply tipping when sponsors price to build or exploit market share. If one
network gets ahead, will its sponsor raise price to exploit that lead and thus
dissipate it, as (recall 2.7.1) happens with switching costs, repeated sales of
a single good, and no price discrimination; or will it keep price low and come
to dominate the market? The literature suggests the answer is ambiguous.
Arthur and Rusczcynski (1992) studied this question when ￿rms set prices
in a many-period dynamic game; Hanson (1983) considered a similar model.
In stochastic duopoly they ￿nd that if ￿rms have high discount rates, a large
￿rm tends to lose share by pricing high for near-term pro￿t. But if ￿rms
have lower discount rates, a large ￿rm sets low prices to reinforce its dominant
position.177
In summary, strong network e￿ects tend to cause tipping or unstable (pos-
itive feedback) dynamics at given prices (including the case of unsponsored
standards and constant costs); sometimes, they also do so where sponsors
strategically set prices.
176Large buyers in oligopoly markets often negotiate discounts in return for exclusivity.
One possible explanation is that a \large buyer" is really a joint purchasing agent for many
di￿erentiated purchases; exclusivity commits the buyer to ignore product di￿erentiation
and thus sharpens price competition.
177Dosi, Ermoliev and Kaniowski (1994) ￿nd that market sharing can occur if ￿rms adjust
prices in response to market shares according to an exogenous non-optimal rule.
853.8 Endogenous Network E￿ects: Choosing How to
Compete
Incompatibility of competing products can be inevitable, but is often chosen.
Why would a ￿rm prefer one form of competition over another?
When ￿rms do not compete, or when competition is equally ￿erce either
way, e￿ciency e￿ects should normally govern: ￿rms internalize e￿ciency ad-
vantages of compatibility choices. But competitive e￿ects modify this, and
can readily reverse it. Finally, when ￿rms disagree on how to compete, who
gets to choose?
3.8.1 E￿ciency E￿ects
Incompatibility has some obvious ine￿ciencies. Network bene￿ts are lost if
some adopters are unwilling to follow the crowd (network e￿ects are weak)
or the market splinters because adopters choose simultaneously or in igno-
rance. If, on the other hand, the market cleanly tips, it worsens matching
of products to consumers when tastes di￿er or if the market tips the wrong
way. When networks’ future relative advantages are uncertain, compatibility
makes switching easier (whether or not inertia is e￿cient given incompatibil-
ity) and thus preserves option value and reduces adopters’ incentives either
to wait and see which network wins or to adopt hastily and pre-empt.
Compatibility can also enable mix-and-match of complements. When the
best hardware and the best software may not come from the same family,
compatibility yields a direct mix-and-match e￿ciency gain.
But compatibility need not be e￿cient. Compatibility may require costly
adapters or impose design constraints that may be severe if a standard re-
quires a slow-moving consensus process. Proprietary control of a standard
can encourage investment in development or in penetration pricing. It thus
makes sense to supplement thinking directly about the pluses and minuses
of compatibility with thinking about ￿rms’ competitive incentives.
3.8.2 Competitive E￿ects
The ￿rst competitive e￿ect is leveling: compatibility neutralizes the compet-
itive advantage of one ￿rm having a larger installed base or being better at
attracting expectations. When ￿rm 1 is larger than ￿rm 2, so x1 > x2, com-
patibility boosts the value of ￿rm 1’s product from u(x1) to u(x1 + x2), and
￿rm 2’s product from u(x2) to u(x1+x2). Since a ￿rm’s pro￿t is increasing in
the value of its own product and decreasing in that of its rival, compatibility
helps the large ￿rm less and hurts it more than it helps or hurts the small
￿rm if we can take the (expected) sizes x1 and x2 as broadly given. So a ￿rm
with a big locked-in installed base, or a ￿rm that is exogenously expected to
be big, is apt to resist compatibility with a smaller but ￿erce rival.178
178See for instance Katz and Shapiro (1985), de Palma and Leruth (1996), Cremer, Rey
and Tirole (2000), and Malueg and Schwartz (forthcoming). Belle￿amme (1998) explores
86Thus the dominant Bell system declined to interconnect with upstart in-
dependents in the early post-patent years of telephone competition in the US,
and Faulhaber (2002, 2003) describes AOL’s failure to interlink with rivals’
instant messaging systems. Borenstein (2003) similarly argues that interline
agreements between airlines, which let customers buy discount tickets with
outbound and return on di￿erent airlines, help smaller airlines much more
than larger ones; interlining has declined over time. Bresnahan (2003) de-
scribes how Word Perfect sought compatibility with the previously dominant
WordStar, but then fought compatibility with its challengers.
Second is the un-di￿erentiating e￿ect. As in 3.7.3, when tipping is likely
and size is (or expectations are) completely up for grabs, incompatibility can
neutralize ordinary horizontal di￿erentiation that would soften price competi-
tion in compatible competition. Even when it is less e￿cient, incompatible
competition can then be sharper. But when tipping is unlikely, incom-
patibility can create horizontal di￿erentiation (segment the market), as in
switching-cost markets.179 Thus ￿rms’ incentives will depend on the likeli-
hood of tipping and on whether expectations are largely exogenous or are
symmetrically competed for. Real-world frictions, including switching costs,
limit short-run shifts of customers (or expectations), and simple network
models that understate such frictions will thus overestimate the strength of
incompatible competition.
Third, if each side has proprietary complements that remain ￿xed inde-
pendent of scale, and compatibility enables mix and match, duopoly models
suggest that ￿rms’ private gains from compatibility exceed the social gains,
but this is less clear with more than two ￿rms (see section 2.8.4). We digress
brie￿y here to discuss the relationship between these mix-and-match models
and indirect network e￿ects.
Indirect Network E￿ects and Mix-and-Match Both indirect network
e￿ects and the mix-and-match literature discussed in 2.8.4 above study mod-
ularity (mix-and-match) versus proprietary complements in a systems mar-
ket, but the two literatures are surprisingly hard to relate; we note some key
di￿erences, but future research should develop a more uni￿ed understanding.
When more customers buy \hardware" of type A, the demand for A-
compatible \software" increases, so there is more pro￿t to be made from
providing such software if entry does not dissipate that pro￿t. The mix-
and-match literature, like the bundling literature (e.g. Nalebu￿ 2000), allows
how the leveling e￿ect varies with the number of ￿rms and with the form (e.g. Cournot
vs Bertrand) of competition. It may be particularly unfortunate if large players resist
compatibility, since they tend to be best at leading bandwagons.
179Augereau, Greenstein and Rysman (forthcoming) ￿nd that when ISPs chose between
incompatible 56kbps modems, there was less compatibility than random choice would im-
ply in each local market. They attribute this to ISPs’ desire for horizontal di￿erentiation,
though it may have been more a switching-cost e￿ect (consumers invested in modems)
than a network e￿ect.
87for this pro￿t increase to be captured by the A-hardware provider through
vertical integration. It then studies pricing and pro￿ts when this fact does
not induce additional entry into A-compatible software.
In contrast, as we discussed in 3.1, the indirect network e￿ect literature
assumes that when more A-hardware is sold, the boost in A-software demand
does induce additional (re-equilibrating) software entry, making A’s hardware
more attractive to customers and thus indirectly increasing hardware pro￿ts.
But a boost in software pro￿ts is not part of this calculation, both because
entry dissipates software pro￿ts and because most models assume there is no
integration.
We also note that with indirect network e￿ects, tipping at the hardware
level increases software variety while reducing hardware variety.180
3.8.3 Institutions and rules: Who chooses?
If participants disagree on compatibility, who chooses? This question arises
at several levels. We pose it primarily as a tussle among competing ven-
dors with di￿erent preferences over how to compete. Another version of
the question pits one vertical layer against another: often customers against
vendors. A third version concerns the various means to achieve network
bene￿ts. Finally, there may be (as in television) compatibility domestically
but not internationally.
i. Horizontal competitors Sometimes side payments can be made
smoothly enough that the outcome is the one that maximizes joint prof-
its. If side payments are ￿xed or one-shot, e￿ciency e￿ects and the feroc-
ity/softness of competition will drive the joint decision. And if ￿rms can
charge one another running royalties for compatibility, that may itself soften
compatible competition. In telecommunications, interconnection (compat-
ibility) is largely compulsory but charges for interconnection are common;
Ennis (2002) shows that the curvature of the network-bene￿t function can
determine equilibrium payments, while Hermalin and Katz (2005) show how
e￿cient carrier-to-carrier pricing depends on demand elasticities. Brennan
(1997) and La￿ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) ask whether competing ￿rms
can use such charges to support monopoly outcomes as noncooperative equi-
libria. Similar concerns may arise if ￿rms agree to include one another’s
intellectual property in a consensus standard or a patent pool, as Gilbert
(2002) stresses.181 But these strategems might be hard to distinguish in
practice from side payments to encourage e￿cient compatibility.
180When indirect network e￿ects are proprietary (mixing and matching is impossible),
tipping at the hardware level tends to improve the match between customers’ software
tastes and the software varieties endogenously provided, by increasing the size of the
winning hardware platform’s market (though tipping worsens hardware matches).
181Firms might also sustain price collusion by threatening to withdraw cooperation on
compatibility.
88In other cases ￿rms choose how to compete noncooperatively without
smooth side payments. As above, any ￿rm wants to o￿er its customers
bigger network bene￿ts, and wants its rival’s customers to get smaller network
bene￿ts. Thus each ￿rm would like to o￿er a one-way converter that gives
its customers the network bene￿ts of compatibility with its rivals’ customers;
but would like to block converters in the other direction.182 In a non-
cooperative framework, then, if any ￿rm can block such a one-way converter
(e.g. through intellectual property or by secretly or frequently changing an
interface), incompatibility results. But if any ￿rm can unilaterally o￿er a
one-way converter, compatibility results.
One can then study incentives for two-way compatibility by thinking
of converters in the two directions as inseparably bundled. If both sides
want compatibility, or if neither does, the question of who chooses is less
prominent. If the ￿rms disagree, incompatibility results if the ￿rm who
dislikes compatibility (typically the larger or expectations-dominant player)
can prevent it, perhaps through intellectual property or through secrecy or
frequent changes of interface.183 MacKie-Mason and Netz (2006) explore
micro-analytics and institutions of such strategies. On the other hand, com-
patibility results if it is easier to imitate than to exclude, as Gabel (1991)
argues it was for auto parts.
With more than two ￿rms, compatible coalitions may compete against
incompatible rivals.184 Extending Katz and Shapiro (1985), Cremer, Rey,
and Tirole (2000) describe a dominant ￿rm’s incentive for targeted (at one
smaller rival) degradation of interconnection even if it has no incentive for
uniform degradation. But Malueg and Schwartz (forthcoming) observe that
a commitment to compatible competition may attract users and deter degra-
dation; Stahl (1982), Dudey (1990), and Schulz and Stahl (1996) similarly
discuss incentives to locate near competitors. Cusumano et al. (1992) sug-
gest that this was important in VHS’s victory over Betamax.
ii. Vertical locus of compatibility choice Network bene￿ts can re-
sult from choices at various vertical layers (see section 3.3.2). The e￿ciency
e￿ects may broadly be the same, but competitive e￿ects may di￿er according
to the vertical layer at which compatibility happens. Many consensus stan-
dards organizations bring together participants from multiple layers, though
few true end users attend. The literature’s focus on competing interests is
a simpli￿cation of the web of interests that results. In particular, end users
182See Manenti and Somma (2002). Adams (1978) recounts how Gillette and others
fought this battle of one-way converters in the razor/blade market.
183 Besen and Farrell (1994) analyze compatibility choice in these terms. Farrell and
Saloner (1992) analyzed e￿ects of two-way converters, and also found that converters can
reduce static e￿ciency; Choi (1996b, 1997b) ￿nds that converters can block the transition
to a new technology. See also David and Bunn (1987), Kristiansen (1998), and Baake and
Boom (2001).
184Axelrod et al. (1995), Economides and Flyer (1998), and Farrell and Shapiro (1993)
also study coalitions in network markets with more than two players.
89often compete with one another less than do the vendors who sell to them,
making it easier for end users than for vendors to agree on standards; but
there are typically many end users, making it hard.
A value-chain layer with a single dominant provider may also be a rela-
tively likely locus for standards. Thus for instance Intel has championed,
even imposed, compatibility in some layers complementary to its dominant
position. In favorable cases, a dominant ￿rm has salutary incentives to
in￿uence complementary layers.
iii. Means to network bene￿ts One way to achieve network ben-
e￿ts is that all the players at one vertical layer of a value chain|perhaps
vendors, perhaps end users|decide to adopt the same design. That in turn
can happen through various mechanisms of coordination, including consensus
agreements and sequential bandwagons, but also including tradition, author-
ity, or the use of sunspot-like focal points. Another path to network bene￿ts
is the use of converters or adapters,185 or the related multi-homing strategies
such as learning a second language.186
iv. International Trade Just as ￿rms might choose incompatibility
for strategic advantage, so too may nations pursuing domestic (especially
producers’) bene￿ts at the expense of foreigners’. As in strategic trade
with economies of scale, one strategy conscripts domestic consumers as a
protected base to strengthen domestic ￿rms in international competition:
incompatibility may be a tool to do so, and Crane (1979) argues that this
was why governments imposed incompatible standards in color television.187
As with competing ￿rms, Jensen and Thursby (1996) note that a country may
prefer compatibility when its standard is behind, but will shift to preferring
incompatibility if it wins. Gandal and Shy (2001) argue that countries
will not choose standards autarky but may ine￿ciently form standardization
unions that exclude some countries (as indeed happened in color TV).188
185See David and Bunn (1990), Farrell and Saloner (1992), and Choi (1994, 1997). Be-
cause converters a￿ect competition between otherwise incompatible networks, they may
be subsidized or provided by sponsors of networks or may be independently supplied. Be-
cause network transitions are not ￿rst-best, strange e￿ects can occur: for instance Choi
shows that they can retard a transition.
186See de Palma et al. Multi-homing is also discussed in the context of two-sided markets
by Rochet and Tirole (2004).
187Farrell and Shapiro (1992), and Rohlfs (2001) discuss this in terms of network e￿ects.
Note also that US high-de￿nition standards however contain many \options," which might
threaten compatibility.
188Walz and Woeckener (2003) also ￿nd forces for ine￿cient incompatibility in trade
policy. Kubota (1999) notes that transfer payments can make this less likely. Adams
(1996), Choi, Lim and Yu (1999), Gandal (2002), Matutes and Regibeau (1996), and
Klimenko (2003) also study trade policy with network e￿ects.
903.9 Network E￿ects and Policy
Economists disagree on the strength and e￿ciency of incompatible compe-
tition. In our judgment, this largely re￿ects di￿erent views on how well
adopters coordinate in the presence of network e￿ects.189
Optimists expect that adopters can ￿nd ways to coordinate on shifting to
any better o￿er that might be available: bandwagon leadership, communi-
cation (including through standards organizations), and penetration pricing
all help. In a static framework, such good coordination makes the market
behave as if there were a single adopter. Relative to compatible competition,
incompatible competition then sacri￿ces variety but neutralizes horizontal
di￿erentiation, sharpening competition (possibly even making it ￿ercer than
compatible competition). In a dynamic framework adopters often invest in
the standard they adopt, creating individual switching costs. These can in-
teract with network e￿ects to create large collective switching costs, but (as
we saw in the simplest models of section 2) a switching-cost market may per-
form tolerably well, giving adopters up-front the quasi-rents that will later
be gouged out of them.190 Thus in the optimists’ view, competition for the
market works well, both in a static framework and dynamically.191
Pessimists see coordination as more likely to fail, or to succeed only by
tracking cues other than adopter surplus, notably history. That implies
several layers of pessimism about markets with proprietary network e￿ects.
First, both splintering and coordination on the \wrong" standard are pos-
sible, so that adopters collectively may fail to take the best deal o￿ered.
Second, because o￿ering better deals is thus unreliable as a way to win the
market, sponsors focus more on attracting expectations in other ways and
on arranging to extract more rent if they do win { so sponsors o￿er less good
deals. Third, if expectations track history rather than surplus, collective
switching costs come to include the value of network e￿ects, cementing us
into what can be badly outdated (or just bad) standards.
Fourth, the strong competitive advantage conferred on a ￿rm that at-
tracts adopters’ expectations opens up new avenues for mischief. Exclusive
dealing may be especially problematic (see Shapiro 1999), and product prean-
nouncements by incumbents can block e￿cient entrants’ \narrow windows"
189Pessimists include David (1985) and Arthur (e.g., 1989) who contend long-run tech-
nology choice is ine￿ciently driven by accidental short-run small events. Liebowitz and
Margolis (e.g., 1994, 1998a,b) are famously optimistic. Between these extremes, Bresna-
han (2003) suggests that in the computer industry long periods of lock-in are punctuated
by occasional "epochs" of competition for the market when barriers due to network ef-
fects and switching costs are much lower than usual because of a shift of the incumbent’s
standard or a strong independent complement.
190With individual switching costs, this broadly applies to each adopter. With network
e￿ects and collective switching costs, the up-front bargains are targeted on pivotal (typi-
cally early) adopters; other adopters may only experience the later rip-o￿s.
191Demsetz (1968) is often cited on competition for the market, although the idea goes
back to Chadwick (1859). Contestability (Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1988)) is closely
related.
91of opportunity. There is more than usual scope for predation if, as seems
likely, expectations tend to center on the products of a powerful incumbent
￿rm, because achieving the status of dominant incumbent will be especially
pro￿table (making recoupment more likely, for instance) even after a more
e￿cient rival attempts (re-)entry. And (whether or not incompatible entry
would be e￿cient) the di￿culty of entry, especially gradual or small-scale
entry, sharpens other competitive concerns. For instance, a merger among
incumbents who would jointly control an established standard may do more
harm than a similar merger if entrants could be compatible.192
If proprietary network e￿ects coupled with imperfect coordination cre-
ates competitive problems, might those problems be addressed directly? Of
course, but doing so e￿ectively is very hard because the dynamics of markets
with proprietary network e￿ects are complex. For example, recognizing that
product preannouncements can be anticompetitive in such a market does
not point to any reliably helpful policy interventions; banning or controlling
product preannouncement is obviously problematic.193 Likewise, conven-
tional anti-predation policy starts from a suspicion of below-cost pricing; but
in network industries below-cost pricing early on or to pivotal adopters is a
big part of incompatible competition, just as with individual switching costs.
Thus, addressing the problems directly is probably not enough.
Still taking as given that there will be incompatible competition, a more
promising approach probably is to help adopters coordinate better. Infor-
mation policy (helping adopters know what they’re choosing), or contract
policy (enforcing sponsors’ promises) may help; because of the externalities
among adopters, private incentives to research alternatives or to extract and
enforce promises may well be too low.194 Sensibly, policy generally seems
recently to be moving to protect standard-setting organizations’ ability to
help focus adopters’ expectations. In particular, these organizations have
been lamentably spooked by fear of antitrust complaints (notably for taking
account of the pricing of patent licenses), and we applaud policies to assuage
that fear and to help them protect themselves against patent \trolls" whose
patents have inadvertently been written into consensus standards.195
192Robinson (1998) describes concerns that the MCI-Worldcom combination would have
so large a share in the internet backbone market that it might pro￿tably deny e￿cient
interconnection. Cremer et al (2000), Dewatripont and Legros (2000), Ennis (2002), and
Malueg and Schwartz (forthcoming) discuss the economics of this concern.
193Farrell and Saloner (1986) and Haan (2003) explore the anticompetitive potential of
preannouncements or vaporware; Dranove and Gandal (2003) found preannouncement
had a signi￿cant e￿ect in DVDs. Fisher (1991) and others have stressed the di￿culty of
crafting good policies to address this concern.
194Large, forward-looking buyers can also take into account the e￿ects of their purchases
on future market power. For example, government procurement might sensibly eschew
o￿ers by sponsors of proprietary networks (e.g. Microsoft) that are more attractive in the
short run (e.g., cheaper, or come with free training) than competing open networks (e.g.
based on Linux) if the latter would bene￿t future competition.
195Since much of the harm from hold-up is borne downstream, standards organizations
have insu￿ciently strong incentives to avoid these problems (e.g. by requiring disclosure in
92But we think that even with such policies adopters will often not coordi-
nate well enough to make incompatible competition work e￿ciently. So the
best policy may be to encourage compatibility and compatible competition.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that|in large part because of the
problems above|the incentives of ￿rms, especially dominant ￿rms, are often
biased towards incompatibility.196 Denial of compatibility is pro￿table if this
allows a ￿rm to retain adopters’ expectations and remove them from rivals.
Sometimes government should mandate a standard to ensure compatibil-
ity, just as other organisations often impose internal compatibility (indeed
￿rms enforce internal compatibility by ￿at more often than governments),
and so avoid splintering or confusion or ine￿cient variety. Most nations
do this in broadcasting, all insist that everyone drive on the same side of
the road,197 and many mandate mobile phone standards. But government
should not always seek rapid standardization when the merits of compet-
ing standards are unclear. Considerations akin to biodiversity can suggest
prolonging rather than cutting short market experimentation; the case for
mandated standardization is strongest when technological progress is unlikely
(as with weights and measures standards, which side of the road to drive on,
or currency).198 Moreover, government may be inexpert, and standards may
need to evolve, and (partly as a result) compliance may not be clear. So
governments wisely, we think, seldom intervene to displace an established
standard because it was thought ine￿cient. (And when they do change a
standard it is typically to replace a previously mandated standard|as with
weights and measures, driving-sides, and currencies|rather than to second-
guess a previous market choice.)
advance and "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND) licensing). For similar reasons
there can be an incentive for ￿rms to agree to charge one another running royalties for
compatibility, perhaps by agreeing to incorporate one another’s intellectual property in a
standard: see Gilbert (2002) and La￿ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b).
196When network e￿ects are indirect, compatibility is part of the broader question of
vertical openness: if A wants to complement B, can B say no, or set terms such as exclu-
sivity? The \one monopoly rent theorem" that suggests B will choose an e￿cient policy
(because having better complements makes its product more appealing) can fail for a range
of reasons (such as price discrimination, see e.g., Farrell and Weiser 2003), even absent
network e￿ects. But with indirect network e￿ects, vertical integration creates particular
concerns if independent complementors can be important potential entrants, as Bresnahan
and Greenstein (1999) argue in the computer industry (the trial court in the US Microsoft
case echoed this logic with its proposed remedy of breaking up Microsoft into an operating
system company and one that would initially sell applications, though the appeals court
overturned this).
197Failure to say which side of the road people should drive would induce confusion (see
3.4 above), and saying \drive on the right" without enforcement leads to ine￿cient variety
(those drivers that buck the norm may take account of their own sacri￿ce of compatibility
bene￿ts, but they also spoil those bene￿ts for others).
Besen and Johnson (1986) argue that government failure to set a standard in AM stereo
led to splintering.
198Cabral and Kretschmer (2006) ￿nd that in Arthur’s (1989) model it is ambiguous
whether policy should retard or accelerate lock-in.
93We are therefore most enthusiastic about facilitating, rather than directly
requiring, compatibility. Standards organisations help when all want to coor-
dinate, but when powerful players resist compatibility we are sympathetic to
policies that give more power to complementors and competitors who want
compatibility, in the analysis of 3.8. Thus telecommunications policy gives
competitors the right of interconnection on regulated terms, and the EU and
increasingly the US have done this for computer software.199 Firms often
enforce incompatibility through intellectual property that may have little
or no inherent innovative value; in such cases, we favor a right to achieve
compatibility despite the intellectual property.
How do these lessons and views relate to those we suggested for switching-
cost markets in 2.9 above? In antitrust terms, incompatible competition with
network e￿ects tends to increase the risks of exclusion, whereas incompatible
competition with switching costs is more apt to soften competition. But in
both cases we emerge with a cautious preference for compatible competition,
which often has direct e￿ciency bene￿ts and is apt to be more competitive.
Firms’ own incentives somewhat align with direct e￿ciency e￿ects but (espe-
cially for dominant ￿rms) often include competitive e￿ects with the \wrong
sign." Thus one might especially suspect that ￿rms have picked incompati-
bility ine￿ciently if compatibility would be low-cost or would even save costs
directly, or if a ￿rm imposes incompatibility while its rivals seek compatibil-
ity.
4 Conclusion
Switching costs and network e￿ects create fascinating market dynamics and
strategic opportunities. They link trades that are not readily controlled by
the same contract: future trades in the case of switching costs, and trades
between the seller and other buyers in the case of network e￿ects. We have
stressed that the result can be e￿cient competition for larger units of business
{ \competition for the market". Thus neither switching costs nor network
e￿ects are inherently and necessarily problematic. But they very often make
competition, perhaps especially entry, less e￿ective. So we favor cautiously
pro-compatibility public policy. And policymakers should look particularly
carefully at markets where incompatibility is strategically chosen rather than
inevitable.
199See Lemley and McGowan (1998a), Menell (2002), and Samuelson and Scotchmer
(2002). But Llobet and Manove (2006) argue that because incumbents may build smaller
networks if entrants can share them, R&D subsidies are better policy than compatibility
rights. Kristiansen and Thum (1997) stress that network size is a public good in compatible
competition.
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